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The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates debt-financed share repurchases. We find 
that debt-financed share buybacks generate positive short-term and long-run 
abnormal stock returns. Leveraged buyback firms have more debt capacity and lower 
growth prospects ex ante, increase leverage and reduce investments more sharply ex 
post than cash-financed buyback firms. Firms that are over-levered ex-ante are 
associated with lower returns and real investments following leveraged buybacks. 
The lower announcement returns are concentrated on firms with weaker corporate 
governance. Leveraged buybacks also have lower completion rates than cash-
financed buybacks. The evidence is consistent with leveraged buybacks enabling 
firms to optimize their leverage, on average benefiting shareholders. The benefits 
decrease with a firm’s leverage ex ante. 
 
The second essay (Chapter 3) studies the effect of the Supreme Court landmark 
Citizens United decision on how firms adjust their political activism under the 
constraints imposed on them by institutional investors. The essay shows that firms 
with more political connections have lower announcement returns, which are 
concentrated in firms with high institutional ownership. Furthermore, firms 
headquartered in states with corporate campaign contribution bans before Citizens 
United have relatively fewer state political connections afterwards. This result is 
concentrated in firms with low institutional ownership. The evidence is consistent 
with institutional investors’ preference to not use the new avenue of political 
activism. 
 
The third essay (Chapter 4) tests the dividend catering theory proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) by using the Internet search volume for dividend-related keywords 
as a direct measure of investors’ dividend sentiment. We find that firms initiate or 
increase dividends when the dividend sentiment is stronger. These effects are 
concentrated on firms located in high dividend sentiment states. They are robust after 
controlling for firm characteristics, risk, and the dividend premium. Our results are 












The thesis consists of three essays on empirical corporate finance. Chapter Two 
investigates debt-financed share repurchases and studies whether or not leveraged 
buybacks are consistent with shareholder value maximization and economic 
efficiency. Chapter Three examines how corporations adjust their political activism 
in response to the Citizens United ruling and the constraints imposed on them by 
institutional investors. Chapter Four tests the dividend catering theory proposed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b) by using the Internet search volume for dividend-related 
keywords as a direct measure of investors’ dividend sentiment. 
Over the past decade share repurchases have become a dominant payout method 
for firms to return excess cash to shareholders (Skinner (2008)). Previous research 
shows that share repurchases are value-enhancing for shareholders, both in the short-
term and the long-run (Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)).  
In Chapter Two, we study whether or not leveraged buybacks are consistent with 
shareholder value maximization and economic efficiency. In leveraged buybacks the 
cash paid out to shareholders is raised from debtholders, which has a larger impact 
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on a firm’s leverage than cash-financed buybacks. Hence from a standard tradeoff 
view of optimal capital structure, firms might conduct leveraged buybacks to 
optimize their leverage, which in turn benefits shareholder value. On the other hand, 
the adjustment in capital structure associated with leveraged buybacks may increase 
a firm’s debt beyond its optimal level and raise the probability of bankruptcy sub-
optimally.  
Empirically, we find that leveraged buybacks on average add value to 
shareholders. Under-levered firms with declining growth prospects and substantial 
debt capacity repurchase shares via issuing debt to optimize their leverage. To our 
best knowledge our study is the first attempt to analyze leveraged buybacks. 
On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision on 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserting for the first time that 
corporations, like individuals, benefit from First Amendment protection regarding 
freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures. In practice, the 
ruling lifts prior bans on corporations to use their treasury to advocate in favor or 
against a political candidate on a federal election, so called independent expenditures 
on express advocacy. Representing the most dramatic change regarding the role of 
corporations in campaign finance in the U.S. since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 that 
prohibited corporations from making any expenditure in connection to federal 
elections, Citizens United provides a natural experiment setting to study how 
corporations adjust their inputs to political activism. 
In Chapter Three, we examine how corporations adjust their inputs to political 
activism in response to the Citizens United ruling. We ask how investors assess the 
impact of the ruling for corporations already engaged in other forms of political 
activism and whether the market response to Citizens United depends on having 
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institutional investor owners that may be engaged in political activism themselves. 
We find that firms with more political connections have lower announcement returns. 
The lower returns are concentrated on firms with high institutional ownership. 
Further, using variation in state campaign finance laws, we show that firms 
headquartered in states with corporate campaign contribution bans prior to Citizens 
United have fewer state political connections after Citizens United relative to a 
control group. This result appears concentrated on firms with low or no institutional 
ownership. Our results are consistent with many institutional investors objecting to 
the use of independent expenditures and fighting vigorously for greater disclosure of 
campaign finance since the Court ruling.  
An emerging literature in corporate payout policy examines the potential driver 
of firm’s dividend policy. In particular, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) provide a 
catering explanation. They propose that investors have time-varying demand for 
dividend-paying stocks and managers cater to investor demand. Academic scholars 
then apply the catering theory to dividend increase or decrease (Li and Lie, 2006) 
and share repurchases (Jiang, Kim, Lie, and Yang, 2013; Kulchania, 2013).  
Empirical research on the catering effect of corporate payout policy has typically 
used dividend/repurchase premium to measure investor demand. The 
dividend/repurchase premium is defined as the difference between the logs of the 
value-weighted market-to-book ratio of dividend payers (share repurchasers) and 
nonpayers (non-repurchasers). However, most academic authors interpret market-to-
book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities, making it difficult to cleanly interpret 
the dividend premium as a measure of investor demand for dividends. It would offset 




In Chapter Four, we study how the time-variation in investors’ dividend attitudes 
affects firm’s dividend policy. We conjecture that investors’ attention to dividend-
paying stocks may motive managers to change firm’s dividend policy consequently. 
In particular, we posit that managers initiate or increase (cut) dividends when 
investors search more (less) on dividends via Internet. To test the conjecture, we 
develop a direct measure of dividend sentiment using the Internet search volume for 
dividend-related keywords. We find that managers cater to the time-varying investor 
demand for dividends. Managers initiate or increase (cut) dividends when retail 
investors have stronger (weaker) dividend sentiment. These effects are concentrated 
on firms located in high dividend sentiment states. Results are robust after 























2.1  Introduction 
“Corporate America is increasingly turning to debt to fund stock repurchases. 
Some investors view even debt-financed stock buybacks as a form of returning cash 
to shareholders—except, it isn’t!” -  CNBC (8th November 2011)  
Share repurchases have become a dominant payout method for firms to return 
excess cash to shareholders (Skinner (2008)). Previous research shows that share 
repurchases are value-enhancing for shareholders, both in the short-term and the 
long-run (Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Gong, 
Louis, and Sun (2008), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). One of the key explanations is 
that managers convey favorable information to the market by buying back 
undervalued stocks (Vermaelen (1981), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000)). Another explanation is that payouts in the form of share repurchases from 
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firms with declining investment opportunities reduce the agency cost of free cash-
flows (Jensen (1986), Grullon and Michaely (2004)).1  
Over the past decade it has been increasingly popular for firms to finance their 
share repurchase programs by issuing debt, which generates controversy. In 
leveraged buybacks the cash paid out to shareholders is raised from debtholders, 
which has a larger impact on a firm’s leverage than cash-financed buybacks. On the 
one hand, share buybacks from undervalued firms may convey favorable information 
to the market even if they are financed by debt, mitigating problems of information 
asymmetry or market undervaluation. Issuing debt to finance share buybacks also 
reduces the agency cost of free cash-flows as money borrowed is paid back over time. 
In addition, it may save taxes for companies as interest payments are tax-deductible, 
or because it is costly to repatriate cash trapped overseas.2 Hence from a standard 
tradeoff view of optimal capital structure, firms that are ex-ante under-levered, with 
substantial debt capacity, or with declining future growth options may conduct 
leveraged buybacks to increase tax benefits or reduce agency costs of free cash-
flows.3 Therefore, we hypothesize that firms conduct leveraged buybacks to optimize 
their leverage, which in turn benefits shareholder value. For example, Jim Turner, 
head of debt capital markets at BNP Paribas, said in an interview: “If a company has 
debt capacity at its current ratings, and it makes sense from a capital optimization 
point of view, share repurchases with bond proceeds still make good sense.” (Reuters, 
6th September 2013). 
                                                            
1Other motives of share repurchases include wealth expropriation from bondholders (Bradley and 
Wakeman (1983), Maxwell and Stephens (2003)), takeover defenses (Bagwell (1991), Billett and Xue 
(2007)), and inflation of earnings per share (Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002)). 
2 For example, Ebay was criticized by investors for repatriating cash trapped overseas to repurchase 
shares and paying $3 billion in taxes. (The Wall Street Journal, 29th April, 2014). 
3 For example, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) show that leverage is negatively associated with future 
growth and does not reduce growth for firms with good investment opportunities. 
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On the other hand, the informational, agency and tax benefits of leveraged 
buybacks may decrease with ex-ante leverage of a firm. It is likely that leveraged 
buybacks lead to excessive debt, which is detrimental to firm value. The adjustment 
in capital structure associated with leveraged buybacks, which is akin to a debt-for-
equity swap, may increase a firm’s debt beyond its optimal level and raise the 
probability of bankruptcy sub-optimally. 4  It may also lead to investment-related 
agency issues such as the debt overhang problem, where a positive net-present-value 
project is not invested in and firm value is destroyed (Myers (1977)). Hence we 
hypothesize that ex-ante over-levered firms are associated with lower returns and 
sharper decline in real investments following leveraged buybacks. In an article titled 
“Share buybacks: corporate cocaine”, the Economist magazine argues in its 13th 
September 2014 issue “Some firms may be borrowing too much to pay for their 
buyback habit… Shareholder capitalism is about growth and creation, not just 
dividing the spoils.”  
This paper studies whether or not leveraged buybacks are consistent with 
shareholder value maximization and economic efficiency. We collect a 
comprehensive sample of debt-financed repurchases in the U.S. from 1994 to 2012. 
For comparison we also construct a sample of share repurchases that explicit state 
that they are cash-financed for the same period. In addition, we match them to 
samples of non-repurchasing firms with similar characteristics to calculate abnormal 
changes in firm performance. Our cash-financed buyback firms have comparable 
firm characteristics to those reported in the buyback literature (Lie (2005), Massa, 
Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007), Grullon and Michaely (2004)).  
                                                            
4 Moody’s Investor Service reports that rating agencies often reacted leveraged buybacks or debt-
financed dividends less favorably than debt used for other corporate purposes (CFO Journal, WSJ, 
25th March 2013). For instance, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Lowe Cos.’s debt two levels 




We find positive short-term market reactions for debt-financed repurchases. The 
average three-day abnormal return for debt-financed repurchases is 2.2%, which 
suggests that leveraged buybacks send a positive signal to the stock market initially. 
In addition, there are significantly negative abnormal returns in the six months prior 
to the repurchase announcements. The market reacts less favorably for leveraged 
buybacks than cash-financed ones. We also find positive long-term stock 
performance following leveraged buybacks. For the next three years following the 
announcements, the abnormal return for leveraged buybacks is 82 basis points per 
month (10% per annum). This suggests that leveraged buybacks, on average, benefit 
shareholders.  
We next examine whether the benefits from leveraged buybacks depend on ex-
ante firm characteristics such as leverage, free cash-flows and cash holdings. In our 
sample, 74% of leveraged buyback firms have substantial unused debt capacity and 
81% are estimated to be under-levered ex ante. For those under-levered firms, the 
average pre-repurchase debt ratio (13%) is substantially below the average target 
debt ratio (25%). This suggests that under-levered firms utilize their unused debt 
capacity to repurchase shares. Four years after the buyback announcements, the debt 
ratio is 6.4% higher than that before repurchase announcements. The permanent 
increase in leverage is consistent with our leverage optimization hypothesis. 
However, firms are over-levered ex-ante in a small segment of the leveraged 
buyback market (19% of our sample). 
We find that the average three-day abnormal returns and long-run stock 
performance of over-levered firms are lower than those of under-levered firms, 
supporting that the benefits of leveraged buybacks decrease with a firm’s leverage ex 
ante. In addition, 73% of leveraged buyback firms have ex-ante cash holdings below 
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the estimated optimal level. But free cash-flows and excess cash holdings do not 
explain the differences in market reactions to leveraged buybacks and to cash-
financed buybacks. 
After share buybacks, firms experience a decline in real investments, similar to 
those reported by Grullon and Michaely (2004). More importantly, we find that 
leveraged buyback firms have lower ex-post investments than matched non-
repurchasing peers. The decline in real investments is larger for leveraged buybacks 
than that for cash-financed ones. The reduction is also sharper for firms that are 
over-levered ex ante. More specifically, we find a 5.5% (1.1%) decline in abnormal 
investments for over-levered (under-levered) firms, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
Firms with lower future growth options may conduct leveraged buybacks from a 
leverage optimization point of view. To examine whether the sharper reduction in 
investments is related to declines in future growth options, we then follow Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) to measure a firm’s growth prospects. We 
find that the growth prospects for leveraged buyback firms are significantly lower 
and decline more sharply than those for cash-financed repurchasing firms. However, 
changes in growth prospects following leveraged buybacks do not explain the lower 
announcement returns and sharper decline in ex-post real investments that are 
associated with over-levered firms. Instead, we find that weaker corporate 
governance explains the lower announcement returns for over-levered firms. 
In addition, debt-financed repurchases exhibit lower completion rates than cash-
financed ones. We do not find significant differences in ex-post operating 
performance and financial distress risk between debt- and cash-financed buybacks. 
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Our paper contributes to the following strands of literature. First, we contribute 
to the share repurchase literature (Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995), Grullon and Michaely (2004)) by showing that leveraged 
buybacks on average benefit shareholders. Firms with declining growth prospects 
and substantial debt capacity optimize leverage by conducting leveraged buybacks. 
The informational, agency and tax benefits decrease with a firm’s leverage ex ante. 
Financing buybacks by debt affects the motivations, short-term market reactions, 
long-run performance, real investments and completion rates of repurchase programs. 
To our best knowledge our study is the first paper analyzing leveraged buybacks. 
Second, our paper adds to the literature on debt-for-equity swap. Cornett and Travlos 
(1989) analyze a sample of 40 firms proposing debt-for-equity exchanges and find 
positive market reactions. We report positive abnormal returns for leveraged 
buybacks in which a firm simultaneously increases debt and reduces equity. Third, 
our study is also related to the literature on sources of financing of corporate 
financial transactions such as takeovers (Schlingemann (2004), Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009)). 5  We show that the sources of financing matter for share 
buybacks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our 
data and methodology. Section 2.3 reports our empirical results and Section 2.4 
concludes. 
 
2.2  Data 
                                                            
5 Schlingemann (2004) analyzes the relation between the source of funds available before a takeover 
and the potential bidder gains. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show that bidder’s pecking order 
preference, the corporate governance environment and firm’s potential growth opportunities together 
determine the financing decision in takeovers.   
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We collect our initial sample of common stock repurchases from the Securities 
Data Company (thereafter SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. Our sample 
contains buybacks announced between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2012. The 
time period is chosen from 1994 as SEC’s EDGAR Database starts providing 
comprehensive filings for buyback firms. SDC reports the “source of funds used to 
finance deal” if firms disclose relative information via corporate filings, news or 
other related sources. A share repurchase is defined as a debt-financed one if it is 
partially or fully financed by debt. 
To verify the reliability of the data, we collect information from SEC’s EDGAR 
Database and manually check the corporate filings i.e. 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K for each 
repurchase. We classify a repurchase as a debt-financed one only if the filings 
explicitly say that the firm expects to use debt to fund the share repurchase.6 Several 
categories of debt financing are mentioned to finance buybacks in the filings, 
including revolving credit facility, bridge loan, borrowing, line of credit or debt 
offering etc. However, details of the exact source of financing for each leveraged 
buyback are unavailable. Similarly, we define a repurchase as a cash-financed one if 
the firm explicitly states that cash or internal fund is used to finance the repurchase 
program.7  The above procedures lead to 277 debt-financed repurchases and 433 
cash-financed repurchases. 
                                                            
6 For example, we define the following repurchase as a debt-financed repurchase. Below is extracted 
from the Current-Event (8-K) filing of Dollar General Corp: “In connection with its previously 
announced $500 million common stock repurchase program, on March 25, 2012 Dollar General 
Corporation entered into an agreement with Buck Holdings, L.P. to repurchase from it approximately 
$300 million in shares of common stock concurrent with, and conditional upon, the completion of a 
contemplated underwritten secondary offering of shares by certain selling shareholders. Dollar 
General expects to fund the share repurchase with borrowings under its asset-based revolving credit 
facility.”  
7For example, we define the following buyback as a cash-financed repurchase. Below is derived from 
the Current-Event (8-K) filing of Extreme Networks Inc. :“Extreme Networks, Inc. (Nasdaq: EXTR) 
today announced its Board of Directors has authorized the repurchase of common stock worth up to 
$75 million which may be purchased over the next three years from time to time in the open market or 
in privately negotiated transactions. Extreme Networks will fund the share repurchases from cash on 
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We obtain stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
files. Accounting variables are collected form Compustat and we require that 
financial variables of each firm are available in Compustat in the year prior to the 
share repurchase. We winsorise all control variables of firm characteristics at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Our summary statistics of firm characteristics are comparable to 
the literature (Lie (2005), Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007)). The summary 
statistics will be discussed in Section 2.2.6. The sample for cross-sectional analysis 
consists of 218 debt-financed repurchases and 357 cash-financed repurchases from 
1994 to 2012.  
 
2.2.1 Measuring Abnormal Stock Returns 
We measure the short-term market reaction using the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) from day −1 to day +1 where day 0 is the announcement date 
of a share repurchase. We use the market model to measure expected returns and the 
CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. The estimation period ends 
46 days before the repurchase announcement and we require the minimum 
(maximum) estimation length to be 15 (255) days.  
We estimate the long-run abnormal returns after the buyback announcement 
using the calendar-time portfolio approach and Ibbotson’s (1975) Returns Across 
Time and Securities (RATS) method. For the calendar-time portfolio approach, we 
form an equally-weighted portfolio which includes firms that made a buyback 
announcement in the previous 12, 24 or 36 months in each calendar month. The 
composition of the portfolio varies each month and the average monthly abnormal 
                                                                                                                                                                        
hand, which was approximately $200 million as of September 30, 2012. As of August 6, 2012, there 
were approximately 95 million shares of common stock outstanding.”   
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return of the portfolio (the intercept) is estimated based on the Fama-French three-
factor model: 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (1) 
Where Rt stands for the portfolio return in month t, HML and SMB denote the 
returns on book-to-market and size factor-mimicking portfolios. Rmt is the stock 
market benchmark return, Rft is the monthly risk-free return, and 𝛼  captures the 
monthly risk-adjusted return. 
Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method allows firm risk to change over time. Following 
the literature (Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), cross-sectional regressions are 
estimated for each month after buyback announcements: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    𝑡 = 1, … . . ,36   (2) 
  Where i stands for each buyback firm, t denotes the number of months following an 
announcement date. 𝛼𝑡 captures risk-adjusted abnormal return in time t. 
 
2.2.2 Measuring Abnormal Investment & Operating Performance 
We measure a firm’s investment as the capital expenditure (item 145 in 
Compustat) divided by total assets (item 6).  We construct a control sample of non-
repurchasing firms matched by investment, industry and size. For each repurchasing 
firm, the matched non-repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with 
both pre-repurchase investment and book value of assets in year −1 within ±20% of 
those of the repurchasing firm. Among those firms satisfying the above criteria, the 
matched firm is the one with the least deviations from the repurchasing firm.8 If no 
firms meet the criteria, we relax the industry criterion to one-digit SIC code. The 
                                                            
8 The score function is defined as: 
(|Investmentyear−1,sample firm − Investmentyear−1,matched firm|)/Investmentyear−1,sample firm+ 
(|Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm − Total Assetsyear−1,matched firm|)/Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm  
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abnormal investment of a repurchasing firm is defined as its capital-expenditure-to-
assets ratio minus that of its matched firm. 
Operating performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which is defined 
as operating income before depreciation (item 13) divided by book assets at the 
beginning of the year (item 6). This is calculated over the eight quarters after the 
repurchase announcement quarter (Lie (2005), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), Chen 
and Wang (2012)). Prior research (Fama and French (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2000)) shows that pre-announcement performance characteristics and 
market-to-book ratio predict future operating performance. Hence we select the 
matched sample of non-repurchasing firms based on prior operating performance, 
market-to-book ratio, industry and size.  
The non-repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both 
operating performance and market-to-book ratio in year −1 within ±20% of those of 
the repurchasing firm. In addition, the book value of assets for the matched firm in 
year −1 is also within ± 20% of that of the repurchasing firm. If no firms meet the 
above criteria, we relax the industry criterion to one-digit SIC code or disregard the 
industry criterion if there is still no match. Among firms satisfying the above criteria, 
we select the matched firm as the one with the least deviations from the repurchasing 
firm.9 The abnormal operating performance for a repurchasing firm is defined as its 
ROA minus that of the matched firm.  
 
2.2.3 Measuring Growth Prospects 
                                                            
9 This score function is defined as: 
(|ROAyear−1,sample firm − ROAyear−1,matched firm|)/ROAyear−1,sample firm+(|TAyear−1,sample firm −
TAyear−1,matched firm|)/TAyear−1,sample firm +(|M/Byear-1, sample firm-M/Byear-1, matched firm|)/M/Byear-1, sample firm 
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To measure firms’ growth prospects, we follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) to decompose the market-to-book ratio into three components: 
  𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡⏟        )
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗⏟          )
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡⏟        
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘
(3) 
i stands for each firm, t denotes year and j accounts for industry. m is the market 
value of equity, b is the book value and v is a measure of fundamental value, all 
expressed in logs. 𝛼 is the regression coefficient. The fundamental value 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡) is 
to be estimated for firm i on time t in industry j and 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) is an industry-specific 
long-run value that equals the industry average of 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡). 
The first term in equation (3) is the difference between the market value and the 
estimated fundamental value. It captures firm-specific error in market valuation. The 
second term reflects the difference between the estimated fundamental value on time 
t and industry j and the long-run sector-specific value. Hence it captures the time-
series sector error. Our variable of interest is the third component: long-run value to 
book 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 . It is the difference between the long-run sector-specific 
fundamental value and the observed book value. It measures a firm’s growth 
prospects.  
To measure the last component, we follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005), and estimate 𝛼 via the following regression based on Fama-
French 12 industries: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4) 
Equation (4) is estimated annually for each industry j so that we have estimated 
coefficients 𝛼0𝑗𝑡  and 𝛼1𝑗𝑡  for each industry-year. ?̅?0𝑗  and ?̅?1𝑗 are the average 𝛼0𝑗𝑡 
and 𝛼1𝑗𝑡 respectively over the sample period for each industry j. They are used to 
calculate the long-run sector-specific fundamental value: 
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𝑣𝑖𝑡(?̅?0𝑗 , ?̅?1𝑗) = ?̅?0𝑗 + ?̅?1𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡         (5) 
The long-run value to book, i.e. the difference between 𝑣𝑖𝑡  and  𝑏𝑖𝑡 , is our 
measure of a firm’s growth prospects. The higher the measure, the better the growth 
prospects. 
 
2.2.4 Measuring Target Leverage, Debt Capacity and Optimal Cash Ratios  
The target leverage ratios vary across firms and over time. Following Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2012), we 
estimate the target leverage ratio for each firm per year using the following model:  
𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6) 
Where 𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is firm i’s market debt ratio, i.e. the book value of debt divided 
by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity, at year t+1, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
is a vector of firm characteristics related to costs and benefits of adjusting the 
leverage ratio. They include EBIT_TA, MB, DEP_TA, LnTA, FA_TA, R&D_TA, 
R&D_DUM and Ind_median. EBIT_TA is earnings before interest and taxes, as a 
proportion of total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio of assets. DEP_TA is 
depreciation as a proportion of total assets. LnTA is log of asset size, measured in 
1983 dollars. FA_TA is fixed assets proportion to total assets. R&D_TA is R&D 
expenses as a proportion of total assets.  R&D_DUM is a dummy variable that equals 
one if firm did not report R&D expenses. Ind_median is median industry market 
debt ratio calculated for each year based on the industry groupings in Fama and 
French (2002). After 𝛽 is estimated, the predicted value of 𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the target 
leverage ratio for firm i at year t+1. A firm is defined as over-levered (under-
levered) if its actual market debt ratio is higher (lower) than the target debt ratio 
before the repurchase announcement. 
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Following Lemmon and Zender (2010), our measure of debt capacity is based on 
the likelihood that a firm has access public debt market. We estimate a logit model in 
which the dependent variable is one if a firm has debt rating in a given year and zero 
otherwise. Debt rating data are available in Compustat and our sample period is from 
1994 to 2012. The explanatory variables include Ln_TA, ROA, PPE, MB, Leverage, 
Ln_Firm Age and Standard deviation of daily stock returns. Ln_TA is natural log of 
asset size. ROA is the ratio of operating profits to total assets. PPE is the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio of assets. 
Ln_Firm Age is the natural log of firm age where firm age is measured as the age of 
the firm relative to the first year the firm appears on Compustat. The estimated 
coefficients from the logit model are used to derive an estimated probability that a 
given firm could get a bond rating for each year during the sample period. We divide 
our sample firms into three groups based on their estimated likelihood of gaining 
access public debt market.10 Firms in the lowest (highest) tercile are defined as firms 
with low (high) debt capacity. 
Following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we estimate the 
optimal cash level for each firm in each year and define the excess cash of a firm as 
its cash holdings in excess of its optimal level of cash. In the regression to estimate 
the optimal cash level, the dependent variable is the logarithm of cash and short-term 
investments (item 1) divided by net assets, where net assets are defined as total 
assets (item 6) minus cash and short-term investments (item 1). The explanatory 
variables are those that affect firms’ cash expenditure and revenue, including the 
market-to-book ratio, size, cash flow, net working capital, capital expenditure, 
leverage, industry sigma (a measure of the volatility of an industry’s cash flow), 
                                                            
10 We also divide our sample firms into two groups based on the ranking of their debt ratings. The 
results are similar to those reported here. 
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R&D and a dividend dummy. Cash flow, net working capital and capital expenditure 
are divided by net assets. After the regression model is estimated, we calculate 
excess cash by taking the antilog of the residual of the regression model. 
 
2.2.5 Measuring Financial Distress Risk  
A firm’s credit risk is measured by using Altman’s (1968) methodology. In 
particular, Altman’s Z-score is computed as: 
𝑍 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.4𝑋4 + 0.999𝑋5   (7)        
where X1 is working capital divided by book assets; X2 is retained earnings 
divided by book assets; X3 is earnings before interest and taxes divided by book 
assets; X4 is the market value of equity divided by total liabilities; and X5 is net sales 
divided by book assets. A lower Z-Score indicates a higher financial distress risk. 
The abnormal Z-Score for a repurchasing firm is its Z-Score minus that of a 
matched non-repurchasing peer. The matched firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, 
and both the pre-announcement Z-Score and book value of assets in year −1 within 
±20% of those of the repurchasing firm. These factors are important in explaining 
the cross-sectional variation in corporate distress risk (Fama and French (1993)). If 
no firms meet these criteria, we relax the industry criterion to one-digit SIC code or 
disregard the industry criterion. Among these firms, the matched firm is selected as 
the one with the least deviations from the repurchasing firm.11 
 
2.2.6 Summary Statistics  
                                                            
11 This score function is  (|Z_Scoreyear−1,sample firm − Z_Scoreyear−1,matched firm|)/
Z_Scoreyear−1,sample firm+ 
(|Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm − Total Assetsyear−1,matched firm|)/Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm  
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The distribution of our sample of share repurchases over time is presented in 
Table 2.1. There is relative small numbers of repurchases in the 1990’s.12 In most 
years of our sample period, the median deal size of debt-financed repurchases is 
larger than that of cash-financed ones.  
Table 2.2 reports the difference of pre-repurchase firm characteristics between 
debt- and cash-financed buybacks. Debt-financed repurchasing firms have higher 
capital expenditure ratios, lower cash holdings, higher debt ratio and financial 
distress risk than cash-financed ones. Those firms are more mature with more assets 
in place, lower growth prospects, larger firm size, and better operating performance 
before conducting leveraged buybacks. The differences are statistically significant at, 
at least, the 5% level. Our summary statistics of firm characteristics are comparable 
to the literature (Lie (2005), Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007)).  
 
2.3  Empirical Results 
2.3.1 Stock Performance Around Repurchases 
Table 2.3 presents the short-term market reaction and long-run stock return 
following share repurchase announcements for debt- and cash-financed repurchases. 
Panels A reports average CAR using either equally- or value-weighted market index 
as the benchmark. We observe positive market reactions for both debt- and cash-
financed repurchases. The average three-day announcement-period abnormal returns 
for debt-financed repurchases vary from 2.19% to 2.27%, which is lower than the 
average abnormal returns of 2.72% to 2.83% for cash-financed repurchases. Our 
three-day abnormal returns for cash-financed repurchases are comparable to those in 
                                                            
12 Our sample is smaller than that of previous research on repurchases (Grullon and Michaely (2004), 
Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), Chen and Wang (2012)) as we require that the sources of financing of 
buybacks are disclosed. Rule 10b-18 of SEC became effective on 17 December 2003, which requires 
voluntary disclosure of the sources of financing used to finance repurchases.  
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Grullon and Michaely (2004), who report an average 2.71% three-day CAR using 
value-weighted market index as the benchmark for cash-financed repurchases.  
The long-term price drift prior to and following repurchase programs is listed in 
Panel B and C. Long-term stock returns in Panel B are measured via a calendar-time 
portfolio approach where the Fama-French three factors are used as the benchmark. 
We observe negative monthly calendar-time alphas six months prior to buyback 
announcements and the returns of debt-financed buybacks are significant (-51 basis 
points per month). Consistent with previous research (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), we find positive post-repurchase 
abnormal returns. The average monthly abnormal returns for debt-financed buybacks 
range from 82 basis points to 96 basis points per month, while cash-financed 
repurchases experience average abnormal returns of 74 basis points to 118 basis 
points per month.  
To the extent that the calendar-time portfolio approach does not allow the factor 
loadings to change over time (Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), the observed positive 
abnormal return may be due to higher systematic risk ex post. Hence we re-estimate 
the long-term price drift using Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method, which allows for 
risk changes through time.  
Panel C exhibits negative monthly abnormal return for both debt- and cash-
financed repurchases six months prior to buyback announcements (-59 basis points 
and -91 basis points per month respectively). The results are consistent with 
Information/Timing hypothesis as beaten down firms initiate share repurchase (Peyer 
and Vermaelen (2009)). The monthly abnormal returns are between 31 basis points 
and 47 basis points over 36 months for debt-financed repurchases. The long-term 
monthly abnormal returns for cash-financed repurchases vary from 39 basis points to 
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45 basis points over 36 months. Hence our results show that debt-financed 
repurchases on average add value to shareholders. 
  
2.3.2 Changes in Firm Performance Around Repurchases 
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the average changes in investment, cash, leverage, 
net leverage, operating performance and Z-score before repurchase announcements. 
Firms exhibit significant declines in cash and significant increases in operating 
performance before leveraged buyback announcements. Cash-financed buyback 
firms experience significant declines in investment and improved operating 
performance before buyback announcements. 
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows the average changes in investment, cash, leverage, 
net leverage, operating performance and Z-score between year −1 (the year before 
the repurchase announcement) and years +1, +2, +3, and +4 (i.e. the years after the 
repurchase announcement). Debt-financed buyback firms experience significant 
declines in investment, and operating performance and significant increases in 
leverage, net leverage and financial distress risk ex post. After the initial mechanical 
increases following buyback announcements, the debt ratio begins levelling off and 
remains 6.4% higher in four years than that before repurchase announcements. Cash-
financed repurchasing firms experience significant declines in cash, and operating 
performance and significant increases in financial distress risk following buyback 
announcements. Consistent with Lie (2005) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), we 
observe a decline in ex-post operating performance for all buyback firms, before 
taking into account that of matched non-repurchasing peers. Figure 2.1 depicts 




2.3.3 Ex-ante Firm Characteristics: Leverage, Free Cash-Flows and Cash 
Holdings 
The section studies how the effects of leveraged buybacks depend on ex-ante 
firm characteristics. First, we study whether unused debt capacity motivates firms to 
conduct leveraged buybacks. 74% of debt-funded buyback firms belong to the high 
debt capacity group, while 29% of cash-financed buyback firms have high debt 
capacity ex ante. Ex-ante under-levered firms may adjust the debt ratio towards its 
optimal level via leveraged buybacks. We also estimate the target debt ratio and find 
that 81% of debt-financed repurchasing firms are under-levered ex ante. For those 
under-levered firms, the average pre-repurchase debt ratio (13%) is substantially 
below the average target debt ratio (25%). As a small segment of our sample, 19% of 
leveraged buybacks are conducted by firms that are estimated to be over-levered ex 
ante. 
Second, we divide our sample of leveraged buybacks into two subsamples: ex-
ante over-levered firms and under-levered ones. Table 2.5 reports the difference in 
firm performance. Both over-levered firms and under-levered ones experience 
positive three-day abnormal returns, while those of over-levered firms are 
insignificant. Over-levered firms have negative but insignificant long-run stock 
performance, while that of under-levered firms is significantly positive under both 
the calendar-time portfolio approach and Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method. The 
difference in long-run stock performance is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the benefits of leveraged buybacks decrease with a firm’s leverage ex 
ante. 
Third, we relate the market reactions to ex-ante firm characteristics in a 
multivariate regression framework, and report results in Table 2.6. The LBB Dummy 
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equals one for debt-financed repurchases and zero otherwise. As the announcement 
effect of a privately negotiated repurchase is stronger than that for an open market 
repurchases (Chen and Wang (2012)), we include a dummy variable that equals one 
if the repurchase is an open market share repurchase and zero otherwise. Bonaime 
(2012) shows that after the 2004 modification to SEC Rule 10b-18, firms disclose 
more about repurchase transactions. Hence we also include a binary variable that 
equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from 2004 onwards. 
The coefficient on the LBB Dummy in column (1) is significantly negative at the 
5% level. This suggests that debt-financed repurchases experience lower abnormal 
returns than cash-financed ones. Consistent with the agency cost of free cash-flows 
(Jensen (1986)), there is a less favorable market reaction if the firm has substantial 
free cash-flows. Larger firms and those with higher prior abnormal returns 
experience lower market reactions.  
The financial leverage increases mechanically following leveraged buybacks. We 
study whether the benefits from leveraged buybacks depend on the ex-ante debt ratio. 
In column (2) of Table 2.6, we interact the LBB Dummy with the Market Leverage. 
The coefficient on this interaction term is significantly negative at the 5% level. The 
LBB Dummy is significantly positive at the 10% level, which suggests that market 
reacts favorably to debt-financed repurchasing firms with low debt ratio, In addition, 
for leveraged buybacks, firms with ex-ante high debt ratio experience lower 
abnormal returns than those with low debt ratio, consistent with the leverage 
optimization hypothesis.  
A firm with high debt ratio is not necessarily over-levered. The optimal capital 
structure varies across firms. In column (3) of Table 2.6, we add an interaction term, 
LBB Dummy × TLEV Dummy to the regression, where TLEV Dummy is a binary 
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variable that equals one if the firm is over-levered before the repurchase 
announcement and zero otherwise. For leveraged buybacks, we find that the average 
three-day abnormal return is lower if the firm is ex-ante over-levered.  
Fourth, we examine how free cash-flows and excess cash holdings in a firm 
affect the impact of debt financing on the market reaction to repurchases. We include 
an interaction term, LBB Dummy × Free Cash Flow in column (4) of Table 2.6. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. As the optimal cash holdings vary 
across firms, following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we estimate 
the target cash holdings for each firm-year. We include an interaction term in column 
(5) of Table 2.6, LBB Dummy × TCASH Dummy, where TCASH Dummy is a binary 
variable that equals one if a firm’s cash holding ex ante is above the optimal level 
and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. This 
suggests that free cash-flows or excess cash does not affect the impact of debt 
financing on three-day abnormal returns. 
Our results suggest that the market reacts favorably for leveraged buyback firms 
with low debt ratio. We find lower three-day announcement returns and poorer long-
run stock performance for firms that are ex-ante over-levered.  
 
2.3.4 Ex-Post Real Investments 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that firms reduce their capital expenditures 
and R&D following repurchases. Table 2.7 shows results of the cross-sectional 
analysis of changes in real investments ex post. The dependent variable is changes of 
abnormal investment, where abnormal investment is the capital expenditure of a 
repurchasing firm minus that of the matched peer with similar pre-buyback 
characteristics, from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. In column (1), the 
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coefficient of the LBB Dummy is significantly negative at the 5% level, which shows 
that debt-financed repurchasing firms experience sharper decline in ex-post 
abnormal investments than cash-financed ones. Post-repurchase capital expenditures 
are higher for firms with higher growth opportunities as proxied by Tobin’s Q, 
similar to findings in previous studies (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000)). Leverage is negatively associated with changes of abnormal investment 
(Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996)).  
In column (2), we include an interaction term, LBB Dummy × Leverage, to 
examine how leverage affects the impact of debt financing on post-repurchase real 
investments. The coefficient on the LBB Dummy is no longer significant but the 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative at the 5% level. This 
suggests that leveraged buybacks lead to a sharper decline in ex-post abnormal 
investment only for highly-levered firms, not for firms with ex-ante low leverage.  
We then investigate whether over-levered buybacks are associated with sharper 
decline in ex-post real investment than under-levered ones. Table 2.5 shows that both 
over-levered leveraged buyback firms and under-levered ones experience significant 
declines in investment after controlling for matched non-repurchasing peers. We 
observe a 5.5% (1.1%) decline in abnormal investments for over-levered (under-
levered) firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly 
in column (3) of Table 2.7, we include an interaction term LBB Dummy × TLEV 
Dummy. For leveraged buybacks, post-repurchase abnormal investment declines 
more sharply for firms with leverage above the optimal ratio ex ante.  
To examine whether free cash-flows or excess cash affects the impact of debt 
financing on post-repurchase real investments, we interact LBB Dummy with Free 
Cash Flow and TCASH Dummy in columns (4) and (5). The coefficients of both 
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interaction terms are insignificant, suggesting that they do not have a significant 
impact. 
Our results indicate that leveraged buybacks experience a steeper decline in 
abnormal investments ex post than cash-financed ones. The reduction in real 
investments is sharper for firms with high leverage ex ante. 
 
2.3.5 Growth Prospects 
We analyze whether the reduction in real investments ex post is driven by 
declining growth prospects. For each repurchasing firm, the matched non-
repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both pre-repurchase 
investment and book value of assets in year −1 within ±20% of those of the 
repurchasing firm.  
Table 2.8 reports changes of growth prospects, measured by long-run value to 
book, prior to and following buyback announcements for debt-, cash-financed 
repurchases and their matched non-repurchasing peers. Figure 2.1 shows the graph. 
The average change in the long-run value to book from the end of year −1 to the end 
of year 0 is insignificant for both leveraged buybacks and their matched peers. From 
the end of year 0 to the end of year +4, only the change for leveraged buybacks is 
significantly negative. The difference between the changes for leveraged buybacks 
and matched peers is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Then we compare the changes in long-run value to book of debt-financed 
repurchases with those of cash-financed ones. Debt-financed buyback firms 
experience a significantly sharper decline in long-run value to book than cash-
financed buyback firms from the end of year 0 to the end of year +4.  
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We next examine whether changes in growth prospects explain the lower returns 
and sharper decline in ex-post real investments for over-levered firms. Table 2.5 
reports the changes in growth prospects from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2 
for the subsamples of over-levered and under-levered firms. Post-repurchase growth 
prospects for over-levered firms do not change significantly, while under-levered 
firms experience significant decline in growth prospects following repurchase 
announcements. This suggests that changes in growth prospects do not explain the 
lower returns and sharper decline in ex-post real investments for over-levered firms.  
Furthermore, we control for growth prospects and changes in growth prospects in 
our return and post-repurchase real investment regressions. We interact Change in 
Growth Prospect with LBB Dummy in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.9 and interact 
Growth Prospect with LBB Dummy in columns (2) and (4). In Table 2.9, the LBB 
and over-leverage interactions remain significant, while all interaction terms with 
growth prospects are insignificant. This confirms that differences in growth 
prospects do not explain the announcement returns and ex-post investments for over-
levered firms. 
Our results suggest that the growth prospects decline significantly for all 
repurchasing firms ex post after controlling for non-repurchasing matched peers. The 
effect is stronger for debt-financed buyback firms. Hence lower growth prospects 
may contribute to the post-repurchase reduction in real investments for leveraged 
buybacks. However, changes in growth prospects following leveraged buybacks do 
not explain the lower announcement returns and sharper decline in ex-post real 




2.3.6 Can Corporate Governance Explain the Lower Returns of Over-Levered 
Firms? 
We next examine whether corporate governance explains the lower 
announcement returns and sharper decline in ex-post real investments for over-
levered firms.  Following Gompers et al. (2003), we use G-Index to control for 
differences in corporate governance across firms. Gompers et al. (2003) construct an 
equally-weighted index based on 24 governance provisions provided by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Higher G-Index indicates weaker corporate 
governance. Among our sample of 575 repurchasing firms, data on G-Index is 
available for 317 firms.  
Table 2.5 reports G-Index at the end of year −1 for the subsamples of over-
levered and under-levered firms. Over-levered firms have significantly weaker 
corporate governance than under-levered firms, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In Table 2.10 we then control for corporate governance in 
our regressions for announcement returns (columns (1) and (2)) and post-repurchase 
real investment (columns (3) and (4)). We interact G-Index with LBB Dummy in all 
columns and interact TLEV Dummy with LBB Dummy in columns (2) and (4). In 
column (1) of Table 2.10, the LBB and G-Index interaction is significantly negative, 
suggesting that weaker corporate governance is associated with lower abnormal 
returns for leveraged buyback firms. In column (2), LBB Dummy*G-Index remains 
significant, while LBB Dummy*TLEV Dummy becomes insignificant. This implies 
that weaker corporate governance explains the lower announcement returns for over-
levered firms. 
In our investment regressions in columns (3) and (4), the LBB and over-leverage 
interactions remain significant, while all interaction terms with G-Index are 
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insignificant. This shows that weaker corporate governance cannot explain the 
sharper decline in ex-post investments for over-levered firms. 
 
2.3.7 Motives and Completion Rates of Leveraged Buybacks  
We study why firms use debt to finance repurchases by employing logit and 
probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if 
firms use debt to fund repurchases and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables 
include one-year lagged firm characteristics. We include both industry and year 
dummies to account for potential industry-specific and year-specific differences. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
Table 2.11 shows that firms with lower cash holdings are more likely to use debt 
to finance share buybacks. Holding other explanatory variables at the average, the 
probability of using debt to buy back shares increases by 7.8% for a one-percent 
decrease in cash holdings. As the optimal cash holdings vary across firms, following 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we estimate the target cash holdings 
for each firm-year. 73% of debt-financed repurchasing firms have ex-ante cash 
holdings below the estimated optimal cash level. This result supports a pecking order 
of financing where the firm raises external debt if internal cash is insufficient (Myers 
and Majluf (1984)).  
Furthermore, firms with stronger past performance have higher probability of 
conducting leveraged buybacks. Holding other explanatory variables at their 
average, there is a 8.5% (1.3%) increase in the probability of using debt to finance 
repurchases for a one-percent increase in ROA (prior abnormal returns). These 
results show that firms with lower cash holdings and better past performance are 
more prone to conduct leveraged buybacks.  
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     Unlike repurchases via Dutch auction or tender offers, open-market repurchase 
programs do not commit to completing a pre-specified buyback program. Hence 
managers may use repurchase programs for their own interest (Fenn and Liang 
(2001), Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010)).13 For leveraged buybacks, existing 
bondholders may deter the execution of repurchases due to an increased leverage.14 
We then examine the completion rates of debt-financed repurchases after 
repurchase announcements. We keep only open-market repurchases and drop 
privately-negotiated deals. To measure the completion rates of share repurchases, we 
use the purchase of common and preferred stock (item 115) minus any decrease in 
redeemable preferred stock (item 175) from Compustat, divided by the market value 
of equity (Grullon and Michaely (2004), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)).15 
In column (1) of Table 2.12, we employ the Tobit model where the dependent 
variable is the actual buyback ratio two years after the repurchase announcement. 
We include intended buyback ratio as an additional explanatory variable in our 
regression. Intended buyback ratio is defined as the intended buyback size disclosed 
in the Current-Event (8-K) filing over the market value of equity (Chen and Wang 
(2012)). The coefficient on the LBB Dummy is significantly negative at the 5% level. 
This suggests that debt-financed repurchases have lower completion rates than cash-
financed buybacks. The results also show that more levered firms have lower 
                                                            
13 Bonaime (2012) finds a reputation effect where the lagged completion rate predicts future 
completion rates of buybacks.   
14 This is possibly due to interventions from debtholders. For example, Bloomberg reports on 17 April 
2012: “Lowe’s Cos. (LOW) is raising $2 billion in the bond market to finance stock repurchases as 
the second-biggest U.S. home-improvement retailer boosts leverage to reward shareholders even as its 
profitability wanes. That raises concern among bondholders and bondholders are somewhat skeptical 
of the company given that the firm changed its financial policies. Debtholders tend to negotiate with 
the senior officials in order to avoid worsen financial position of the company.”   
15 Several proxies are proposed by previous research to measure actual buyback ratio. Fama and 
French (2001) select changes in treasury stock from Compustat to proxy for actual repurchase rate. 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Guay and Harford (2000) use decreases in shares outstanding 
from CRSP to measure actual buyback ratio. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) show that purchase of 
common and preferred stock minus any decrease in redeemable preferred stock from Compustat is 
considered a better measure. 
31 
 
completion rates. The results are similar when we use OLS regressions in column 
(2).  
 
2.3.8 Operating Performance, Financial Distress Risk and Robustness Checks 
We first examine whether operating performance improves following debt-
financed repurchases. Figure 2.2 depicts changes of operating performance following 
repurchase announcements for debt- and cash-financed buybacks and their matched 
peers. Consistent with Lie (2005) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), we find lower 
reductions in operating performance ex post for debt- and cash-financed repurchases 
than matched non-repurchasing firms. We then test whether the abnormal post-
repurchase operating performance differs between debt- and cash-financed 
buybacks, controlling for other factors in a regression setting. The dependent 
variable is changes of abnormal operating performance from the end of year −1 to 
the end of year +2. We do not find significant difference in ex-post abnormal 
operating performance between debt- and cash-financed buybacks (Tables are 
available upon request). 
We next analyze whether debt-financed buyback firms face higher financial 
distress risk ex post than their matched non-repurchasing peers. Shareholders may 
use buybacks to expropriate wealth from debtholders (Bradley and Wakeman (1983), 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003)). For instance, Greenberg reports on 8th November 
2011: “Fitch Rating downgraded Amgen the day when the firm announced that it 
would use debt to finance the repurchase.” Figure 2.2 plots changes of Z-score 
following buyback announcements for debt-, cash-financed repurchases and their 
matched non-repurchasing peers. Debt-financed buyback firms do not exhibit higher 
financial distress risk than their matched peers. We also run regression where the 
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dependent variable is changes of abnormal Z-score from the end of year −1 to the 
end of year +2. The coefficient of the LBB Dummy is negative but insignificant. We 
do not find significant difference of abnormal changes of financial distress risk ex 
post between debt- and cash-financed buybacks (Tables are available upon request). 
We also conduct several robustness checks to our main results. First, we use an 
alternative definition of debt-financed repurchases. We define a repurchase as a debt-
financed one only if the corporate filings explicitly state that the firm expects to use 
only debt to finance the share repurchase. In our sample, 86 out of 218 leveraged 
buybacks are fully financed by debt. We investigate short-term market reaction to 
those fully-debt financed repurchases. We find similar results to those reported 
before. 
Second, we use alternative measures of abnormal returns. For example, we use a 
five-day window in CAR. We also use alternative models such as the CRSP equally-
weighted market index as the benchmark or market-adjusted returns where equity 
beta is assumed to be 1. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 2.6. 
Third, an alternative measure of completion rates is employed. Following 
Bonaime (2012), we use the purchase of common and preferred stock minus any 
decrease in redeemable preferred stock, all scaled by the announced size of 
repurchase plan to measure completion rates.16 Results remain unchanged. 
Fourth, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) argue that the motivation for conducting 
privately negotiated repurchase differs from that of open market share repurchases. 
Therefore, we exclude 57 privately negotiated repurchases in our sample. The results 
are very similar to what we reported previously.  
 
                                                            
16 Results are similar when we drop the decrease in redeemable preferred stock item.  
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2.4  Conclusion 
This paper studies the performance of leveraged buybacks. We propose that 
firms conduct leveraged buybacks to optimize their capital structures. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, under-levered firms with low cash holdings but substantial debt 
capacity conduct leveraged buybacks. We find positive short-term abnormal returns 
and long-term price drift for debt-financed repurchases. The market reactions are less 
positive than those of cash-financed buybacks. The stock market reacts less 
favorably to firms with ex-ante higher leverage, consistent with the informational, 
agency and tax benefits of leveraged buybacks decreasing with a firm’s leverage. 
Leveraged buyback firms experience a steeper decline in real investments ex post 
than cash-financed buyback firms. Lower growth prospects do not explain the lower 
announcement returns and ex-post real investments that are associated with ex-ante 
over-levered firms. Instead, we find that the lower announcement returns for over-
levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker corporate governance. Debt-
financed repurchases also exhibit lower completion rates than cash-financed ones. 
Debt-financed buyback firms do not have significantly different financial distress 
risk or operating performance ex post than cash-financed ones.  
Our results suggest that leveraged buybacks on average add value to 
shareholders. Firms with declining growth prospects and substantial debt capacity 
repurchase shares via issuing debt to generate tax benefits or reduce agency costs of 
free cash-flows, therefore optimizing their leverage. However, the evidence does not 
imply that all leveraged buybacks are consistent with value maximization and 
economic efficiency. For a small segment of the leveraged buyback market where 
firms are over-levered ex-ante, leveraged buybacks lead to lower market reactions 




Table 2.1: The Distribution of Share Repurchases Over Time 
This table lists the number of debt- and cash-financed repurchases each year over the period 
1994-2012. Debt-financed repurchases are share buybacks that use external debt to buyback 
stocks. Cash-financed repurchases are repurchase programs that use internal funds to finance 
share buybacks. We also report the mean (median) deal value for both debt- and cash-
financed repurchases. 















1994 12 81.30 25.75  13 41.93 9.40 
1995 19 115.85 34.68  6 13.25 9.09 
1996 14 133.78 43.67  12 113.81 24.53 
1997 17 229.30 47.81  10 124.42 6.32 
1998 16 36.16 17.76  10 401.69 19.22 
1999 17 48.41 15.70  6 53.47 63.89 
2000 4 91.47 47.50  4 9.80 8.15 
2001 7 114.23 53.28  7 78.64 11.49 
2002 8 104.84 33.00  13 297.15 9.60 
2003 3 70.02 38.50  4 46.69 41.65 
2004 7 869.66 100.00  28 318.55 101.38 
2005 13 361.70 300.00  26 311.76 57.5 
2006 12 411.37 250.00  27 228.59 25.52 
2007 35 1001.39 150.00  62 253.43 55.00 
2008 29 146.48 46.30  102 390.16 20.00 
2009 10 161.65 63.00  27 167.49 25.00 
2010 6 300.40 212.50  9 348.38 15.00 
2011 31 470.91 100.00  37 132.09 50.00 
2012 17 426.47 200.00  30 756.96 250.00 











Table 2.2: Source of Financing and Firm Characteristics 
The sample consists of 218 debt-financed repurchases and 357 cash-financed repurchases over the period 1994-2012. Investment is defined as capital expenditure 
(item 145 in Compustat) divided by total assets (item 6). Cash Holding is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Free Cash Flow is the 
gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 21). 
Market Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* 
item 24). Net Market Leverage is the book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents, all divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. 
Intended Buyback Ratio is the intended buyback size disclosed in the 8-k filing over the market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Z-score is Altman’s (1968) 
measure of credit risk. Dividend is the sum of common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total assets (item 6). Tobin’s Q is defined 
as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). 
Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Operating Performance is measured by ROA, which is defined as operating income (item 
13) divided by book assets (item 6). FA_TA is the property, plant and equipment (item 14) over total book assets (item 6). The last column reports the difference in 
mean test. ***, **and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases  Difference 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Debt - Cash 
Investment 215 0.07 0.04  351 0.04 0.03  0.03*** 
Cash Holding 218 0.09 0.04  356 0.25 0.22  -0.16*** 
Free Cash Flow 203 0.06 0.05  292 0.06 0.05  0.00 
Market Leverage 214 0.21 0.15  346 0.15 0.07  0.06*** 
Net Market Leverage 214 0.16 0.12  346 -0.03 -0.06  0.19*** 
Intended Buyback Ratio 194 0.10 0.07  317 0.07 0.05  0.03*** 
Z-score 193 4.34 3.71  308 6.63 4.18  -2.29*** 
Dividend 217 0.02 0.00  355 0.01 0.00  0.01* 
Tobin’s Q 214 1.91 1.57  349 2.14 1.60  -0.23** 
Size 218 20.04 19.90  356 19.65 19.73  0.39** 
Operating Performance 211 0.18 0.15  349 0.13 0.12  0.05*** 
FA_TA 209 0.30 0.20  350 0.18 0.11  0.12*** 
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Table 2.3: Short-Term and Long-Run Stock Performance  
This table shows the short-term market reaction and long-term price drift for both debt- and cash-financed repurchases. Panel A shows the cumulative 
abnormal returns based on different event windows. We use market model and select CRSP equally-weighted (EW) or value-weighted (VW) market index as 
the benchmark. Panel B reports the monthly calendar-time alphas 6-month prior to and 12-, 24-, and 36-month following the repurchase announcement date, 
where portfolios are formed monthly in calendar time. Panel C shows the monthly abnormal returns 6-month prior to and 12-, 24-, and 36-month following 
the repurchase announcement using Ibbotson’s (1975) Return Across Time and Securities (RATS) method. ***, **and *represent the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: Short-term CAR 
 ALL  Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases 
 N EW VW  N EW VW  N EW VW 
(-1,0) 672 1.30%*** 1.19%***  269 1.14%*** 1.04%***  403 1.41%*** 1.30%*** 
(0,1) 672 2.68%*** 2.63%***  269 2.27%*** 2.21%***  403 2.96%*** 2.90%*** 
(-1,+1) 672 2.60%*** 2.50%***  269 2.27%*** 2.19%***  403 2.83%*** 2.72%*** 
Panel B: Fama-French Long-term AR 
 ALL  Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases 
 N Calendar-time Approach  N Calendar-time Approach  N Calendar-time Approach 
(-6,0) 682 -0.54%**  273 -0.51%*  409 -0.06% 
(+1,+12) 682 1.00%***  273 0.96%***  409 1.18%*** 
(+1,+24) 682 0.87%***  273 0.89%***  409 0.84%*** 
(+1,+36) 682 0.78%***  273 0.82%***  409 0.74%*** 
Panel C: Fama-French IRATS Long-term AR 
 ALL  Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases 
 N Ibbotson RATS  N Ibbotson RATS  N Ibbotson RATS 
(-6,0) 682 -0.82%***  273 -0.59%**  409 -0.91%*** 
(+1,+12) 682 0.46%***  273 0.47%**  409 0.42%** 
(+1,+24) 682 0.43%***  273 0.37%**  409 0.45%*** 
(+1,+36) 682 0.37%***  273 0.31%**  409 0.39%*** 
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Table 2.4: Changes in Investment, Cash, Leverage, ROA and Z-Score around Buybacks  
This table reports average changes in investment, cash, leverage, net leverage, operating performance and Z-score before and after repurchase announcements. Panel 
A shows changes ex ante and Panel B displays changes ex post. Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase is announced. Period (x, y) measures 
changes from the end of year y to the end of year x. Investment is defined as capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6). Cash Holding is the cash 
and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Market Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt 
(item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Net Market Leverage is the book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents, all divided by the 
sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. Operating Performance is measured by ROA, which is defined as operating income (item 13) divided by book 
assets (item 6). Z-score is Altman’s (1968) measure of credit risk.  ***, **and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Changes in Performance ex ante  
Category Period Change in INV Change in CASH Change in LEV Change in NLEV Change in OP Change in Z-Score 
Debt-Financed Repurchases (-2,-1) 0.001 -0.004** -0.007 -0.004 0.007* 0.127 
 (-3,-1) -0.000 -0.012** -0.022* -0.008 0.010** 0.274 
 (-4,-1) -0.000 -0.015*** -0.022 -0.012 0.018** 0.141 
 (-5,-1) -0.002 -0.025*** -0.001 0.011 0.017** -0.356 
        
Cash Financed Repurchases (-2,-1) -0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 0.010* 0.205 
 (-3,-1) -0.005** -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 0.018** 0.213 
 (-4,-1) -0.009*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.030** 0.028*** -0.204 
 (-5,-1) -0.006** -0.003 -0.028*** -0.042*** 0.019** -1.572*** 
Panel B: Changes in Performance ex post 
Category Period Change in INV Change in CASH Change in LEV Change in NLEV Change in OP Change in Z-Score 
Debt-Financed Repurchases (-1,+1) -0.012** -0.001 0.084*** 0.068*** -0.003 -0.884*** 
 (-1,+2) -0.021*** 0.002 0.061*** 0.044*** -0.013* -1.016*** 
 (-1,+3) -0.020*** 0.008 0.064*** 0.038** -0.019** -1.093*** 
 (-1,+4) -0.020*** 0.013* 0.064*** 0.033 -0.031*** -1.354*** 
        
Cash Financed Repurchases (-1,+1) 0.001 -0.028*** 0.021** 0.011 -0.018** -1.469*** 
 (-1,+2) -0.001 -0.032*** 0.014 0.001 -0.014* -1.418*** 
 (-1,+3) -0.005* -0.035*** 0.036*** -0.008 -0.022** -2.068*** 
 (-1,+4) -0.001 -0.035*** 0.026* -0.022 -0.017* -2.163*** 
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Table 2.5: Leveraged Buybacks and Firm Performance: Over-levered vs Under-levered Firms 
We disentangle over-levered leveraged buyback firms from under-levered ones. The leveraged buyback firm is defined as over-levered if its market leverage 
exceeds the optimal level one year before the repurchase announcement. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith 
(2012), we estimate the target leverage ratio for each firm per year. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (−1, +1) where day 0 is the repurchase 
announcement date. Fama-French Calendar-time AR is the monthly calendar-time alphas 12 months following the repurchase announcement date, where 
portfolios are formed monthly in calendar time. Ibbotson RATS AR is the monthly abnormal returns 12 months following the repurchase announcement using 
Ibbotson’s (1975) Return Across Time and Securities (RATS) method. We calculate Changes in Abnormal Investment, Abnormal Operating Performance, 
Abnormal Z-Score, and Growth Prospect from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. Abnormal Investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 
145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of its matched firm. The Abnormal Operating Performance for a repurchasing firm is its ROA, which is defined 
as operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6) minus that of the matched firm. The Abnormal Z-Score for the repurchasing firm is the firm 
specific Z-Score minus that of the matched firm. Growth Prospect is the difference between long-run value and observed book value. We follow Gompers et al. 
(2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). High G-Index indicates weak 
corporate governance. The last column reports the difference in mean test. ***, **and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Over-levered Firms  Under-levered Firms  Difference 
 N Mean  N Mean  Over - Under 
CAR 41 0.016  173 0.027***  -0.011 
Fama-French Calendar-time AR (+1,+12) 41 -0.008  173 0.007**  -0.0154*** 
Ibbotson RATS AR (+1,+12) 41 -0.001  173 0.005**  -0.0062*** 
Changes in Abnormal Investment 32 -0.055***  144 -0.011**  -0.044*** 
Changes in Abnormal Operating Performance 30 0.014  138 0.058**  -0.044 
Changes in Abnormal Z-Score 31 -0.243  139 0.806  -1.049 
Changes in  Growth Prospect 29 0.009  137 -0.031***  0.040*** 





Table 2.6: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Short Term Reaction to Buyback Announcements 
This table reports results of the cross-sectional analysis of short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements. The 
dependent variable is the three day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is the repurchase announcement date. LBB Dummy is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a 
debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. TLEV Dummy is a binary variable that equals 
one if the firm is over-levered before the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. TCASH Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has excess cash prior to the buyback announcement. OMSR Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the repurchase is an open market repurchase program and zero otherwise. HD Dummy is a 
binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from 2004 onwards and zero otherwise. We 
include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. 
We also include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. 
***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.156 0.195 0.194 0.157 0.163 
 [3.09]*** [3.91]*** [3.54]*** [3.07]*** [3.18]*** 
LBB Dummy -0.019 0.022 -0.000 -0.022 -0.022 
 [2.03]** [1.71]* [0.02] [1.66]* [1.47] 
TLEV Dummy   0.042   
   [1.76]*   
TCASH Dummy     0.001 
     [0.06] 
OMSR Dummy -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 
 [0.64] [0.50] [0.42] [0.68] [0.23] 
HD Dummy -0.009 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 
 [0.54] [0.90] [0.73] [0.53] [0.49] 
Prior AR -0.116 -0.128 -0.152 -0.116 -0.123 
 [2.61]*** [3.14]*** [3.30]*** [2.61]*** [2.63]*** 
Q -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.87] [0.20] [0.20] [0.86] [0.84] 
Size -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 [2.36]** [3.43]*** [3.02]*** [2.35]** [2.61]*** 
Cash Holdings -0.018 -0.021 -0.028 -0.019 -0.019 
 [0.52] [0.64] [0.78] [0.55] [0.50] 
Free Cash Flow -0.197 -0.195 -0.204 -0.207 -0.188 
 [1.99]** [1.97]** [1.87]* [1.82]* [1.88]* 
Leverage -0.008 0.079 -0.023 -0.008 -0.006 
 [0.26] [1.47] [0.76] [0.25] [0.19] 
Dividend -0.022 0.061 0.097 -0.022 -0.026 
 [0.21] [0.59] [0.79] [0.20] [0.25] 
LBB Dummy* 
Leverage 
 -0.141    
 [2.45]**    
LBB Dummy* 
TLEV Dummy 
  -0.057   
  [1.97]**   
LBB Dummy* 
Free Cash Flow 
   0.042  
   [0.29]  
LBB Dummy* 
TCASH Dummy 
    0.005 
    [0.26] 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 575 554 479 554 543 





Table 2.7: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Changes in Post-Repurchase Real Investments 
This table reports results of the cross-sectional analysis of post-announcement changes in abnormal investment. 
The dependent variable is changes in abnormal investment from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. 
Abnormal investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6), 
minus that of its matched firm. LBB Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-
financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or 
fully financed by debt. TLEV Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is over-levered before the 
repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. TCASH Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm has 
excess cash prior to the buyback announcement. OMSR Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
repurchase is an open market repurchase program and zero otherwise. HD Dummy is a binary variable that equals 
one if the repurchase announcement is made from 2004 onwards and zero otherwise. We include two time 
dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also 
include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, 
**and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.003 0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.06] [0.09] [0.15] [0.02] [0.03] 
LBB Dummy -0.022 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017 
 [2.51]** [1.14] [1.26] [1.59] [1.63] 
TLEV Dummy   0.006   
   [0.59]   
TCASH Dummy     0.008 
     [0.84] 
OMSR Dummy -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 [1.92]* [1.84]* [1.71]* [1.89]* [1.90]* 
HD Dummy 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 
 [0.13] [0.23] [0.28] [0.14] [0.03] 
Prior AR -0.030 -0.030 -0.045 -0.030 -0.029 
 [1.35] [1.34] [2.03]** [1.36] [1.28] 
Q 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.009 
 [2.35]** [2.43]** [1.40] [2.57]** [2.54]** 
Size 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.18] [0.12] [0.32] [0.18] [0.16] 
Cash Holdings -0.025 -0.018 -0.031 -0.025 -0.036 
 [1.22] [0.90] [1.15] [1.25] [1.59] 
Free Cash Flow -0.011 -0.006 -0.015 0.006 -0.013 
 [0.38] [0.21] [0.49] [0.22] [0.45] 
Leverage -0.032 0.001 -0.022 -0.031 -0.033 
 [2.17]** [0.06] [1.31] [2.06]** [2.26]** 
LBB Dummy* 
Leverage 
 -0.056    
 [2.20]**    
LBB Dummy* 
TLEV Dummy 
  -0.045   
  [2.55]**   
LBB Dummy* 
 Free Cash Flow 
   -0.118  
   [1.30]  
LBB Dummy* 
TCASH Dummy 
    -0.008 
    [0.57] 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 419 419 398 419 409 






Table 2.8: Changes of Growth Prospects after Share Buybacks 
This table reports average changes of growth prospects, measured by long-run value to book (Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)). Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share 
repurchase is announced. Period (x, y) measures changes from the end of year y to the end of year x. 
Long-run value to book is the difference between long-run value and observed book value and 
accounts for firm’s growth prospects. Both debt- and cash-financed repurchases are matched to non-
repurchasing peers with similar pre-repurchase firm characteristics. For each repurchasing firm, the 
matched non-repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both pre-repurchase 
investment and book value of assets in year −1 within ±20% of those of the repurchasing firm. Tests 
of differences and difference-in-difference are reported. ***, **and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Category (−1,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+3) (0,+4) 
Debt-financed Repurchases -0.004 -0.007 -0.017 -0.027 -0.038 
 [1.52] [3.57]*** [3.84]*** [4.25]*** [5.31]*** 
Matched Non-repurchasing Firms 0.006 0.014 0.016 0.011 -0.006 
 [1.11] [1.09] [1.00] [0.48] [0.46] 
Difference (1) -0.010 -0.021 -0.033 -0.038 -0.044 
 [0.83] [2.42]** [2.79]*** [3.64]*** [4.71]*** 
Cash-financed Repurchases -0.003 -0.005 -0.012 -0.015 -0.026 
 [1.51] [2.78]*** [3.43]*** [2.41]** [4.26]*** 
Matched Non-repurchasing Firms 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
 [0.21] [0.38] [0.50] [0.82] [0.49] 
Difference (2) -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -0.021 
 [1.02] [2.39]** [3.11]*** [2.25]** [3.73]*** 
Diff-in-Diff (1)-(2) -0.006 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030 -0.023 













Table 2.9:  The Effect of Growth Prospects on Market Reaction and Post-Repurchase Investments 
This table reports the effect of growth prospects on short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements and post-
repurchase real investments. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the three day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 
is the repurchase announcement date. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is changes in abnormal investment 
from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. Abnormal investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 
145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of its matched firm. LBB Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the 
transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. OMSR Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is 
an open market repurchase program and zero otherwise. HD Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the 
repurchase announcement is made from 2004 onwards and zero otherwise. TLEV Dummy is a binary variable that 
equals one if the firm is over-levered before the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. Growth Prospect is the 
difference between long-run value and observed book value one year prior to the repurchase announcement. Change in 
Growth Prospect is changes in growth prospects from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. We include two time 
dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 
11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and 
*represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
               (1)               (2)             (3)             (4) 
Intercept 0.202 0.096 -0.026 0.026 
 [3.40]*** [0.59] [0.59] [0.32] 
LBB Dummy -0.000 0.011 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.02] [0.82] [0.27] [0.20] 
OMSR Dummy -0.005 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 
 [0.39] [0.21] [1.33] [1.60] 
HD Dummy -0.014 -0.014 0.003 0.003 
 [0.66] [0.65] [0.26] [0.23] 
TLEV Dummy 0.049 0.049 0.002 0.006 
 [1.93]* [1.87]* [0.15] [0.55] 
Prior AR -0.163 -0.155 -0.051 -0.045 
 [3.43]*** [3.43]*** [2.13]** [2.02]** 
Q -0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.006 
 [0.02] [0.43] [1.40] [1.34] 
Change in Growth 
Prospect 
0.138  0.016  
[0.83]  [0.21]  
     Growth Prospect  0.045  -0.005 
  [0.89]  [0.18] 
Size -0.008 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 [3.02]*** [0.45] [0.51] [0.22] 
Cash Holdings -0.029 -0.026 -0.027 -0.032 
 [0.73] [0.72] [1.14] [1.11] 
Free Cash Flow -0.166 -0.197 0.002 -0.010 
 [1.44] [1.80]* [0.06] [0.33] 
Leverage -0.026 -0.025 -0.010 -0.019 
 [0.83] [0.83] [0.55] [0.98] 
Dividend 0.114 0.105   
 [0.86] [0.84]   
LBB Dummy*TLEV 
Dummy  
-0.067 -0.062 -0.055 -0.047 




0.027  0.223  




             -0.030  -0.020 
             [1.13]  [0.67] 
R2 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.20 




Table 2.10:  The Effect of Corporate Governance on Market Reaction and Post-Repurchase Investments 
This table reports the effect of corporate governance on short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements 
and post-repurchase real investments. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the three day CAR (−1, 
+1) where day 0 is the repurchase announcement date. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is changes 
in abnormal investment from the end of year −1 to the end of year +2. Abnormal investment is a repurchasing 
firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of its matched firm. LBB 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a 
share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. OMSR Dummy is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is an open market repurchase program and zero otherwise. 
HD Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from 2004 onwards and 
zero otherwise. TLEV Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is over-levered before the 
repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. We follow Gompers et al. (2003) and construct G-Index based on 
24 governance provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). High G-Index indicates 
weak corporate governance. We include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and 
the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 
industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
                 (1)               (2)            (3)            (4) 
Intercept 0.002 0.006 -0.113 -0.088 
 [0.03] [0.08] [1.10] [0.94] 
LBB Dummy 0.053 0.056 0.023 0.027 
 [2.02]** [2.16]** [0.56] [0.64] 
OMSR Dummy -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 [0.05] [0.02] [0.22] [0.19] 
HD Dummy -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 
 [0.57] [0.56] [0.91] [0.83] 
TLEV Dummy 0.015 0.023 -0.015 0.004 
 [1.05] [1.19] [1.06] [0.27] 
G-Index 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 [1.07] [1.11] [0.27] [0.10] 
Prior AR -0.085 -0.085 -0.042 -0.039 
 [2.53]*** [2.58]*** [1.29] [1.28] 
Q -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 [0.25] [0.27] [0.69] [0.76] 
Size 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.005 
 [0.19] [0.09] [1.30] [1.09] 
Cash Holdings 0.028 0.030 -0.041 -0.034 
 [0.63] [0.69] [0.80] [0.66] 
Free Cash Flow 0.030 0.029 0.079 0.082 
 [0.22] [0.22] [0.82] [0.84] 
Leverage -0.070 -0.070 -0.029 -0.018 
 [1.52] [1.55] [1.31] [0.80] 
Dividend 0.162 0.157   
 [0.83] [0.82]   
LBB Dummy*G-
Index  
-0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 




 -0.020  -0.053 
 [0.63]  [1.97]** 
R2 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.24 




Table 2.11: Motives of Leveraged Buybacks 
This table shows results of the relation between the sources of financing used and firm characteristics. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and 
zero otherwise. Prior AR represents stock returns on the firm minus returns on the value-weighted 
CRSP index, calculated from 44 days prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to the 
announcement. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity 
(item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). 
Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Cash Holding is the cash 
and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Leverage is defined as book value of debt 
(item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of 
equity (item 25* item 24). Operating Performance is measured by ROA, which is defined as 
operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Dividend is the sum of common (item 21) 
and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total assets (item 6). Z-score is Altman’s 
(1968) measure of credit risk. We include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 
1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 industry dummy 
variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 Logit  Probit  
Intercept 1.574 0.660 
 (0.95) (0.69) 
Prior AR 1.284 0.763 
 (2.07)** (2.13)** 
Tobin’s Q 0.029 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.01) 
Size -0.091 -0.044 
 (1.22) (1.03) 
Cash Holding -8.067 -4.440 
 (5.10)*** (5.48)*** 
Leverage 0.464 0.426 
 (0.42) (0.74) 
Operating Performance 8.095 4.456 
 (3.87)*** (3.86)*** 
Dividend -0.339 -0.220 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Z-Score -0.077 -0.029 
 (1.36) (1.05) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
N 501 501 







Table 2.12: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Actual Share Repurchases 
This table displays results of the cross-sectional analysis of actual share repurchases. The dependent 
variable is the actual buyback ratio two years after the repurchase announcement. The actual buyback 
ratio is defined as purchase of common and preferred stock (item 115) minus any decrease in 
redeemable preferred stock (item 175), all divided by market value of equity (item 25* item 24). LBB 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. 
We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by 
debt. HD Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from 
2004 onwards and zero otherwise.  Intended buyback ratio is the intended buyback size disclosed in 
the 8-k filing over the market value of equity (item 25* item 24). We include two time dummies 
capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also 
include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors 
by firm.***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 Tobit  OLS   
Intercept -0.117 0.098 
 (0.40) (0.50) 
LBB Dummy -0.010 -0.072 
 (2.01)** (2.04)** 
HD Dummy -0.084 -0.053 
 (1.04) (0.91) 
Prior AR -0.047 -0.059 
 (0.35) (0.61) 
Tobin’s Q 0.011 0.009 
 (0.54) (0.66) 
Size 0.012 0.001 
 (0.75) (0.05) 
Cash Holding -0.302 -0.211 
 (1.49) (1.37) 
Free Cash Flow 0.268 -0.002 
 (1.03) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.452 -0.206 
 (2.76)*** (2.22)** 
Dividend -0.699 -0.355 
 (0.59) (0.46) 
Intended Buyback Ratio 0.169 0.090 
 (1.34) (1.41) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
N 419 419 







Figure 2.1: Changes in Cash, Leverage and Growth Prospects around Buybacks  
This figure shows average changes in cash holdings, market leverage and growth prospects prior to and following 
buyback announcements for both debt- and cash-financed repurchases. Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when 
share repurchase is announced. Cash Holding is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). 
Market Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt 
(item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Growth Prospects is measured by long-run 
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Figure 2.2: Changes in Investment, Operating Performance and Z-Score around Buybacks  
This figure shows average changes in investment, operating performance and Z-score after repurchase 
announcements for both debt- and cash-financed buyback firms and their matched non-repurchasing peers. Year 
0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase is announced. Investment is defined as capital expenditure 
(item 145) divided by total assets (item 6). Operating performance is measured by ROA, which is defined as 
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Institutional Investors and Corporate          
Political Activism 
 
“Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people 
who commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to 
themselves the greatest share of the public consideration. […] As their thoughts, 
however, are commonly exercised rather about the interest of their own particular 
branch of business, than about that of the society, their judgment, even when 
given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion), is 
much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, 
than with regard to the latter. […]The proposal of any new law or regulation of 
commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great 
precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most 
suspicious attention.”  
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, pp. 
316-17. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision on 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserting for the first time that 
corporations, like individuals, benefit from First Amendment protection regarding 
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freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures.17 In practice, 
the ruling lifts prior bans on corporations to use their treasury to advocate in favor or 
against a political candidate on a federal election, so called independent expenditures 
on express advocacy.18 The result, according to the Centre for Responsive Politics 
(CRP), is a seven-fold increase in independent expenditures to federal elections.19  
The Supreme Court ruling generated significant controversy. A week after the 
ruling, President Barack Obama (2010) voiced the opinion of many regarding 
Citizens United in his State of the Union Address: “Last week, the Supreme Court 
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests 
– including foreign corporations – to spend without limit in our elections. Well I 
don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful 
interests …” On February 24, 2010, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an 
association of public, union and corporate employee benefit plans, endowments and 
foundations, and the Center for Political Accountability (CPA) wrote a letter to 427 
S&P 500 companies – those lacking disclosure rules on political spending – urging 
them to adopt rules to disclose all political contributions from corporate treasuries 
and calling on boards to review and approve such contributions (CPA-CII, 2010).20  
Representing the most dramatic change regarding the role of corporations in 
campaign finance in the U.S. since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 that prohibited 
                                                            
17 Citizens United, Appellant v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. (docket nos. 08-205) decided 
1/21/2010. Werner (2011) provides an overview of the antecedents of Citizens United and of the 
ruling itself. 
18 Direct contributions to candidates or coordinated expenditures are still prohibited.  
19 Expenditures increase in presidential cycles from $143 million in 2008 to over $1 billion in the 
2012 election cycle, and in non-presidential cycles from $37 million in 2006 to $205 million in 2010 
and $550 million in 2014 (CRP, 2015). 
20 The CII pressed on when Ann Yerger, Executive Director of the CII, testified before Congress on 
March 11, 2010, asking for legislation along the same lines (Yerger, 2010). Interestingly, Institutional 
Shareholder Services Inc., a leading proxy advisor firm, only changed their recommendation from 
vote CASE-BY-CASE to “generally vote FOR proposals requesting greater disclosure of a 
company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities” in their 
Dec/19/2011 Proxy voting Guideline Updates. 
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corporations from making any expenditure in connection to federal elections, 
Citizens United provides a natural experiment setting to study how corporations 
adjust their inputs to political activism. Corporations are not new to political 
activism and have used for that purpose, political connections, lobbying, and 
contributions by both executives and Political Action Committees (PAC). We ask 
how investors assess the impact of the ruling for corporations already engaged in 
other forms of political activism. Further, because many institutional investors are 
agencies of state governments, we ask whether the market response to Citizens 
United depends on having institutional investor owners that may be engaged in 
political activism themselves. We therefore revisit Adam Smith (1776)’s point on the 
influence of business over politics, adapted to today’s ownership structure and to the 
possibility that politics can also influence business through the ownership structure. 
We examine four hypotheses of which the first two hypotheses deal with the 
announcement returns around Citizens United.  
First, we hypothesize that firms that are engaged in political activism benefit 
from having access to a new input to political activism, but only if they can adjust 
their other inputs. This hypothesis follows from the fact that Citizens United creates 
the opportunity to actively pursue political activism with money from corporate 
treasuries. Ceteris paribus, the price of independent expenditures relative to the price 
of other inputs to political activism falls (from infinity). Corporations engaged in 
political activism should therefore benefit from the lower cost of independent 
expenditures and increase firm value by redirecting some of their funds to 
independent expenditures and away from other inputs. However, firms may be 
constrained from using certain forms of political activism, which may result in a 
decrease in firm value. This loss in value occurs whenever a firm’s other inputs to 
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political activism lose some of their value, for example, through the loss of real 
options associated with them. Second, we hypothesize that the ability to adjust 
between independent expenditures and other forms of political activism is affected 
by the share ownership of institutional investors. Specifically, institutional investors’ 
behavior post Citizens United indicates a strict preference to not use independent 
political expenditures. Therefore, for the firms with high institutional ownership, the 
inability to adjust may mean that in the new equilibrium they are required to spend 
more in relatively more expensive inputs to keep up with the same level of political 
activism.  
The last two hypotheses deal with changes in political activism after Citizens 
United and looks to see if the actions of firms were consistent with the initial market 
reaction. We explore the fact that prior to Citizens United twenty-three states had 
bans on independent political expenditures by corporations on state elections besides 
the ban on all states on independent political expenditures on federal elections. State 
bans had been ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 21  The decision in Citizens United overruled 
Austin. In our third and fourth hypotheses, we exploit these cross-sectional 
differences to consider the differential impact of Citizens United on corporate 
decisions based on company headquarter state, with corporations headquartered in 
ban states being the treatment group and corporations headquartered in no-ban states 
being the control group (see also Spencer and Wood, 2014). 
Our third hypothesis states that firms that are headquartered in ban states engage 
in less of the other forms of political activism after Citizens United than firms in no-
                                                            




ban states. This means that firms that were previously hindered from using 
independent political expenditures in state elections and thus had to rely on other 
forms of political activism at the state level, can now adjust by decreasing their 
engagement in the latter. Fourth, we hypothesize that the ability to decrease their 
engagement in other forms of political activism is most pronounced in firms with 
low or no institutional ownership, which, according to hypothesis two, have no 
adjustment restrictions. 
Using a merged sample of 1,722 firm-year observations based on ExecuComp 
and BoardEx, we find that the average three-day return on the announcement of the 
Citizens United ruling amounts to 0.92%. In the cross-section, firms with more 
political connections exhibit lower three-day abnormal stock returns than firms with 
less political connections, but this negative effect is concentrated in firms with high 
institutional ownership. A one-standard-deviation increase in the number of political 
connections leads to a 1.15% lower three-day abnormal return for firms with high 
institutional ownership relative to firms with low institutional ownership, or a 
relative loss of $80 million in market capitalization. This result is consistent with a 
general inability of high institutional ownership firms with established political 
connections to adjust to the presence of a new input to political activism. We do not 
find any significant stock market reaction for lobbying, PAC spending, or executive 
contributions. This could be because lobbying activities encompass the provision of 
issue-specific information (Bertrand, Bombardini, Trebbi, 2014) and therefore may 
bring unique value to political activism;22 PAC contributions come from employees 
                                                            
22 The evidence finds that lobbying increases firm value through lower effective tax rates and tax 
savings (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009, and Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz, 2009), 
access to subsidies during a financial crisis (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012, and Adelino and Dinc, 2014), 
lower likelihood of SEC enforcement actions and lower penalties (Correia, 2014), and higher 
financial performance ex post (Chen, Parsley, and Yang, 2012). 
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(and shareholders) and so are not at the full discretion of management; and executive 
contributions have low legal limits. In contrast, political connections, like 
independent political expenditures, are exclusively about political activism and are 
strictly under the control of the management.23 
Our results are consistent with firms with low institutional ownership benefiting 
from the ruling (i.e., taking advantage of substitutability) and firms with high 
institutional ownership, given their preference not to adjust, being relatively worse 
off. We pursue three other main specifications of Hypotheses one and two. First, the 
results are robust to a variety of controls including several corporate governance 
variables. More importantly, we show that the effect of high institutional ownership 
does not capture the quality of governance normally associated with these 
institutions. However, it is the institutional owners without business ties to the 
corporation that seem to drive the negative market reaction, suggesting that an arm’s 
length relationship may be more effective in imposing constraints on management. 
Second, when we separate institutional ownership according to the political color of 
the institutional investors’ headquarter’s state in the 2008 presidential election, our 
main result goes through only for democratic-state-based institutional owners. Third, 
one concern with our exercise is the presence of other information events occurring 
in the day of the ruling. The main other such event that we could identify is the 
announcement by President Obama of the Volcker rule, which states that commercial 
banks should not be allowed to engage in proprietary trading. While Paul Volcker’s 
conception of the rule was not a surprise, the decision to adopt it may have come as a 
surprise to some. We repeat our exercise without financial firms and the results are 
unchanged.  
                                                            
23 Corporations have historically hired executives and board members with current or past political 
connections (e.g., Faccio, 2006, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009, and Goldman, Rocholl 
and So, 2009).  
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We test Hypotheses three and four on all forms of political activism. Again the 
main results are with regards to political connections. We find that on average firms 
in ban states, i.e. the treatment group, establish less state-level political connections 
after Citizens United than firms in no-ban states, i.e. the control group. We also find 
that this effect depends on the level of institutional ownership. Citizens United has a 
negative net impact on state-level political connections for low institutional-
ownership firms, which we argue can adjust to the presence of the new input. In 
contrast, high-institutional-ownership firms do not significantly change or mildly 
increase state-level political connections after Citizens United. Historical 
connections are affected in the same way that state connections are, but we find that 
it is the historical-state connections that explain the result. This evidence is 
consistent with the preference for no adjustment by high institutional investor firms. 
We find that state-level PAC contributions appear to respond to Citizens United in a 
way that is consistent with hypothesis four, though statistical significance exists only 
for firms in ban states with high institutional ownership. We do not find any 
evidence of change in the inputs lobbying and executive contributions perhaps 
because these are not state level variables.  
We conduct two falsification tests. First, we move the announcement day of the 
Court ruling to either two weeks prior to the true announcement day or two weeks 
after. We observe no effect of political activism variables over the respective three-
day abnormal returns. Second, we conduct a falsification test over changes in 
political activism. We move the window of study to the period 2004-2009, non-
overlapping with the Court ruling, and create a fictitious date for a ruling in 2007. 




We consider several alternative explanations. One alternative explanation that we 
emphasize here is that firms with high institutional ownership have connections of 
higher quality than firms with low institutional ownership and this is what causes the 
former to not substitute inputs. Using two proxies for the quality of connections from 
Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009), we find that high institutional ownership firms do 
not have connections of higher quality than low institutional ownership firms.  
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First, it relates to the 
papers that examine how institutional investors can alleviate agency conflicts 
between management and shareholders. There is evidence that institutional investor 
activism increases firm value (Gillan and Starks, 2000, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas, 2008, and Klein and Zur, 2009) through a variety of channels, including 
through investment and growth prospects (Bushee, 1998), executive turnover and 
compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), corporate governance (Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos, 2011, and Chung and Zhang, 2011) and the quality of 
management earnings forecast (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005). We consider 
a potential conflict of interest between institutional investors and other shareholders 
and propose that some institutional investors may pursue agendas that are outside the 
scope of public corporations, for example regarding their political motivations.  
Second, our paper is related to the work on the effects of Citizens United. Werner 
(2011) finds no evidence of market reaction to Citizens United for firms with 
lobbying activity, political action committee (PAC) contributions, and procurement 
contracts. Burns and Jindra (2014) and Skaife and Werner (2014) uncover a response 
by firms in regulated industries, which we control for with industry dummies in our 
regressions. In work contemporaneous to ours, Newton and Uysal (2013) also find a 
negative market reaction around the announcement of Citizens United for politically 
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connected firms, but they do not identify the effect of institutional investors. 
Consistent with our results, Spencer and Wood (2014) find an increase in 
independent expenditures in state elections for states with prior bans on contributions. 
Like us, Coates (2012) finds increased PAC contributions, though our evidence 
suggests that the effect is concentrated on firms with high institutional ownership. 
Coates (2012) also finds increased lobbying after Citizens United and lower 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for politically active unregulated firms. Klumpp, Mialon 
and Williams (2014) find evidence that Citizens United is associated with an increase 
in Republican election probabilities in state House races.  
Finally, our paper contributes to the evidence on political connections by 
demonstrating that political connections and independent expenditures are substitute 
inputs in the production of political activism. There is a large literature documenting 
that political connections add value to the firm (see Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009, 
for evidence in the U.S., and Fisman, 2001, Faccio, 2006, Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2009, and Stahl, 2015, for international evidence). The value 
from political connections comes from a variety of sources including the ability to 
access outside funding (Khwaja and Mian, 2005, and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006), the likelihood of being bailed out (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006), the 
subsidies gained in the event of financial crises (Johnson and Mitton, 2003, and 
Duchin and Sosyura, 2012, Acemoglu et al., 2013) and in obtaining procurement 
contracts (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013).  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2 presents 
the hypothesis development. Section 3.3 presents the data and Section 3.4 gives our 




3.2  Hypothesis Development 
We assume that firms engage in political activism using a variety of inputs, 
political connections, lobbying, PAC contributions, executive contributions and 
independent political expenditures. We further assume that the firms’ objective is to 
minimize the cost of providing for a certain value of political activism.24 We develop 
the following four main hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: If firms can adjust their inputs to political activism, then firms with 
more political activism have higher announcement returns following Citizens United, 
otherwise they have lower announcement returns.  
Citizens United recognizes for the first time corporations’ First Amendment 
rights regarding independent political expenditures and overturns state bans deemed 
constitutional in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. The decision was 
unexpected, broader than the original lawsuit and with a Court closely divided vote 
of 5 “conservative” judges in favor against 4 “liberal” judges. Citizens United creates 
a new avenue for political activism by allowing firms to spend unlimited amounts 
from their corporate treasuries in support of candidates in state and federal elections 
as long as uncoordinated with the political campaigns of the specific candidates 
being financed, so called independent expenditures. On the one hand, this new input 
provides firms with added flexibility in the production of political activism. In 
practice, the relative price of independent expenditures decreased from infinity 
(because they were illegal) to some finite amount allowing firms to produce the same 
amount of political activism possibly with the same or less spending. On the other 
                                                            
24 We do not require the assumption that political activism is value increasing. While the existing 
literature seems to suggest that political activism is in general value increasing, the hypotheses and 
results in this paper could in principle be consistent with an agency view of political activism where 




hand, firms may be subject to constraints on the use of certain forms of political 
activism. If these constraints critically limit the ability of a firm to adjust, firm value 
may decrease if the firm’s other inputs to political activism lose some of the value 
associated with them, for example, through the loss of real options associated with 
them, or if these firms are now less well equipped to compete with other firms for 
political favoritism.  
Provided the firm can adjust its inputs, the substitutability across inputs dictates 
the optimal amount of adjustment and hence the effect on firm value. Substitutability 
requires that the inputs share similar characteristics with independent political 
expenditures, namely that they are under the full control of management, that they 
can target specific politicians, and that they may not have to be disclosed.25 Political 
connections, lobbying, PAC and executive contributions are all under the control of 
management, though the size of PAC contributions is not entirely at the discretion of 
managers and the legal maximum for executive contributions is very low. All can be 
used to target specific politicians, though lobbying may have a component of 
complement to the input of political activism because of its dual role as a mechanism 
to provide issue-specific information (Bertrand, Bombardini, Trebbi, 2014). Finally, 
while political connections do not have to be disclosed, lobbying, and PAC and 
executive contributions have clear disclosure rules, which may make them less 
substitutable. Overall, political connections appear to be the closer substitute to 
independent expenditures. Hypothesis one resembles the argument by Issacharoff 
and Karlan (1999) that campaign finance can be viewed as a hydraulic system where 
                                                            
25 Whether these expenditures are disclosed depends on who gets the money. They are eventually 
disclosed if made through a Super PAC because of Federal Election Comission regulations, but will 
not de disclosed if made through organizations formed under section 501(c)(4) of the U.S. tax code, 
reserved for “social welfare groups”, section 501(c)(5), reserved for “labor organizations”, or section 
501(c)(6), reserved for business leagues, chambers of commerce, the real estate boards, or boards of 
trade because the IRS does not require these organizations to disclose their sources of funding. 
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money, like water, must go somewhere. “Money, like water, will seek its own level. 
The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere” (p. 
1713). 
Hypothesis 2: Higher announcement returns are concentrated in firms with low 
institutional ownership.  
We expect firms with institutional shareowners to give up on the added input 
flexibility that comes with Citizens United due to the public reaction by the Council 
of Institutional Investors shortly after the Court ruling, and the many shareholder 
proposals initiated by institutional investors on disclosure of political contributions 
especially since Citizens United (Westcott, 2013). The origin of this preference may 
be premised on the advancement of governance usually associated with these 
investors (e.g. Gillan and Starks, 2000, Aggarwal et al., 2011, and Chung and Zhang, 
2011). Alternatively, it may be premised on political pressure, as some of these 
institutional investors are state employee pension funds like CalPERS (the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System) and CalSTRS (the California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System), both leading institutional investors and agencies of the State of 
California. Bill Lockyer, California Treasurer, wrote to CalPERS and CalSTRS 
urging them – as a consequence of Citizens United – to develop policies regarding 
disclosure of political contributions by portfolio companies (Lockyer, 2011). The 
premise of political pressure for not using independent expenditures is also observed 
by Westcott (2013) who instead argues that the goal of institutional investors is not 
to promote disclosure but to force corporations out of the political debate. Along 
similar lines, Finseth (2013) suggests that employees that are forced to contribute to 
such pension funds should be able to control on a pro rata basis the publicly traded 
shares of the companies that the funds are trying to influence. In sum, firms with 
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institutional shareowners are expected to react most negatively to Citizens United 
(see also Taub, 2012). 
Hypothesis 3: If firms can adjust their inputs to political activism, then firms 
headquartered in states with corporate campaign contribution bans prior to Citizens 
United reduce other inputs to political activism after Citizens United relative to a 
control group, otherwise they do not change or even increase other inputs to 
political activism. 
Prior to Citizens United, twenty-three states had bans on independent 
expenditures by corporations on state elections, based on Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.26 These bans are overruled by Citizens United. We thus use 
firms in ban states as the treatment group and firms in no-ban states as the control 
group (Spencer and Wood, 2014). We expect that firms in ban states that could not 
use their own treasury and had to rely on other forms of political activism before 
Citizens United, but that are unconstrained to use the flexibility created with Citizens 
United, reduce other inputs to political activism after Citizens United. Firms that 
cannot take advantage of the added flexibility may do nothing or overcompensate by 
engaging more in the other forms of political activism. 
Hypothesis 4: The reduction in other forms of political activism for firms 
headquartered in states with corporate campaign contribution bans prior to Citizens 
United is concentrated in firms with low or no institutional ownership. 
Citizens United is expected to have a negative net impact on other types of 
political activism for low-institutional-ownership firms. These firms now substitute 
into independent political expenditures. In contrast, high-institutional-ownership 
                                                            




firms do not significantly change their political activism after Citizens United, given 
the outside pressure posed on them. 
 
3.3  Data 
Our sample is based on firms in ExecuComp and BoardEx. We use BoardEx to 
collect CVs of corporate board members and executives and produce a list of 
individuals who currently hold or previously have held a position in a government 
organization in the U.S.27 The number of political connections for each firm in any 
given year (Connection) is the number of executives and board members of the firm 
with such positions in that year. To merge BoardEx to ExecuComp, we require firms 
to have valid identifiers such as tickers and when tickers are missing or incorrect 
from BoardEx, we manually match firms using firm names. Most ExecuComp firms 
have at least one political connection in 2009. We further distinguish between 
contemporaneous and historical connections, and political connections with national-, 
state- and local-level government organizations. A political connection is defined as 
contemporaneous if the individual simultaneously holds both government and firm 
positions whereas it is an historical connection if the executive or board member 
used to hold a government position.  
Our source for lobbying data is the Center for Responsive Politics that has been 
collecting data since 1998, after the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 that requires 
firms that spend more than $20,000 on direct lobbying activities to file with the 
                                                            
27 We drop observations if the start and end date for government or firm positions held by individuals 
are missing. We also delete observations if individuals leave the firm before joining the government. 
The position each individual holds in a firm varies each year. For individuals with no more than two 
observations, we create the earliest start/end year and the latest start/end year for each individual to 
verify the duration of individual’s stay in the firm. For individuals that have three or more 
observations, we manually check to identify whether the individual holds a position each year from 
1990 to 2013. 
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Senate Office of Public Records and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.28 We 
add up all past lobbying expenditures made before the end of 2009 for each firm to 
calculate cumulative prior lobbying expenditures (Lobbying).29 We match these data 
to the ExecuComp sample by manually checking firm names. We code lobbying as 
zero for ExecuComp firms that never spend money on lobbying. 
Individual political contributions data are collected from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) for 10 federal election cycles from 1991 to 2010 and matched to 
ExecuComp names. The FEC gives information on donors’ names, employers, 
addresses, and sometimes their occupation. We develop an algorithm to conduct the 
match and visually check the results. The match is based on (i) last name (exact 
match), (ii) first name (allowing for variations, e.g. Rob vs. Robert), (iii) either 
employer names (including employment history) or (3-digit) Zip codes. 30  We 
measure managers’ political contributions (Executive Contributions) by adding all 
past contributions made before the end of 2009 by current managers independently 
of their previous occupation. This measure does not include contributions made by 
past managers.31  
Political contributions of firms’ Political Action Committees to state elections are 
obtained from the National Institute on Money in State Politics.32 We add all past 
contributions donated before the end of 2009 for each firm to calculate cumulative 
contributions prior to 2010 (PAC Contributions). We match the contributions data to 
                                                            
28 Lobbying data are available on https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. 
29 We also use lobbying spending in 2009 as an alternative variable with similar results. 
30 In the end, 82% of matched results are based on employer names rather than zip codes. We also 
check the occupation of matched donors. The FEC records occupation since 2001 and the coverage 
has improved over time. In 2010, 80% of the matched donors have recorded occupation of 
‘executive’, ‘director’, ‘CEO’, etc.   
31 We also sum up contributions made by both current and past managers provided the contributions 
are made during the tenure as a top executive of the firm. The results are similar. 
32 PAC contributions data are available on http://www.followthemoney.org/. 
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the ExecuComp sample by manually checking firm names. One third of firms have 
positive PAC Contributions.  
We obtain stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
files and require that ExecuComp firms have available stock return data around 
January 21st, 2010. We calculate three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from 
day -1 to day 1 using the market model to measure expected returns and the CRSP 
value-weighted market index as the benchmark.33 Finally, accounting variables are 
obtained from Compustat. We winsorise these control variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Our main sample consists of 1,722 firms. 
We obtain institutional ownership data from the FactSet/LionShares database. 
The institutions covered in the database are qualified money managers such as 
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and bank trusts. 
FactSet/LionShares collects quarterly institutional holding data from public sources 
such as stock exchanges, national regulatory agencies, company proxies, and 
industry directories, as described by Ferreira and Matos (2008). Institutional 
ownership (I.O_DOM) is calculated as of the final quarter of 2009 and includes 
ordinary shares, preferred shares, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), Global 
Depositary Receipts (GDRs), and dual listings. Of the 1,722 firms in our sample, 
1,631 firms have positive institutional ownership. For firms whose shares are not 
held by any institutions in FactSet/LionShares, we set the institutional ownership 
variable to zero following Gompers and Metrick (2001).  
Following Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), we use both G-Index 
and E-Index to control for differences in corporate governance. Gompers et al. (2003) 
                                                            
33 Our results are similar when we use two-day CAR from day 0 to day 1. The estimation period ends 
10 days before the announcement of Citizens United decision and we require the minimum 
(maximum) estimation length to be 60 (505) days.  
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construct an equally-weighted index based on 24 governance provisions provided by 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Bebchuk et al. (2009) propose 
an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments and mergers.34 Among our 1,722 firms, 1,429 
firms have available data on G-Index and E-Index.  
We use two additional measures of corporate governance. We follow Larcker et 
al. (2011) and measure excess pay (Excesspay) using ExecuComp data as the 
difference between CEO compensation and the median compensation of a set of peer 
firms in the same industry and of similar size as that of the firm.35  Specifically, it is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of total compensation (variable TDC1 from 
ExecuComp) for the CEO minus the natural logarithm of the median total annual pay 
for all remaining firms on ExecuComp that are in the same Fama and French (1997) 
12 industry group and size quintile of the firm for that year. This measure captures 
compensation earned by the CEO in excess of the market pay for CEOs at other 
firms with similar firm characteristics. A firm where the CEO is also chairman of the 
board may have fewer mechanisms for supervising management. Hence we also use 
a dummy variable to capture whether a CEO is the Chairman of the Board (CEO 
Duality). We obtain positions of executives from RiskMetrics and manually check 
whether the CEO held the position of chairman of the board as of December 31, 
2009. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for each variable (Panel A) and the 
correlations between key variables (Panel B).  
 
                                                            
34 IRRC covers between 1400 and 1800 firms depending on the year. All S&P 500 firms are covered 
in IRRC and other firms not included in the S&P 500 but considered important are covered in IRRC 
as well. 
35 We thank Ana Albuquerque for providing us with the data. 
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3.4  Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Political Activism and Firm Value 
Table 3.2 presents a test of Hypothesis 1.36 The table displays estimates of how 
existing political activism by firms is perceived by the stock market with the 
announcement of the ruling in Citizens United v. FEC. The dependent variable is the 
three-day cumulative abnormal return around January 21st, 2010, the day the ruling is 
announced. We add control variables that are suggested in previous literature. We 
include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by 
industry. In columns (1) through (4), we include Connection, Lobbying, Executive 
Contributions and PAC Contributions separately in the regression and in column (5) 
we include all these inputs.  
We find that Connection is negatively associated with the three-day CAR. The 
coefficients on other political variables are insignificant. The results are consistent 
with firms not being able to adjust to the new input to political activism (Hypothesis 
1). Table 3.3 repeats the regression in column (5) of Table 3.2 but adds Excesspay, 
E-Index, G-Index and CEO Duality respectively in columns (1) through (4) as 
corporate governance control variables. The corporate governance controls appear 
not to affect the market response. We also use alternative corporate governance 
variables, such as a founder-CEO dummy, the percentage of independent directors in 
the board of directors, Excesspay_Cai defined by Cai and Walking (2011) and a co-
opted board dummy.37 The results are similar. 
 
3.4.2 Political Activism and Institutional Ownership 
                                                            
36 Any result discussed in the main text that is not tabulated can be found in the paper’s internet 
appendix. 
37 Co-opted board dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm has a high co-opted board 
(measured as the percentage of directors appointed by the CEO among the top quintile of the firm-
years observations) and zero otherwise. 
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In Table 3.4, we investigate whether institutional investors affect the stock 
market reaction for firms that engage in political activism (Hypothesis 2). We 
interact institutional ownership of domestic institutions, I.O_DOM, with Connection, 
Lobbying, Executive Contributions and PAC Contributions respectively in columns 
(1) through (4) of Table 3.4.  
In column (1), the coefficient on the I.O_DOM*Connection is significantly 
negative at the 1% level. For firms with institutional ownership in the 90th percentile, 
i.e., with a total percent ownership of 94%, and relative to firms with zero 
institutional ownership, a one standard deviation increase in the number of political 
connections established prior to Citizens United leads to a 1.15% (=0.004*0.94*3.06) 
lower three-day abnormal return (equivalent to a relative decrease in market value of 
$80 million for the average firm). This calculation uses our regression results that 
only allow us to describe the conditional, or relative outcome of firms with high 
institutional ownership versus those with low institutional ownership. To analyze the 
unconditional or absolute outcome of Citizens United we look at the abnormal 
returns of highly connected firms, i.e. firms that rank in the top 10 percentile in our 
sample of 1,722 firms for the number of political connections. We split these firms 
into high institutional ownership, i.e. firms that rank in the top 10th percentile for the 
institutional ownership share, and low institutional ownership, i.e. firms that rank in 
the bottom 10th percentile for the institutional ownership share. Highly connected 
firms with high institutional ownership experience a stock return of -0.18% over the 
three-day period surrounding Citizens United, whereas highly connected firms with 
low institutional ownership see a stock return of 1.52% over the same time period. 
Given an average market capitalization of $21.4 billion for highly connected firms, 
being connected results on average in an unconditional loss of $39 million for high 
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institutional ownership firms and an unconditional gain of $325 million for low 
institutional ownership firms.  
We interpret these results as suggesting that political connections are a substitute 
to independent political expenditures for firms with flexibility to adjust inputs to 
political activism, i.e. firms with low or no institutional ownership, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. For firms with high institutional ownership, the results are consistent 
with the view that these firms do not adjust to the new input in virtue of the public 
discourse by many institutional investors after the Court ruling, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. The loss of firm value may come from the loss of value produced by 
the other inputs, for example, via real options associated with them.  
These results are robust to using bootstrapped p-values. Bootstrapped p-values 
account for the fact that the announcement could result in cross-sectional correlation 
of returns across stocks and thus bias the OLS standard errors even with the industry 
clustering (Sefcik and Thompson, 1986, and Bernard, 1987). We use a procedure 
similar to that of Lo (2003), Zhang (2007), and Cai and Walking (2011). The 
procedure generates 10,000 repetitions where each repetition uses sample firm 
abnormal returns from 50 randomly-selected non-overlapping 3-day windows from 
non-event periods. This procedure maintains the cross-sectional correlation of firms’ 
returns in the non-event period so that one can assess whether the event returns are 
significant independently of any correlation generated by the event. 
The three-day CAR does not appear to be sensitive to any other form of political 
activism. As discussed above, there are reasons to believe that there is a lower degree 
of substitutability with these other inputs. In the rest of the analysis, we continue to 
tabulate the results for all forms of political activism, but to conserve on space we 
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will only comment on Connection since the effect of the other inputs lacks statistical 
significance. 
In Table 3.5, we repeat the regression model in column (5) of Table 3.4 but add 
corporate governance control variables. In columns (1) and (3), we add G-Index and 
E-Index respectively, as controls. The coefficient associated with 
I.O_DOM*Connection remains negative and the coefficient associated with 
Connection remains positive. In columns (2) and (4) of Table 3.5, we interact the 
inputs in the production of political activism with G-Index and E-Index, 
respectively. 38  If the effect of institutional ownership were premised on the 
advancement of governance in our specific exercise, then one would expect a similar 
effect from interacting other governance variables with the inputs to political 
activism. In contrast, we find that the estimated parameters associated with the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant. 
 
3.4.3 Political Activism and Institutional Ownership: Business Relationships  
The evidence above is consistent with institutional investors pursuing agendas 
that are outside the scope of public corporations, for example regarding their 
political motivations. If this is the case, then our results are driven by institutional 
investors without business ties to corporations. This is because institutional investors 
without business ties may be less sensitive to pressures from corporate managers 
(Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988) and may exert more pressure themselves. Our 
definition of business ties between institutional investors and corporations follows 
that of Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) who classify institutional investors into 
“pressure sensitive” (i.e. with business ties to corporations), “pressure resistant” 
                                                            
38 The results are similar if we use alternative governance variables such as excesspay or CEO duality. 
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(without business ties to corporations) or “pressure indeterminate”.39 They argue that 
mutual funds and pension funds, endowments and foundations are pressure resistant 
because they have little potential business ties with the firms in which they invest, 
which makes them more independent. In contrast, insurance companies, banks, and 
nonbank trusts are more likely to have current or prospective business relationships 
with corporations and are labeled as “pressure-sensitive” institutions. Finally, 
brokerage houses, investment counsel firms, miscellaneous and unidentified 
institutions are “pressure-indeterminate” institutions. The correlation between 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive (IO_Pressure_Resistant) with our institutional ownership 
variable I.O_DOM is 0.05 (0.78) (see Panel B of Table 3.1).  
In Table 3.6, we interact IO_Pressure_Sensitive, IO_Pressure_Resistant and 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate with Connection. In column (1) we show that there is a 
negative association between IO_Pressure_Resistant*Connection with the three-day 
CAR while IO_Pressure_Sensitive*Connection and 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate*Connection are statistically insignificant. The effect 
that political connections reduce value for firms with high institutional ownership is 
driven by “pressure-resistant” institutions. As with previous results, we find no effect 
from interacting the various IO_Pressure variables with other inputs to political 
activism. When we add the corporate governance control variables as in Table 3.5, 
we obtain similar results.  
 
3.4.4 Political Activism and State of headquarter of Institutional Investor 
                                                            
39 Other papers follow a similar definition of investor types and label them differently. For example, 
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) divide institutions as “passive” (with business ties) or “active” 
(without business ties). Ferreira and Matos (2008) label institutions as independent (without business 
ties) or grey (with business ties) institutions. 
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Next we ask whether the political color of the institutional investor’s headquarter 
state explains the results. Because the Court ruling was decided by the Republican-
leaning judges against the Democratic-leaning judges and the negative reaction to 
the Court ruling came primarily from the Democratic side of the political spectrum, 
we expect the negative stock market response to be concentrated on firms with a 
significant percentage of institutional investors from democratic-leaning states. We 
define I.O_DOM_Dem (I.O_DOM_Rep) as the institutional ownership of domestic 
institutions from democratic (republican) states based on the 2008 presidential 
election. There is significant concentration of institutional investors in the U.S. with 
86 percent of them headquartered in democratic states. 
The results are in Table 3.7. Consider the regression model in column (5). The 
variable Connection displays an estimated positive coefficient whereas the 
coefficient on the interaction variable I.O_DOM_Dem*Connection displays a 
negative coefficient and the coefficient on the interaction variable 
I.O_DOM_Rep*Connection is insignificant. These results suggest that it is the 
institutions from democratic states that drive our results. Moreover, we also divide 
our “pressure resistant” institutions into those from democratic states and those from 
republican states. In untabulated results, we show that it is the “pressure resistant” 
institutions from democratic states that appear to drive our results.  
 
3.4.5 Changes of Political Connections Following the Citizens United Ruling 
We turn now to examining Hypothesis 3. We start by analyzing the effect of 
Citizens United on political connections. We test whether the number of political 
connections changes after the Citizens United ruling using a sample period from 
2007 to 2012. The dependent variable is the number of connections for any firm and 
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year, but we also consider the breakdown of connections into the potentially 
overlapping categories of contemporaneous, historical, national, state and local 
connections. Because the ban is at the state level, we expect state connections to be 
most affected. Post Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one from 2010 to 2012 
and zero from 2007 to 2009. Each of these periods contains two years of a 
presidential election cycle and one year of a mid-term election cycle. Ban States is a 
binary variable that equals one if the headquarter of the firm locates in a state that 
had bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise.40 We 
add firm characteristics that affect the establishment of political connections and 
other inputs in the production of political activism as control variables. We include 
industry dummies based on Fama-French 12 industries and standard errors are 
clustered by firm. 
Table 3.8 reports the results. In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction Ban 
States* Post Dummy is significantly negative at the 1% level. This suggests that 
firms in ban states have less political connections after the Citizens United ruling 
than firms in no-ban states. The expected number of political connections is 0.19 
units lower for firms in ban states compared to those in no-ban states after Citizens 
United. The results are similar across all types of connections except for local 
connections, though statistical significance is highest for historical and state 
connections. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that firms adjust by 
decreasing the number of political connections. Results are similar if we use a 
Poisson regression model, which is a log-linear model and also if we add corporate 
governance control variables such as G-Index and E-Index. 
                                                            
40 Our data is collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures. There were 23 states that 
prohibited or restricted corporate spending on candidate elections at the time of the Citizens United 
ruling, which we define as Ban States. In 17 of these states, legislation has been introduced to amend 




To test Hypothesis 4, we incorporate institutional ownership and examine 
whether the change in the number of political connections following Citizens United 
differs between firms with high and low institutional ownership. In Table 3.9, we 
interact Ban States with Post Dummy and I.O_DOM. Ban States*Post 
Dummy*I.O_DOM is positively associated with connections while Ban States*Post 
Dummy is negatively associated with connections, though these effects are only 
statistically significant for all connections, historical and state connections. In 
untabulated results we show that the effect on historical connections is driven by the 
state-level historical connections. This suggests that firms with low institutional 
ownership have fewer state-level political connections after Citizens United if their 
headquarters locate in ban states than those in no-ban states. The expected number of 
state political connections is 0.42 units lower for firms without institutional 
ownership in ban states compared to those in no-ban states after Citizens United. The 
results are economically significant as the reduction represents 55% of the average 
number of state political connections in our sample (0.76). In contrast, high 
institutional ownership firms in ban states have virtually no change in state political 
connections after Citizens United when compared with those in no-ban states. The 
evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that the firms that adjust political 
connections the most are firms with no or low institutional ownership.  
The diff-in-diff analysis of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 assumes that the growth in 
political connections before the treatment effect is the same for firms in ban states 
and firms in no-ban states. In the online appendix we report the results from 
comparing average growth rates of political connections across the two groups of 
firms and show that the differences of all connections, historical, and state 
connections are not statistically significant. Further, we check that no firm in ban 
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states moves to a non-ban state during the period of analysis or vice-versa. Finally, 
we consider the possibility of confounding biases. Spencer and Wood (2014) argue 
that the level of political competition can create a confounding bias. In our exercise 
increased political competition may lead to higher independent expenditures and 
political connections. In the online appendix we tabulate results where the models in 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are extended to also control for a Political Competition Index.41 
The results are qualitatively the same as those in the paper. We also look to see if 
there is any significant difference in political leaning in ban states versus no-ban 
states to account for the possibility that democratic-leaning states promote legal bans 
on spending, for example, and the firms headquartered in these states substitute less. 
Our data suggest that ban states are more likely to be republican leaning than non-
ban states, but the difference is not statistically significant. Finally, ban and no-ban 
states could differ in their industries and this difference could condition the response 
of connections to Citizens United. However, we find no difference in industry 
composition across ban and no-ban states. Further, in untabulated results we control 
for corporate governance variables and the results are unchanged. 
 
3.4.6 Changes of Lobbying, Executive Contributions and PAC Contributions 
In Table 3.10, we examine changes to lobbying expenditures, executive 
contributions and PAC contributions after Citizens United. Of these three variables 
only PAC contributions is a state-level variable. We therefore expect no significant 
change on lobbying expenditures and executive contributions from pre- to post-
Citizens United from removing the ban on state contributions. As expected, Table 
                                                            




− 0.5|, where LHDij (LHRij) and UHDij (UHRij) represent the number of 
seats that Democrats (Republicans) hold, respectively, in the lower and upper chambers of the state 
legislature that was elected in year j. The range of the index is from -0.5 to 0. 
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3.10 shows that the triple interactions and double interactions are insignificant for 
lobbying expenditures and executive contributions. 
In the next-to-last column, we find that Ban States*Post Dummy is positively 
associated with PAC Contributions (see also Coates, 2012): firms in ban states have 
15% more PAC contributions after Citizens United than firms in no-ban states, but 
this effect is not statistically significant. In the last column we show that the effect on 
PAC contributions comes from high institutional investor ownership firms. Ban 
States*Post Dummy*I.O_DOM is positively associated with contributions from 
PACs. This suggests that high institutional ownership firms in ban states spend more 
on contributions from PACs after Citizens United just as they also increase the 
number of political connections. Firms in the 90th percentile of institutional 
ownership that are in ban states see their PAC contributions increase by 39% 
(−0.659+1.117*0.94) more than those in no-ban states after Citizens United. 
Consistent with Hypothesis four, firms with no institutional owners in ban states 
decrease the level of PAC contributions after Citizens United, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. 
 
3.4.7 Placebo Tests 
We conduct placebo tests to validate that our results are subject to the exogenous 
shock of the Citizens United ruling rather than other events. First, we use the three-
day CAR from -1 to +1 when day 0 is two weeks before/after the date when the 
Citizens United decision is announced (January 21st, 2010). The results are shown in 
panel A of Table 3.11. Connection, Lobbying, Executive Contributions, and PAC 
Contributions are all statistically insignificant. In panel B, we interact I.O_DOM 
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with Connection and find that all interaction terms are insignificant with or without 
corporate governance control variables.  
Second, we eliminate the Citizens United effect and examine changes to inputs in 
the production of political activism where the pre-period is 2004-2006 and the post-
period is 2007-2009. The results are shown in Table 3.12. The coefficient associated 
with Ban States*Post Dummy*I.O_DOM is insignificant in all specifications. This 
evidence supports our identification strategy and suggests that our previous results 
come from Citizens United. 
 
3.4.8 Robustness Tests and Alternative Hypotheses 
We conduct several robustness tests. First, we look for other confounding, 
contemporaneous information events. The same day that the Supreme Court ruling 
was announced, President Obama announces the Volcker rule that commercial banks 
should not be allowed to engage in proprietary trading. 42   Paul Volcker had 
“campaigned” for the rule during much of 2009, but the decision to adopt it may 
have still come as a surprise to some because of its controversy. While our tests 
include industry dummies to ensure the results are not driven by a particular industry, 
to further minimize this concern, we also drop financial firms (i.e. SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999) from our sample. Our main results remain similar after 
excluding financial firms. 
Second, we test the alternative hypothesis that high institutional ownership firms 
had higher valued connections than low institutional ownership firms. Accordingly, 
the value of connections and not any constraint on the ability to adjust inputs to 
political activism post-Citizens United would explain the results we get. Then 
                                                            




Citizens United would result in higher returns for low-institutional ownership firms 
as they would benefit most from the new input to political activism. We examine this 
possibility by taking into account the quality of connections following Goldman, 
Rocholl and So (2009) who show that the connected director has a greater impact in 
early nominations, while this impact decreases as the director joins further 
companies. We find that the difference of the nomination order between these two 
types of firms is very small and insignificant. Furthermore, high institutional 
ownership firms have lower recent political connections than low institutional 
ownership firms and the difference is significant at the 1% level. This is an important 
point to consider as more recent political connections could be considered as being 
more valuable than more historical ones. In sum, high institutional ownership firms 
do not seem to have higher quality of connections than low institutional ownership 
firms. The results are robust to identifying the firms with institutional ownership 
above the 70th percentile, as high institutional ownership firms. 
Third, we add state-level political competition as a control variable using two 
measures suggested in previous literature: Political Competition Index, described 
above, and Divided Government Dummy. Divided Government Dummy equals one if 
the state government is divided (different parties control different branches of 
government) and zero if the state government is unified.  We wish to control for the 
possibility that the marginal benefit of political connections depends on the state-
level political system. For example, after the Citizens United ruling political 
connections become costlier for firms in states with more political competition 
between political parties. Consistent with this we find that Political Competition 
Index*Connection is negatively associated with the three-day CAR, but the 
coefficient is insignificant. Other results remain qualitatively the same as before.  
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Fourth, we investigate whether top customers of the company affect the relation 
between political activism and firm value. We collect data from Compustat and 
create the variable Government Dummy that equals one if at least one top customer 
of the firm is government-related and zero otherwise. As political connections help 
obtain government procurement contracts (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013), we 
expect a weaker substitution effect if one of the top customers in a firm is 
government-related. Consistent with this we find that Government 
Dummy*Connection is positively associated with the three-day CAR although the 
coefficient is insignificant. Government Dummy itself is insignificant as well and the 
relation between political activism and firm value still holds. 
Fifth, we winsorise Connection, Lobbying, Executive Contributions and PAC 
Contributions and the results are similar to those reported above. We use various 
proxies to measure institutional ownership. We use the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions divided by the firm’s market capitalization, and the sum of ownership by 
the top five institutional investors in percentage of market capitalization. The results 
are very similar to what we reported previously. Because the level of institutional 
ownership is highly correlated with firm size, we include both Size*Connection and 
IO_DOM*Connection. The coefficients on both interaction terms are significantly 
negative in the announcement return regressions. This implies that 
IO_DOM*Connection is robust to the inclusion of size interaction. 
 
3.4.9 Other Relevant Dates in Citizens United 
On June 29th, 2009, the Supreme Court decided that a rehearing was needed so 
the parties could address the question of whether a resolution of the case was tied to, 
among other things, the overruling of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
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which upheld a state law prohibiting an independent political expenditure by the 
nonprofit Michigan Chamber of Commerce. The rehearing happened on September 
9th, 2009. Expanding the scope of the case and ordering new oral arguments by the 
Court is rare and may have provided a signal to expert observers that the likely 
outcome was a ruling in favor of Citizens United. We therefore repeat the stock 
market announcement analysis for each of these dates. We find that neither 
Connection nor Connection*I.O_DOM is statistically significant in either date. 
While there could be many reasons for these results, it is possible that a significant 
amount of uncertainty about the final ruling still remained that was only truly 
resolved on January 21st, 2010. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies how corporations adjust their political activism in response to 
the Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v. FEC and the constraints imposed on 
firms by some investors. We find that firms with high political connections and low 
or no institutional ownership experienced a greater stock market return with the 
announcement of Citizens United relative to firms with high institutional ownership. 
We did not find any market reaction for firms with lobbying, PAC contributions and 
executive contributions. Our results are consistent with actions taken by many 
institutional investors since the Court ruling objecting to the use of independent 
expenditures and fighting vigorously for greater disclosure of campaign finance. 
High institutional ownership firms appear to lose value by choosing not to avail 
themselves of the added flexibility created by Citizens United for the production of 
political activism.  
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Our work focuses on the intensive margin of political activism. We ask how 
firms that are already engaged in political activism respond to the Citizens United 
ruling. There is an equally interesting question of whether an extensive margin of 
response can be observed? That is, are there firms that started doing political 























Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for each variable. Connection is the number of political 
connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all 
prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total 
amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 
and it does not include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the 
sum of all prior PAC contributions till 2009. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of domestic 
institutions. I.O_DOM_Dem is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions from democratic states. 
I.O_DOM_Rep is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions from republican states. 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive is the institutional ownership held by insurance companies, banks, and nonbank 
trusts. IO_Pressure_Resistant is the institutional ownership held by public pension funds, mutual funds, 
endowments, and foundations. IO_Pressure_Indeterminate is the institutional ownership held by brokerage 
houses, investment counsel firms, miscellaneous and unidentified institutions. We follow Gompers et al. 
(2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). E-Index is proposed by Bebchuk et al (2009) and based on six provisions: 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for charter amendments and mergers. We follow Larcker et al. (2011) and 
measure Excesspay as the difference between CEO compensation and the median compensation of a set of 
peer firms in the same industry and of similar size as that of the firm. CEO Duality is a binary variable that 
equals one if the CEO held the position of chairman of the board as of December 31, 2009. CAR is the 
three-day abnormal return from −1 to +1 where day 0 is January 21st, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is 
announced. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. Std. Dev 
Connection 1,722 2.27 0.00 1.00 6.00 3.06 
Lobbying 1,722 5.85 0.00 0.00 15.95 7.16 
Executive Contributions  1,722 8.63 0.00 9.66 12.01 3.60 
PAC Contributions 1,722 3.04 0.00 0.00 11.54 4.95 
I.O_DOM 1,722 0.67 0.12 0.75 0.94 0.28 
I.O_DOM_Dem 1,722 0.60 0.11 0.65 0.83 0.22 
I.O_DOM_Rep 1,722 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.05 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive 1,722 0.002 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.03 
IO_Pressure_Resistant 1,722 0.26 0.04 0.28 0.40 0.12 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate 1,722 0.46 0.13 0.50 0.67 0.19 
G-Index 1,429 7.42 6.00 7.00 9.00 1.51 
E-Index 1,429 3.68 2.00 4.00 5.00 1.14 
Excesspay 1,722 -0.07 -0.98 0.00 0.79 0.87 
CEO Duality 1,636 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
CAR 1,722 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05 
Size 1,722 7.41 5.53 7.32 9.51 1.60 
BM 1,722 0.64 0.18 0.55 1.18 0.53 
Past Return 1,722 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.10 0.05 
ROA 1,722 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.11 0.11 
Debt 1,722 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.48 0.19 






Panel B: Correlation Matrix 




















Connection 1.0000            
Lobbying 0.3550 1.0000           
Executive Contributions 0.3176 0.3117 1.0000          
PAC Contributions 0.2618 0.3774 0.2567 1.0000         
I.O_DOM -0.0822 0.0071 -0.1860 0.0330 1.0000        
I.O_DOM_Dem -0.1922 -0.0597 -0.1308 -0.0722 0.3944 1.0000       
I.O_DOM_Rep -0.1527 -0.1433 -0.1353 -0.0858 0.1900 0.1277 1.0000      
IO_Pressure_Sensitive 0.0267 0.0070 0.0202 -0.0045 0.0503 0.0439 -0.0294 1.0000     
IO_Pressure_Resistant 0.0133 0.0742 -0.0812 0.0440 0.7752 0.2767 0.0376 -0.0031 1.0000    
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate -0.0841 0.0170 -0.1714 0.0640 0.8982 0.3729 0.2003 -0.0052 0.5449 1.0000   
G-Index -0.1063 -0.0502 -0.0240 -0.0323 0.0357 0.0231 0.0658 -0.0371 0.0413 0.0395 1.0000  









Table 3.2: Political Activism and Firm Value 
This table shows results of the relation between political activism and firm value. The 
dependent variable is the three-day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is January 21st, 2010 
when Citizens United ruling is announced. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of 
domestic institutions. Connection is the number of political connections firms had with 
government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all prior 
corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of 
the total amount of managerial contribution. It captures all past contributions made by 
current managers in 2009 and it does not include contributions made by past managers. 
PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions till 2009. 
The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We 
winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include 
industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by industry. 
***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
        (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5) 
I.O_DOM 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 [1.23] [1.18] [1.20] [1.18] [1.26] 
Size 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.05] [0.73] [0.95] [0.74] [0.21] 
BM 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 
 [1.82]* [1.74]* [1.72]* [1.74]* [1.82]* 
Past Return -0.069 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 
 [1.61] [1.60] [1.60] [1.61] [1.62] 
ROA -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 [0.23] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.23] 
Debt 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.94] [0.86] [0.80] [0.87] [0.85] 
Cash 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 [0.78] [0.80] [0.83] [0.78] [0.83] 
Connection -0.001    -0.001 
 [2.67]***    [2.67]*** 
Lobbying  0.000   0.000 
  [0.08]   [0.25] 
Executive 
Contributions 
  0.000  0.000 
  [0.59]  [0.77] 
PAC 
Contributions 
   -0.000 -0.000 
   [0.17] [0.01] 
Constant -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 
 [0.81] [0.54] [0.61] [0.56] [0.89] 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2           0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21           0.21 




Table 3.3: Political Activism and Firm Value with Controls for Corporate Governance 
This table shows results of the relation between political activism and firm value, controlling for corporate governance 
variables. The dependent variable is the three-day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is January 21st, 2010 when Citizens United 
ruling is announced. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions. Connection is the number of 
political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all 
prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total amount of 
managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 and it does not include 
contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions till 
2009. We follow Larcker et al. (2011) and measure Excesspay as the difference between CEO compensation and the 
median compensation of a set of peer firms in the same industry and of similar size as that of the firm. E-Index is 
proposed by Bebchuk et al (2009) and based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments and mergers. We 
follow Gompers et al. (2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). CEO Duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO held the position 
of chairman of the board as of December 31, 2009. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the 
data appendix. We winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include industry 
dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)            (4) 
I.O_DOM 0.007 0.005 0.004 -0.003 
 [1.39] [1.04] [0.97] [0.59] 
Size -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.12] [0.02] [0.02] [0.37] 
BM 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.008 
 [1.84]* [1.91]* [1.92]* [1.51] 
Past Return -0.065 -0.133 -0.131 -0.088 
 [1.53] [3.14]*** [3.13]*** [2.61]*** 
ROA -0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.023 
 [0.23] [0.34] [0.37] [1.87]* 
Debt 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.007 
 [0.97] [0.19] [0.23] [1.00] 
Cash 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.009 
 [0.80] [0.10] [0.18] [0.94] 
Connection -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [2.71]*** [2.51]** [2.43]** [3.09]*** 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.27] [0.35] [0.34] [0.09] 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.79] [0.25] [0.24] [1.08] 
PAC Contributions -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.00] [0.55] [0.56] [0.45] 
Excesspay -0.002    
 [1.18]    
E-Index  0.001   
  [0.76]   
G-Index   0.001  
   [1.31]  
CEO Duality    -0.000 
    [0.03] 
Constant -0.015 -0.009 -0.015 0.002 
 [0.96] [0.62] [0.90] [0.22] 
Industry Fixed Effect           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.23 
N         1,722         1,429          1,429          1,636 
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Table 3.4: Institutional Ownership, Political Activism and Firm Value 
This table shows results of the effect of institutional ownership on the relation between political 
activism and firm value. The dependent variable is the three-day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is 
January 21st, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is announced. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership 
of domestic institutions. Connection is the number of political connections firms had with government 
organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying 
expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total amount of managerial 
contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 and it does not 
include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all 
prior PAC contributions till 2009. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the 
data appendix. We winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We 
include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by industry. ***, 
**and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
         (1)          (2)         (3)         (4)         (5) 
I.O_DOM 0.012 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.015 
 [2.16]** [1.13] [1.47] [1.48] [1.54] 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.30] [0.22] [0.28] [0.23] [0.32] 
BM 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 [1.82]* [1.82]* [1.82]* [1.81]* [1.82]* 
Past Return -0.072 -0.068 -0.069 -0.068 -0.073 
 [1.72]* [1.62] [1.64] [1.62] [1.72]* 
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.26] [0.23] [0.23] [0.24] [0.26] 
Debt 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.86] [0.86] [0.85] [0.84] [0.85] 
Cash 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 [0.79] [0.83] [0.87] [0.82] [0.81] 
Connection 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 [1.91]* [2.68]*** [2.65]*** [2.75]*** [1.69]* 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.37] [0.41] [0.31] [0.28] [0.28] 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 [0.83] [0.78] [1.15] [0.76] [0.67] 
PAC Contributions -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 [0.02] [0.00] [0.05] [1.03] [0.56] 
I.O_DOM*Connection -0.004    -0.004 
 [2.78]***    [2.49]** 
I.O_DOM*Lobbying  -0.000   0.000 
  [0.32]   [0.54] 
I.O_DOM*Executive 
Contributions 
  -0.001  -0.000 
  [0.91]  [0.36] 
I.O_DOM*PAC 
Contributions 
   -0.001 -0.001 
   [1.14] [0.62] 
Constant -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 
 [1.03] [0.87] [1.24] [0.93] [1.18] 
Industry Fixed Effect         Yes        Yes        Yes         Yes         Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
N       1,722       1,722       1,722         1,722        1,722 
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Table 3.5: Institutional Ownership, Political Activism and Firm Value with Governance Controls 
This table shows results of the effect of institutional ownership on the relation between political activism and firm value, 
controlling for corporate governance variables. The dependent variable is the three-day CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is January 
21st, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is announced. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions. 
Connection is the number of political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log 
of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total amount 
of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 and it does not include 
contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions till 2009. 
We follow Gompers et al. (2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). E-Index is proposed by Bebchuk et al (2009) and based on six provisions: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments and mergers. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each 
control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and 
cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
               (1)               (2)              (3)               (4) 
I.O_DOM 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 [0.45] [1.05] [0.48] [1.06] 
Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.08] [0.10] [0.12] [0.02] 
BM 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 [1.91]* [1.85]* [1.90]* [1.87]* 
Past Return -0.135 -0.131 -0.137 -0.131 
 [3.28]*** [3.07]*** [3.29]*** [3.14]*** 
ROA 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 [0.36] [0.41] [0.33] [0.38] 
Debt 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.25] [0.21] [0.21] [0.20] 
Cash 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 [0.09] [0.17] [0.01] [0.12] 
Connection 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 
 [1.89]* [1.77]* [1.92]* [1.92]* 
Lobbying -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.79] [0.13] [0.80] [0.03] 
Executive Contributions 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
[0.12] [0.18] [0.12] [1.29] 
PAC Contributions -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 [0.66] [1.22] [0.63] [0.67] 
I.O_DOM*Connection -0.005  -0.005  
 [3.01]***  [3.06]***  
I.O_DOM*Lobbying 0.001  0.001  
 [1.10]  [1.11]  
I.O_DOM*Executive 
Contributions 
0.000  0.000  
[0.25]  [0.27]  
I.O_DOM*PAC 
Contributions 
-0.000  -0.000  
[0.03]  [0.13]  
G-Index 0.001 0.000   
 [1.28] [0.50]   
G-Index*Connection  0.000   
  [1.43]   
G-Index*Lobbying  -0.000   
  [0.31]   
G-Index*Executive 
Contributions 
 0.000   
 [0.02]   
G-Index*PAC 
Contributions 
 0.000   
 [1.19]   
E-Index   0.001 0.003 
   [0.78] [1.44] 
E-Index*Connection    0.001 
    [1.47] 
E-Index*Lobbying    0.000 
    [0.23] 
E-Index*Executive 
Contributions 
   -0.000 
   [1.28] 
E-Index*PAC 
Contributions 
   -0.000 
   [0.85] 
Constant -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.019 
 [0.69] [0.68] [0.45] [1.31] 
Industry Fixed Effect            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 




Table 3.6: Institutional Ownership, Political Activism and Firm Value: The Role of Business Relationships 
This table disentangles institutions with and without business ties to corporations. The dependent variable is the three-day 
CAR (−1, +1) where day 0 is January 21st, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is announced. IO_Pressure_Sensitive is the 
institutional ownership held by insurance companies, banks, and nonbank trusts. IO_Pressure_Resistant is the institutional 
ownership held by public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, and foundations. IO_Pressure_Indeterminate is the 
institutional ownership held by brokerage houses, investment counsel firms, miscellaneous and unidentified institutions. 
Connection is the number of political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural 
log of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total 
amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 and it does not 
include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions 
till 2009. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each control 
variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster 
standard errors by industry. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
        (1)       (2)     (3)      (4)       (5) 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive -0.000 -0.013 -0.056 -0.012 -0.045 
 [0.00] [0.48] [0.53] [0.42] [0.28] 
IO_Pressure_Resistant 0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.010 
 [0.83] [0.48] [0.56] [0.15] [0.71] 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.013 
 [1.73]* [1.59] [1.38] [1.75]* [0.91] 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.25] [0.19] [0.29] [0.21] [0.27] 
BM 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 [1.80]* [1.76]* [1.76]* [1.77]* [1.77]* 
Past Return -0.075 -0.071 -0.071 -0.072 -0.075 
 [1.81]* [1.71]* [1.69]* [1.72]* [1.79]* 
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.27] [0.23] [0.20] [0.24] [0.25] 
Debt 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.85] [0.79] [0.81] [0.79] [0.86] 
Cash 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 [0.79] [0.80] [0.76] [0.79] [0.74] 
Connection 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 [2.38]** [2.32]** [2.73]*** [2.67]*** [2.31]** 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.38] [0.31] [0.27] [0.27] [0.26] 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.81] [0.78] [0.50] [0.77] [0.05] 
PAC Contributions -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.13] [0.04] [0.10] [1.15] [0.64] 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive* 
Connection 
-0.006    -0.008 
[0.18]    [0.28] 
IO_Pressure_Resistant* 
Connection 
-0.010    -0.010 
[2.39]**    [2.22]** 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate*  
Connection 
-0.002    -0.002 
[0.77]    [0.78] 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive* 
Lobbying 
 -0.000   -0.000 
 [0.27]   [0.44] 
IO_Pressure_Resistant 
*Lobbying 
 -0.000   0.000 
 [0.48]   [0.07] 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate* 
Lobbying 
 -0.000   0.000 
 [0.20]   [0.53] 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive*  
Executive Contributions 
  0.000  0.000 
  [0.45]  [0.52] 
IO_Pressure_Resistant* 
Executive Contributions 
  0.000  0.000 
  [0.54]  [0.62] 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate*  
Executive Contributions 
  -0.000  0.001 
  [0.22]  [0.32] 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive* 
PAC Contributions 
   -0.016 -0.011 
   [0.41] [0.25] 
IO_Pressure_Resistant*PAC 
Contributions 
   -0.002 0.000 
   [0.63] [0.02] 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate*  
PAC Contributions 
   -0.001 -0.001 
   [0.75] [0.79] 
Constant -0.019 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
 [1.27] [1.00] [1.06] [1.09] [1.14] 
Industry Fixed Effect            Yes            Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
 Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
N          1,722          1,722          1,722          1,722          1,722 
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Table 3.7: Institutional Ownership, Political Activism and Firm Value: Democratic vs Republican States 
This table shows results of the effect of institutional ownership on the relation between political activism and firm value. We 
disentangle institutions from democratic states and those from republican states. The dependent variable is the three-day CAR 
(−1, +1) where day 0 is January 21st, 2010 when Citizens United ruling is announced. I.O_DOM_Dem is the institutional 
ownership of domestic institutions from democratic states. I.O_DOM_Rep is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions 
from republican states. Connection is the number of political connections firms had with government organizations in 2009. 
Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the 
natural log of the total amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 2009 
and it does not include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the sum of all prior PAC 
contributions till 2009. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each 
control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code and 
cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)  (5) 
I.O_DOM _Dem 0.009 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.012 
 [1.39] [0.55] [0.81] [0.50] [0.78] 
I.O_DOM _Rep -0.003 0.023 0.007 0.025 0.011 
 [0.10] [0.65] [0.13] [0.78] [0.22] 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.32] [0.20] [0.25] [0.22] [0.33] 
BM 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 [1.80]* [1.79]* [1.79]* [1.80]* [1.78]* 
Past Return -0.070 -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 -0.070 
 [1.66]* [1.65] [1.65]* [1.66]* [1.66]* 
ROA -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 [0.29] [0.22] [0.26] [0.21] [0.26] 
Debt 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 [0.86] [0.93] [0.88] [0.95] [0.92] 
Cash 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 [0.83] [0.94] [0.92] [0.96] [0.89] 
Connection 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.59] [2.72]*** [2.65]*** [2.66]*** [0.71] 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.26] [0.33] [0.25] [0.20] [0.07] 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 [0.76] [0.74] [0.80] [0.74] [0.56] 
PAC Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.16] [0.23] 
I.O_DOM_Dem*Connection 
-0.003    -0.003 
[1.94]*    [2.25]** 
I.O_DOM _Rep*Connection 
0.005    0.008 
[0.58]    [0.81] 
I.O_DOM_Dem*Lobbying 
 0.000   0.000 
 [0.04]   [0.43] 
I.O_DOM_Rep*Lobbying 
 -0.002   -0.002 
 [0.84]   [0.49] 
I.O_DOM_Dem*Executive 
Contributions 
  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.53]  [0.34] 
I.O_DOM_Rep*Executive 
Contributions 
  0.000  0.001 
  [0.04]  [0.07] 
I.O_DOM_Dem*PAC 
Contributions 
   0.000 0.001 
   [0.28] [0.67] 
I.O_DOM_Rep*PAC 
Contributions 
   -0.005 -0.005 
   [0.96] [0.82] 
Constant -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.016 
 [0.88] [0.83] [1.08] [0.83] [1.03] 
Industry Fixed Effect            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes            Yes 
 Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 




Table 3.8: Changes of Political Connections after the Citizens United Ruling 
This table shows results of changes of political connections from 2007 to 2012 based on OLS regressions. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of political connections firms had with all 
government organizations. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the number of contemporaneous and historical connections. From columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the number of 
connections established with government of national-, state- and local-level respectively. Ban States is a binary variable that equals one if the headquarter of the firm locates in the state that had bans on 
independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise. Post Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one from 2010 to 2012 and zero from 2007 to 2009. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of 
domestic institutions. Lobbying is the natural log of the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past 
contributions made by current managers and it does not include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the amount of PAC contributions. The definitions of other 
financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 
industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 ALL Contemporary Historical National State Local 
Ban States -0.492 -0.132 -0.359 -0.376 -0.154 0.038 
 [3.87]*** [3.69]*** [3.23]*** [3.96]*** [2.76]*** [1.79]* 
Post Dummy 0.284 0.326 -0.042 0.086 0.164 0.034 
 [4.95]*** [10.82]*** [0.92] [1.92]* [6.30]*** [2.97]*** 
I.O_DOM -0.662 -0.231 -0.431 -0.446 -0.153 -0.063 
 [2.35]** [2.66]*** [1.82]* [2.15]** [1.31] [1.51] 
Ban States*Post Dummy -0.187 -0.073 -0.114 -0.102 -0.079 -0.006 
 [2.54]*** [1.64] [2.03]** [1.84]* [2.27]** [0.38] 
Leverage -0.252 -0.071 -0.180 -0.137 -0.054 -0.061 
 [0.73] [0.69] [0.62] [0.53] [0.39] [1.14] 
Size 0.815 0.200 0.615 0.631 0.154 0.030 
 [12.38]*** [8.36]*** [12.03]*** [12.13]*** [6.54]*** [3.21]*** 
ROA -0.968 -0.168 -0.800 -0.922 -0.166 0.119 
 [1.07] [0.55] [1.10] [1.35] [0.44] [1.00] 
Tobin’s Q -0.338 -0.089 -0.250 -0.211 -0.100 -0.028 
 [5.33]*** [4.59]*** [4.77]*** [4.34]*** [4.13]*** [3.51]*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.816 -0.020 -0.796 -0.872 0.164 -0.108 
 [0.90] [0.07] [1.08] [1.27] [0.40] [0.82] 
Sales Growth -0.371 -0.072 -0.299 -0.295 -0.061 -0.015 
 [2.70]*** [1.42] [2.61]*** [2.75]*** [1.01] [0.70] 
Lobbying 0.048 0.006 0.042 0.034 0.013 0.001 
 [3.67]*** [1.38] [3.97]*** [3.29]*** [2.59]*** [0.28] 
Executive Contributions 0.054 0.005 0.049 0.035 0.015 0.005 
 [4.54]*** [1.22] [4.98]*** [3.68]*** [2.55]** [2.35]** 
PAC Contributions 0.139 0.035 0.105 0.072 0.055 0.012 
 [5.61]*** [4.54]*** [5.17]*** [3.98]*** [5.71]*** [3.60]*** 
Constant -2.495 -0.742 -1.753 -2.475 -0.088 0.068 
 [3.78]*** [3.28]*** [3.42]*** [5.15]*** [0.36] [0.57] 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.40 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.26 0.09 
N 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 
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Table 3.9: Changes of Political Connections after the Citizens United Ruling: The Role of Institutional Ownership 
This table shows results of the effect of institutional ownership on changes of political connections from 2007 to 2012 based on OLS regressions. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of political connections firms had 
with all government organizations. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the number of contemporaneous and historical connections. From columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the number of connections 
established with government of national-, state- and local-level respectively. Ban States is a binary variable that equals one if the headquarter of the firm locates in the state that had bans on independent expenditures on state elections 
and zero otherwise. Post Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one from 2010 onwards and zero from 2007 to 2009. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions. Lobbying is the natural log of the amount of 
corporate lobbying expenditures. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers and it does not include contributions made by past 
managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the amount of PAC contributions. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
respectively. We include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 ALL Contemporary Historical National State Local 
Ban States -0.012 0.027 -0.039 -0.096 -0.034 0.118 
 [0.03] [0.23] [0.10] [0.29] [0.18] [1.41] 
Post Dummy 0.573 0.528 0.045 0.193 0.272 0.108 
 [2.37]** [4.44]*** [0.25] [1.07] [2.82]*** [2.30]** 
I.O_DOM -0.484 -0.070 -0.415 -0.341 -0.145 0.001 
 [1.18] [0.62] [1.16] [1.09] [0.86] [0.02] 
Ban States*Post Dummy -0.805 -0.179 -0.626 -0.312 -0.416 -0.077 
 [2.13]** [0.96] [2.21]** [1.19] [2.68]*** [1.16] 
I.O_DOM*Post Dummy -0.432 -0.285 -0.147 -0.166 -0.159 -0.107 
 [1.41] [1.92]* [0.64] [0.73] [1.27] [1.84]* 
Ban States*I.O_DOM -0.664 -0.222 -0.442 -0.384 -0.171 -0.109 
 [1.18] [1.52] [0.91] [0.92] [0.75] [1.12] 
Ban States*Post 
Dummy*I.O_DOM 
0.824 0.145 0.680 0.275 0.454 0.095 
[1.73]* [0.63] [1.88]* [0.83] [2.27]** [1.16] 
Leverage 0.076 -0.011 0.087 0.063 0.051 -0.038 
 [0.22] [0.10] [0.30] [0.25] [0.36] [0.75] 
Size 1.051 0.247 0.804 0.771 0.233 0.046 
 [15.00]*** [10.81]*** [14.66]*** [14.58]*** [10.03]*** [4.61]*** 
ROA -0.166 -0.008 -0.157 -0.459 0.120 0.174 
 [0.18] [0.03] [0.21] [0.66] [0.32] [1.44] 
Tobin’s Q -0.455 -0.113 -0.342 -0.279 -0.140 -0.036 
 [6.81]*** [5.72]*** [6.25]*** [5.60]*** [5.64]*** [3.96]*** 
Free Cash Flow -1.783 -0.229 -1.554 -1.401 -0.202 -0.180 
 [1.90]* [0.75] [2.03]** [2.01]** [0.49] [1.35] 
Sales Growth -0.520 -0.102 -0.418 -0.385 -0.109 -0.026 
 [3.69]*** [2.02]** [3.58]*** [3.51]*** [1.86]* [1.20] 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.98] [0.95] [0.99] [0.92] [1.17] [0.78] 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.90]* [0.59] [2.08]** [2.12]** [1.53] [0.42] 
PAC Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.31] [1.33] [1.30] [0.93] [1.65]* [2.40]** 
Constant -3.507 -1.035 -2.473 -3.083 -0.409 -0.016 
 [4.89]*** [4.36]*** [4.35]*** [5.83]*** [1.55] [0.14] 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.37 0.22 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.08 
N 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800 
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Table 3.10: Changes of Lobbying, Executive, and PAC Contributions after the Citizens United Ruling  
This table shows results of changes of political expenditures from 2007 to 2012 based on OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) and (2) is the natural log of corporate lobbying expenditures. The dependent variable in columns (3) 
and (4) is the natural log of past political contributions made by current managers. The dependent variable in columns (5) and 
(6) is the natural log of PAC contributions. Ban States is a binary variable that equals one if the headquarter of the firm locates 
in the state that had bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero otherwise. Post Dummy is a dummy variable 
that equals one from 2010 to 2012 and zero from 2007 to 2009. I.O_DOM is the institutional ownership of domestic 
institutions. Connection is the number of political connections firms had with government organizations. Lobbying is the 
natural log of the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the amount of 
managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers and it does not include contributions 
made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of the amount of PAC contributions. The definitions of other 
financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
respectively. We include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. 
***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 









Ban States 0.171 1.097 0.127 -0.440 -0.201 -0.149 
 [0.60] [1.18] [0.79] [0.78] [1.27] [0.27] 
Post Dummy 0.078 0.525 -1.067 -0.793 0.001 0.341 
 [0.59] [1.20] [9.45]*** [2.25]** [0.01] [1.13] 
I.O_DOM  0.076  -0.917  -0.797 
  [0.10]  [2.13]**  [1.54] 
Ban States*Post 
Dummy 
0.106 -1.116 -0.041 -0.625 0.151 -0.659 
[0.58] [1.44] [0.24] [0.92] [1.50] [1.39] 
I.O_DOM*Post 
Dummy 
 -0.625  -0.413  -0.506 
 [1.05]  [0.88]  [1.31] 
Ban States*I.O_DOM 
-1.229  0.769  -0.053 
[1.06]  [1.07]  [0.08] 
Ban States*Post 
Dummy*I.O_DOM 
 1.645  0.829  1.117 
 [1.62]  [0.96]  [1.85]* 
Leverage 1.575 1.571 1.402 1.365 0.717 0.689 
 [2.16]** [2.14]** [2.97]*** [2.88]*** [1.66]* [1.59] 
Size 1.231 1.238 0.522 0.521 0.584 0.589 
 [11.00]*** [10.98]*** [8.19]*** [8.22]*** [8.81]*** [8.83]*** 
Free Cash Flow 0.993 1.253 -0.915 -0.500 -6.137 -5.574 
 [0.44] [0.55] [0.64] [0.34] [4.37]*** [3.98]*** 
ROA 1.351 1.317 1.246 1.176 3.788 3.699 
 [0.64] [0.63] [0.96] [0.90] [2.83]*** [2.77]*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.343 -0.351 -0.123 -0.121 -0.355 -0.359 
 [2.48]** [2.54]** [1.34] [1.31] [4.70]*** [4.76]*** 
Herfindahl Index -1.918 -1.873     
 [0.92] [0.90]     
Sales Growth   -0.084 -0.091 -0.204 -0.216 
   [0.41] [0.45] [1.05] [1.12] 
Connection 0.222 0.219 0.097 0.094 0.230 0.226 
 [3.77]*** [3.72]*** [4.09]*** [3.99]*** [6.76]*** [6.61]*** 
Lobbying   0.059 0.059 0.113 0.112 
   [5.07]*** [5.03]*** [7.62]*** [7.54]*** 
Executive 
Contributions 
0.172 0.172   0.091 0.088 
[5.98]*** [5.95]***   [5.82]*** [5.65]*** 
PAC Contributions 0.322 0.320 0.085 0.082   
 [8.01]*** [7.96]*** [4.94]*** [4.80]***   
Constant -8.468 -6.684 5.111 5.720 -2.514 -2.024 
 [6.79]*** [5.84]*** [7.91]*** [8.20]*** [3.24]*** [2.47]** 
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.34 




Table 3.11: Placebo Tests: Abnormal Returns 
This table shows the placebo test of abnormal returns. The dependent variable is the three day CAR 
from −1 to +1 where day 0 is two weeks before/after the date when the Supreme Court announced the 
Citizens United decision. The event dates (day 0) are reported in the column heads. Panel A shows the 
results of the inputs in the production of political activism whereas Panel B examines the effect of 
institutional ownership on the relation between political activism and firm value. I.O_DOM is the 
institutional ownership of domestic institutions. Connection is the number of political connections 
firms had with government organizations in 2009. Lobbying is the natural log of the sum of all prior 
corporate lobbying expenditures till 2009. Executive Contributions is the natural log of the total 
amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by current managers in 
2009 and it does not include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural 
log of the sum of all prior PAC contributions till 2009. We follow Gompers et al. (2003) and 
construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC). The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We 
winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include industry 
dummies based on two-digit SIC code and cluster standard errors by industry. ***, **and *represent 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: Inputs in the Production of Political Activism 
     7th January     7th January   4th February   4th February 
I.O_DOM -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 
 [1.22] [0.16] [0.51] [2.12]** 
Size -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.33] [0.73] [1.58] [2.03]** 
BM 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.005 
 [2.92]*** [2.23]** [0.78] [0.86] 
Past Return -0.066 -0.084 -0.093 -0.089 
 [2.03]** [2.23]** [3.09]*** [2.47]** 
ROA -0.033 -0.026 -0.003 -0.012 
 [2.31]** [1.75]* [0.36] [1.05] 
Debt 0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
 [1.27] [0.54] [1.13] [0.88] 
Cash 0.008 -0.004 -0.013 -0.006 
 [0.67] [0.32] [1.39] [0.65] 
Connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.78] [0.35] [1.44] [1.53] 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 [0.53] [0.80] [0.27] [0.21] 
Executive Contributions -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.17] [0.15] [0.87] [0.43] 
PAC Contributions 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.18] [0.62] [1.38] [0.77] 
G-Index  0.000  -0.000 
  [0.07]  [0.06] 
Constant 0.002 -0.003 0.019 0.027 
 [0.17] [0.21] [2.10]** [1.76]* 
Industry Fixed Effect           Yes           Yes             Yes             Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.13 0.05  0.07 




Panel B: Institutional Ownership*Connection 
     7th January     7th January   4th February   4th February 
I.O_DOM -0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 
 [0.97] [0.23] [0.06] [1.67]* 
Size -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.34] [0.74] [1.64] [2.05]** 
BM 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.005 
 [2.93]*** [2.23]** [0.78] [0.85] 
Past Return -0.067 -0.084 -0.095 -0.089 
 [2.05]** [2.23]** [3.13]*** [2.46]** 
ROA -0.033 -0.026 -0.004 -0.012 
 [2.32]** [1.76]* [0.37] [1.05] 
Debt 0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
 [1.28] [0.55] [1.14] [0.88] 
Cash 0.008 -0.004 -0.013 -0.006 
 [0.66] [0.32] [1.41] [0.66] 
Connection 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 [0.55] [0.10] [2.14]** [0.74] 
Lobbying 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 [0.55] [0.78] [0.22] [0.22] 
Executive Contributions -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.16] [0.13] [0.91] [0.45] 
PAC Contributions 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.18] [0.61] [1.39] [0.78] 
I.O_DOM*Connection -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
[0.35] [0.21] [1.58] [0.31] 
G-Index  0.000  -0.000 
  [0.08]  [0.07] 
Constant 0.002 -0.003 0.018 0.027 
 [0.14] [0.20] [1.97]* [1.73]* 
Industry Fixed Effect          Yes          Yes             Yes             Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.12           0.13             0.05             0.07 









Table 3.12: Placebo Tests: Changes of Political Activism  
This Table shows the placebo test in changes of political activism. We conduct OLS estimation in all columns. We 
eliminate the Citizens United effect and choose the sample period from 2004 to 2009. The dependent variable in column 
(1) is the number of political connections firms had with all government organizations. The dependent variable from 
columns (2) to (4) is the natural log of corporate lobbying expenditures, past political contributions made by current 
managers, and PAC political contributions respectively. Ban States is a binary variable that equals one if the 
headquarter of the firm locates in the state that had bans on independent expenditures on state elections and zero 
otherwise. Post Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one from 2007 to 2009 and zero from 2004 to 2006. I.O_DOM 
is the institutional ownership of domestic institutions. Connection is the number of political connections firms had with 
government organizations. Lobbying is the natural log of the amount of corporate lobbying expenditures. Executive 
Contributions is the natural log of the amount of managerial contributions. It captures all past contributions made by 
current managers and it does not include contributions made by past managers. PAC Contributions is the natural log of 
the amount of PAC contributions. The definitions of other financial control variables are listed in the data appendix. We 
winsorise each control variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. We include 11 industry dummy variables 
based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
       Connection             Lobbying 
    Executive       
Contributions 
     PAC                       
Contributions 
Ban States 0.010 0.660 -1.100 -0.835 
 [0.02] [0.58] [1.32] [1.21] 
Post Dummy -0.277 0.164 0.683 -1.989 
 [1.12] [0.27] [1.31] [4.84]*** 
I.O_DOM -0.620 -0.390 -0.045 -1.615 
 [1.66]* [0.42] [0.07] [2.60]*** 
Ban States*Post Dummy 
-0.153 0.088 0.828 0.682 
[0.45] [0.10] [1.02] [1.23] 
I.O_DOM*Post Dummy 
0.197 0.482 -1.007 0.774 
[0.68] [0.61] [1.55] [1.67]* 
Ban States*I.O_DOM 
-0.525 -0.695 1.977 0.983 
[0.98] [0.50] [1.91]* [1.13] 
Ban States*Post 
Dummy*I.O_DOM 
0.132 -0.042 -1.357 -1.013 
[0.32] [0.04] [1.35] [1.45] 
Leverage 0.288 1.697 1.269 0.399 
 [0.88] [2.28]** [2.74]*** [0.93] 
Size 0.848 1.211 0.694 0.614 
 [14.92]*** [10.47]*** [12.34]*** [9.15]*** 
Free Cash Flow -1.718 2.288 0.586 -4.156 
 [2.00]** [0.94] [0.40] [2.91]*** 
ROA -0.572 0.138 0.615 3.406 
 [0.72] [0.06] [0.48] [2.53]** 
Tobin’s Q -0.256 -0.240 -0.147 -0.382 
 [4.91]*** [1.71]* [1.79]* [5.24]*** 
Herfindahl Index  -2.454   
  [1.19]   
Sales Growth -0.573  -0.076 -0.277 
 [3.43]***  [0.29] [1.17] 
Connection  0.224 0.099 0.291 
  [3.64]*** [4.16]*** [7.68]*** 
Lobbying 0.000  0.051 0.102 
 [3.62]***  [4.65]*** [6.88]*** 
Executive Contributions 0.000 0.203                   0.071 
 [1.37] [6.12]***                 [4.13]*** 
PAC Contributions 0.000 0.325                    0.067  
 [0.71] [7.82]***                   [4.26]***  
Constant -2.286 -6.725 3.622 -0.569 
 [3.86]*** [5.33]*** [4.31]*** [0.68] 
Industry Fixed Effect                Yes                   Yes                     Yes                   Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.31 0.26  0.32 




Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Inputs in the Production of Political Activism 
Connection The number of political connections firms had with 
government organizations in 2009. We count it as one 
political connection if individuals with political background 
currently hold a position in the firm. 
Source: BoardEx database 
Lobbying The natural log of the sum of all prior corporate lobbying 
expenditures till 2009. 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
Executive Contributions The natural log of the total amount of managerial 
contributions. It captures all past contributions made by 
current managers in 2009 and does not include contributions 
made by past managers.  
Source: ExecuComp & FEC 
PAC  Contributions The natural log of the sum of all prior political contributions 
from corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) to state 
elections till 2009.  
Source: Follow The Money 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
I.O_DOM The sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in US 
where the stock is listed divided by the firm’s market 
capitalization. 
Source: FactSet/LionShares Database 
IO_Pressure_Sensitive The percentage of shares held by insurance companies, banks, 
and nonbank trusts. The current or prospective business 
relationships of these types of institutions with corporations 
tend to make this group more “pressure-sensitive” with 
respect to corporate management.  
Source: FactSet/LionShares Database 
IO_Pressure_Resistant The percentage of shares held by public pension funds, 
mutual funds, endowments, and foundations. These 
institutions are more likely to collect information, are subject 
to fewer regulatory restrictions, and have fewer potential 
business relationships with the corporations in which they 
invest.  
Source: FactSet/LionShares Database 
IO_Pressure_Indeterminate The percentage of shares held by brokerage houses, 
investment counsel firms, miscellaneous and unidentified 
institutions. 
Source: FactSet/LionShares Database 
Panel C: Corporate Governance 
G-Index An equally-weighted index based on 24 governance 
provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) (Gompers et al. (2003)). High G-Index 
indicates weak corporate governance. 
Source: IRRC & RiskMetrics Database 
E-Index An entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments and mergers (Bebchuk et al (2009)). High E-
Index indicates weak corporate governance. 




The difference between CEO compensation and the median 
compensation of a set of peer firms in the same industry and 
of similar size as that of the firm (Larcker et al 
(2011)). Specifically, it is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of total compensation (variable TDC1 from ExecuComp) for 
the CEO less the natural logarithm of the median total annual 
pay for all remaining firms on ExecuComp that are in the 
same Fama and French (1997) 12 industry group and size 
quintile of the firm for the same year. High Excesspay 
indicates weak corporate governance. 
Source: ExecuComp 
CEO Duality A binary variable that equals one if the CEO held the position 
of chairman of the board as of December 31, 2009 and zero 
otherwise. If CEO Duality equals one, it indicates weak 
corporate governance. 
Source: RiskMetrics Database 
Panel D: Financial Control Variables 
Size The natural log of market value of equity (item 25*item 24) 
Source: Compustat 
BM The book value of equity (item 60) divided by market value 
of equity (item 25*item 24) 
Source: Compustat 
Past Return The past stock return for the previous twelve months 
Source: Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) files 
ROA Operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6) 
Source: Compustat 
Debt Book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by book assets 
(item 6) 
Source: Compustat 
Cash Cash holdings (item 1) over book assets (item 6) 
Source: Compustat 
Leverage Book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of 
book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of 
equity (item 25* item 24) 
Source: Compustat 
Tobin’s Q The book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity 
(item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all 
divided by book value of assets (item 6) 
Source: Compustat 
Free Cash Flow The gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of 
depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses 
(item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 21) 
Source: Compustat 
Sales Growth The difference between current sales (item 12) and lagged 
sales, all divided by lagged sales.  
Source: Compustat 
Herfindahl Index The annual sum of squared market shares for all Compustat 
firms in each industry based on two-digit SIC code, and it 
approaches a maximum value of one as the industry 









A Direct Test of Catering Theory of 
Dividends 
 
4.1  Introduction 
A growing literature in corporate payout policy examines the potential driver of 
firm’s dividend policy. In particular, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) provide a 
catering explanation. They propose that investors have time-varying demand for 
dividend-paying stocks and managers cater to investor demand. Academic scholars 
then apply the catering theory to dividend increase or decrease (Li and Lie, 2006) 
and share repurchases (Jiang, Kim, Lie, and Yang, 2013; Kulchania, 2013). 
Empirical research on the catering effect of corporate payout policy has typically 
used dividend/repurchase premium to measure investor demand.  
In this paper, we study how the time-variation in investors’ dividend attitudes 
affects firm’s dividend policy. We conjecture that investors’ attention to dividend-
paying stocks may motivate managers to change firm’s dividend policy consequently. 
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In particular, we posit that managers initiate or increase (cut) dividends when 
investors search more (less) on dividends via Internet. To test the conjecture, we 
develop a direct measure of dividend sentiment using the Internet search volume for 
dividend-related keywords.  
We first examine whether investors’ dividend sentiment predicts firm’s dividend 
policy from 2004 to 2013. Consistent with our prediction, we find that when the 
dividend sentiment of investors becomes stronger (weaker), managers initiate or 
increase (decrease) dividends in the next quarter. In economic terms, a one-standard-
deviation increase in investors’ dividend sentiment leads to a 0.4% higher dividend 
initiation rate in the following quarter. These results are economically significant as 
the increase is 9.1% of the average dividend initiation rate in our sample. Results are 
robust after controlling the dividend premium proposed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004b).  
We next examine whether the dividend sentiment of investors helps explain the 
residual variation of dividend policies after controlling for firm characteristics and 
risk. We calculate the propensity to pay dividends (PTP) based on the logit estimates 
and find that the dividend sentiment effect is as predicted by catering after 
controlling for firm characteristics and risk. When dividends attract more (less) retail 
investors, firms have higher propensity to pay, initiate or increase (decrease) 
dividends.  
In the third set of tests, we investigate the extent to which geographical 
differences in dividend sentiment influence firm’s dividend policy. As local 
investors’ dividend sentiment varies across regions, we conjecture that the effects of 
dividend sentiment on firm’s dividend policy would be stronger among U.S. states 
with stronger dividend sentiment. In these states, investors pay more attention to 
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dividends and managers are more likely to cater. To test our prediction, we use each 
firm’s headquarter state to define its location and use the average state-level SVI to 
measure the dividend sentiment of local investors.  
Consistently, we find that managers cater to investors’ dividend sentiment in 
states with strong dividend sentiment. In economic terms, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in investors’ dividend sentiment in states with strong dividend sentiment is 
associated with 0.5% increase in the propensity to pay dividends in the following 
quarter. These results are economically significant as the increase is 32.7% of the 
average propensity to pay in states with strong dividend sentiment. In contrast, in 
weak dividend sentiment states, managers choose not to cater to the dividend 
sentiment of individual investors. Results are similar after controlling the dividend 
premium proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004b). 
We conduct a number of robustness checks and other tests. As an alternative 
measure of dividend sentiment, we construct a topic index which includes searches 
in different languages and various text strings as long as they are dividend-related. 
We find similar results except dividend decrease. We examine the relation between 
the dividend sentiment and the dividend premium and find that the correlation is low 
(0.04).  
Overall, these findings suggest that changes in investors’ dividend attitudes 
affect firm’s dividend policy. Specifically, when investors’ dividend sentiment 
becomes stronger (weaker), firms are more likely to initiate or increase (decrease) 
dividends in the following quarter. The effects of the dividend sentiment on firm’s 
dividend policy are stronger among U.S. states with stronger dividend sentiment.  
Our paper contributes to different strands of finance literature. First, it relates to 
the papers that examine the catering theory of payout policy. Baker and Wurgler 
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(2004b) and Li and Lie (2006) find that when investors put a stock price premium on 
dividend-paying firms, managers initiate or increase dividends in order to capture 
this dividend premium. Jiang, Kim, Lie, and Yang (2013) and Kulchania (2013) 
extend the catering theory to share repurchase and find that managers cater to 
investor demand for share repurchases. Recent literature has typically used 
dividend/repurchase premium to measure investor demand and we develop a more 
direct measure of investors’ dividend sentiment. We find that shifts in investors’ 
dividend attitudes over time affect firm’s dividend policy.  
Second, our paper is related to the catering theory in other corporate decisions. 
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) propose a catering theory of nominal share 
prices and show that when investors place a premium on low-price firms, managers 
respond by supplying shares at lower price through stock split. Polk and Sapienza 
(2009) suggest that the stock market might misprice firms based on their investment 
level. Mangers cater to the mispricing by inflating stock price through investment 
decisions. Aghion and Stein (2008) find that managers either maximizing sales 
growth or improving profit margins depending on which is preferred by the stock 
market.  We test the dividend catering theory by using the Internet search volume for 
dividend-related keywords as a direct measure of investors’ dividend sentiment. 
 Finally, our paper provides new evidence on the economic effects of investor 
attention. There is a large literature using indirect proxies for investor attention such 
as news and headlines (Baber and Odean, 2008), extreme returns (Baber and Odean, 
2008), advertising expense (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004) and trading 
volume (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin, 2001). Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) 
propose a direct measure of investor attention by aggregating search frequency in 
Google and report that it measures the attention of retail investors and captures 
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investor attention in a more timely manner. We show that managers initiate or 
increase dividends when the dividend sentiment of retail investors becomes stronger. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 4.2 presents 
the data. Section 4.3 gives our main results. Section 4.4 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2  Data and Sample Construction 
We collect data from various sources to test our conjectures. In this section, we 
describe the data sets and our measure of dividend sentiment.  
 
4.2.1  Dividend Sentiment  
Google provides data on search term frequency via the product Google Trends 
from January 2004.43 The search data from Google Trends are normalized and scaled 
to a range of 0 to 100. 44 We use the search volume index (SVI) of dividend-related 
searches at both national- and state-levels in the U.S. to capture retail investors’ 
dividend sentiment. 45 SVI indicates the popularity of a search term relative to all 
other terms from the same location at the same time. An increase in SVI indicates 
that individual investors pay more attention to the search than they normally do. 
Weekly SVI for a search term is the number of searches for that term scaled by its 
time series average. We aggregate weekly SVI to monthly SVI by linear interpolation 
as in Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011). 
                                                            
43 Google Trends is available at https://www.google.com/trends/ 
44 Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) report that Google accounted for 72.1% of all search queries in the 
U.S. The search volume data is thus representative of the searching behavior of the general 
population. 
45 The Internet search volume is proper to test the dividend catering theory. Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009) show that dividend catering theory rests on the assumption that the time-varying demands for 
dividends are driven by individual investors. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) find that the Internet 
search volume in Google captures the attention of retail investors. 
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Google Trends provides top searches that are most frequently searched with the 
term we entered (for instance, “dividend”) in the same search session within the 
chosen category, country, or region. We then pick up dividend-related searches with 
available data and construct a keyword-based index SVI_Div, to capture retail 
investors’ dividend sentiment (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011, 2015). 46 SVI_Div is 
the search volume index if the search term in Google Trends includes “dividend” or 
“dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or “dividend 
payout”.  
To study the geographical variation in dividend attitudes, we manually collect the 
monthly Internet search volume from Google Trends for each U.S. state from 2004 
to 2013. We define a state as a zero dividend sentiment state if the median value of 
SVI_Div is zero within the sample period.  We next rank the remaining non-zero 
states by averaging SVI_Div from 2004 to 2013. The top 10 dividend sentiment 
states are those with the highest average SVI_Div while the bottom 10 states with 
non-zero dividend sentiment are these with the lowest but positive average 
SVI_Div.47  
Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), our key variable of interest is the 
change in SVI, i.e. abnormal search volume index (ASVI).48  We define ASVI for 
search term j at time t as: 
   , , , 1lo g lo gj t j t j tA S V I S V I S V I       (8) 
                                                            
46 Google Trends does not return a valid search volume index if the dividend-related term is rarely 
searched. Instead, Google Trends will return a zero value for that search.  
47  The top 10 dividend sentiment states are Texas, Florida, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Georgia, Illinois and Arizona. The bottom 10 states with non-zero 
dividend sentiment are Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, Iowa, South 
Carolina, Utah and Virginia. 
48 ASVI has the merit that low-frequency seasonality and time trends are removed. 
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Where log (SVIj,t) and log (SVIj,t-1) represent the natural logarithm of SVIs during 
month t and month t-1,respectively.49 The time series of ASVI start from February 
2004 and it measures changes in investors’ dividend sentiment.  
Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) show that one of the important features of the 
search data in Google Trends is seasonality. Then, to eliminate seasonality from 
ASVIj,t, we regress ASVIj,t on month dummies and keep the residual (Da, Engelberg, 
and Gao, 2015). Quarterly ASVIj,t is the median value of the monthly ASVIj,t within 
each quarter. 
 
4.2.2  Validation Tests 
We conduct two validation tests to verify whether our measure of dividend 
sentiment is reasonable. Table 4.1 reports the median value of the state-level search 
volume index of dividend-related searches from Google Trends. Panel A lists the top 
10 dividend sentiment states. Florida has the strongest dividend sentiment (i.e., with 
the highest SVI_Div) across all U.S. states with the largest fraction of seniors 
(Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner, 2011). This is consistent with the findings of 
Graham and Kumar (2006) who show that older investors like dividend-paying 
stocks.50  
We then visually examine the time-series variation of the Internet search volume 
from 2004 to 2013. We posit that investors may prefer dividend-paying stocks when 
economy slumps. Figure 4.1 depicts the natural log of SVI_Div and SVI_DT from 
2004 to 2013. To eliminate seasonality from the natural log of the SVIs, we regress 
the ratio on month dummies and keep the residual. We follow the National Bureau of 
                                                            
49 We also define ASVI as the natural logarithm of SVI during month t minus the average natural 
logarithm of SVI in month t-1 and t-2. Results are similar. 
50 Similarly, Alaska is one of the zero dividend sentiment states with the smallest fraction of seniors 
(Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner, 2011). This is consistent with the findings of Graham and Kumar 
(2006) who report that younger investors prefer dividend nonpayers. 
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Economic Research (NBER)51 and define recession period from December 2007 to 
June 2009. Indeed, we find that individual investors search more on dividends during 
the financial crisis period than the pre-crisis period. The search spikes on October 
2008 shortly after US investment banks are pummeled on the stock markets and two 
American banks collapse. This again validates that the Internet search volume 
intuitively captures investors’ attention to dividends and represents a reasonable 
measure of dividend sentiment.  
 
4.2.3  Sample Construction 
We analyze the dividend policy of firms from 2004 to 2013. We use quarterly 
dividend data rather than annual dividends to enrich our observations. The 
Compustat sample for quarter t includes those firms that have the following data 
(Compustat data items in parentheses): total assets (44), stock price (12), and shares 
outstanding (61) at the end of each quarter, income before extraordinary items (8), 
interest expenses (22), dividends per share by ex date (16), preferred dividends (24), 
and preferred stock carrying value (55). Firms must also have (i) stockholder’s 
equity (60), (ii) liabilities (54), or (iii) common equity (59) and preferred stock par 
value (55). Total assets must be available in quarter t and t-1. The other items must 
be available in quarter t. We also use, but do not require, balance sheet deferred 
taxed and investment tax credit (52), income statement deferred taxes (35), 
purchases of common and preferred stock (93), sale of common and preferred stock 
(84), and common treasury stock (98). We exclude firms with book equity below 
$250,000 or assets below $500,000. To ensure that firms are publicly traded, the 
Compustat sample includes only firms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. The 
                                                            
51 Business Cycle Dates are available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html 
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CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with CRSP codes of 
10 or 11. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 to 6999).  
 
4.2.4  Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.2 lists the summary statistics of each variable. The average 
dividend initiation rate is 4.3% from 2004 to 2013. Our dividend sentiment measure, 
ASVI_Div, has significant variation with the 90th percentile value being 0.045 and the 
10th percentile number being -0.067. Firm and risk controls are comparable to those 
reported in the previous literature (Fama and French, 2001; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009). Panel B of Table 4.2 reports the correlation matrix of our key variables. The 
correlations between the dividend premium and the dividend sentiment are low. 
Specifically, the correlation between ASVI_Div and the dividend premium is about 
4%. Such low correlation suggests that ASVI_Div might capture investors’ dividend 
sentiment that is not included in the dividend premium.  
In terms of firm and risk controls, both risk variables have absolute correlations 
of less than 20% with the four firm characteristics proposed by Fama and French 
(2001) with two exceptions. Idiosyncratic risk has a correlation of -41% with NYP, 
which is in align with smaller firms being more risky. Idiosyncratic risk has a 
correlation of -32% with Earnings/Assets, consistent with less profitable firms being 
more risky. Overall, the correlations among these firms and risk controls are similar 
to those reported in the previous literature and indicate that multicollinearity is not 
an issue for our analysis.  
 
4.3  Empirical Results 
105 
 
4.3.1  Dividend Sentiment and Dividend Payment 
We follow Baker and Wurgler (2004b) and define a firm-quarter observation as a 
dividend payer if it has positive dividends per share by ex date, or else it is a 
dividend nonpayer.  We then define Payers and Old Payers as follows: 
t t t t
P a y e r s N e w P a y e r s O ld P a y e r s L is t P a y e r s                      (9) 
1t t t t
O ld P a y e r s P a y e r s N e w N o n p a y e r s D e lis t P a y e r s

          (10) 
Payers is the total number of dividend payers at quarter t, New Payers is the 
number of firms that initiate dividend among last quarter’s dividend nonpayers, Old 
Payers is the number of dividend payers among last quarter’s payers, List Payers is 
the number of dividend payers this quarter that were not in the sample last quarter, 
New Nonpayers is the number of dividend omitters that paid last quarter. Delist 
Payers is the number of last quarter’s dividend payers not in the sample this quarter.  
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                  (13) 
Where Increase Payers (Decrease Payers) is the number of firms increase 
(decrease) dividends this quarter among last quarter’s dividend payers. We count a 
firm-quarter observation as an increase (decrease) payer if this quarter’s dividend per 
share by ex date is higher (lower) than that in last quarter. Initiate is the fraction of 
surviving nonpayers that starts paying dividends. Increase (Decrease) is the fraction 
106 
 
of surviving payers that increase (decrease) dividends. These variables capture 
whether to pay dividends rather than how much to pay as dividends.52 
 Unlike annual dividends that are typically used in the previous literature (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004b; Li and Lie, 2006; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009), quarterly 
dividend payment has seasonality features (Verdelhan, 2010). Then, to eliminate 
seasonality from dividend payment measures, we regress Initiate, Increase, and 
Decrease on quarter dummies respectively and keep the residual (Da, Engelberg, and 
Gao, 2015). 
We first investigate whether time-varying dividend attitudes affect dividend 
payment. Figure 4.2 relates investors’ dividend sentiment to the dividend initiation 
(Panel A) and increase ratio (Panel B) in the following quarter. The dividend 
initiation and increase ratios reach the lowest level at the end of 2008 as managers 
are reluctant to initiate or increase dividends when economy slumps. Both panel A 
and B reveal a strong positive relation between one-quarter lagged dividend 
sentiment (ASVI_Div) and the dividend initiation or increase rate.  
We then formally examine whether dividend sentiment predicts firm’s dividend 
policy from 2004 to 2013. If elevated dividend sentiment increases the demand for 
dividend-paying stocks, we expect ASVI to have a positive (negative) impact on the 
subsequent dividend initiation or increase (decrease) ratio. We regress dividend 
payment measures on one-quarter lagged ASVI_Div. All standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation to four lags using the procedure of Newey 
and West (1987).  
Panel A of Table 4.3 reports results. The dependent variable in column (1) is the 
fraction of new dividend payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving nonpayers 
                                                            
52 Baker and Wurgler (2004b) argue that the dividend payout ratio is sensitive to profitability while 
the decision to initiate dividend is always a policy decision.  
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from t-1. The coefficient on ASVI_Div is significantly positive at the 1% level. This 
suggests that ASVI_Div, on a stand-alone basis, strongly predicts the dividend 
initiation ratio in the next quarter. The regression coefficient of 0.086 suggests that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in ASVI_Div leads to a 0.39% (0.045*0.086) higher 
dividend initiation rate in the following quarter. These results are economically 
significant as the increase is 9.1% of the average dividend initiation rate in our 
sample (0.043).  
Column (2) reports the regression for the rate of dividend increase. The 
dependent variable is the fraction of payers that increase dividends at quarter t. we 
find that one-quarter lagged ASVI_Div is positively associated with the dividend 
increase rate. This suggests that firms cater to increase dividends when individual 
investors have stronger dividend sentiment. In economic terms, a one-standard-
deviation increase in ASVI_Div is associated with a 1.37% (0.045*0.305) increase in 
the dividend increase rate in the following quarter.  
Column (3) shows that the dividend decrease rate is negatively associated with 
ASVI_Div. When retail investors have weaker dividend sentiment, firms are more 
likely to decrease dividends. The regression coefficient of 0.314 shows that a one-
standard-deviation decrease in ASVI_Div is associated with a 1.41% (0.045*0.314) 
increase in the dividend decrease rate in the following quarter.  
Prior dividend catering literature has typically used the dividend premium to 
measure investor demand for dividends. We next examine whether dividend 
sentiment predicts firm’s dividend policy after controlling for the dividend premium. 
The quarterly dividend premium is the difference between the logs of the value-
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weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and nonpayers each quarter.53 We 
regress ASVI_Div on the dividend premium and keep the residual (ASVI_Div_DP).  
We repeat the analysis in Panel A using ASVI_Div_DP and report results in 
Panel B of Table 4.3. We find that ASVI_Div_DP is positively (negatively) 
associated with dividend initiation and increase (decrease) rate. The economic 
significance remains similar in all specifications. This suggests that managers cater 
to investor demand by initiating or increasing (cutting) dividends when retail 
investors search more (less) on dividends via Internet. The results are consistent with 
dividend catering even after controlling for the dividend premium.  
In summary, dividend sentiment strongly predicts firm’s dividend policy. 
Managers initiate or increase (decrease) dividends when individual investors have 
stronger (weaker) dividend sentiment. Results are robust after controlling for the 
dividend premium proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004b).  
 
4.3.2  The Propensity to Pay Dividends with Firm Characteristics Controls 
Although we find that dividend sentiment predicts firm’s dividend policy, one 
possibility is that firm’s dividend payment measures are related to the cross-sectional 
distribution of dividend-relevant firm characteristics. For instance, an increase in the 
dividend initiation rate may indicate that firms do not need to retain internal cash 
rather than managers cater to dividend demands when retail investors have stronger 
dividend sentiment.  
We test this explanation by controlling for firm characteristics. We examine 
whether dividend sentiment helps explain the residual variation of dividend policies 
after controlling for firm characteristics proposed by Fama and French (2001). We 
                                                            
53 To eliminate seasonality from quarterly dividend premium, we regress the ratio on quarter dummies 
and keep the residual. 
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conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of a logit model with four control 
variables: 
P r( 1) lo g ( )
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
M d A E
P a y e r it a b N Y P c d e u
B A A
                      (14) 
where size NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e., the percentage 
of NYSE firms having equal or smaller capitalization than firm i in quarter t. 
Market-to-book ratio M/B is book assets (item 44)  minus book value of equity (item 
60+item 52) plus market value of equity (item 12*item 61), all divided by book 
assets (item 44). Asset Growth dA/A is the difference between book assets (item 44) 
and lagged book assets, all divided by lagged book assets. Profitability E/A is 
earnings before extraordinary items (item 8) plus interest expense (item 22) plus 
income statement deferred tax (item 35), all divided by book assets (item 44). 
The test is conducted in three stages. We first perform a set of Fama-Macbeth 
logit regression of dividend payment on firm characteristics. We obtain the average 
quarter prediction errors (actual dividend policy minus predicted policy) from the 
logit regressions. Then, to eliminate seasonality from the average quarter prediction 
errors, we regress the prediction errors on quarter dummies and keep the residual (Da, 
Engelberg, and Gao, 2015). We regress the seasonal-adjusted residual of average 
quarter prediction errors on ASVI_Div in the final stage.  
We report first and final stage results in column (1) of Table 4.4. Consistent with 
Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004b), we find that larger and 
more profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends while firms with more 
investment opportunities and greater asset growth are less likely to pay dividends. 
We then construct the propensity to pay dividends for quarter t based on the first 
stage logit estimates in column (1) of Table 4.4. The propensity to pay (PTP) is the 
difference between the actual percentage of firms that pay dividends in a given 
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quarter and the expected percentage, which is the average predicted probability from 
the logit model. Panel A of Figure 4.3 depicts that in the first half of the sample, 
ASVI_Div and subsequent propensity to pay move almost in lockstep. Then the 
average propensity to pay has a pronounced downward trend during the financial 
crisis period, which is captured by our dividend sentiment measure.  
The dependent variable of the final stage is the change in the propensity to pay 
(CPTP) dividends from quarter t-1 to t. The coefficient on ASVI_Div is significantly 
positive at 1% level. This suggests that ASVI_Div predicts firm’s propensity to pay 
dividends in the following quarter. This is consistent with catering prediction after 
controlling for firm characteristics. Managers cater to pay dividends when individual 
investors have stronger dividend sentiment. 
The supply of dividends comes from two sources in any given quarter: (i) firms 
that already pay dividends; and (ii) firms that newly initiate dividends. We next 
divide the sample to surviving nonpayers in column (2) and to surviving payers in 
columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable of the first-stage regression in column 
(2) is a binary variable that equals one if firm i pays dividend in quarter t and zero 
otherwise. The average quarter prediction errors in column (2) represent the 
propensity to initiate dividends (PTI). The propensity to initiate (PTI) is the 
difference between the actual percentage of previous nonpayers that initiate 
dividends in a given quarter and the expected percentage, which is the average 
predicted probability from the logit model. 
 The dependent variable of the first-stage regression in column (3)/(4) is a binary 
variable that equals one if firm i increase/decrease dividend in quarter t and zero 
otherwise. Hence the average quarter prediction errors in columns (3)/(4) stand for 
the propensity to increase/decrease dividends (PTE/PTD). The propensity to 
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increase/decrease (PTE/PTD) is the difference between the actual percentage of 
firms that increase/decrease dividends in a given quarter and the expected percentage, 
which is the average predicted probability from the logit model. 
As predicted by dividend catering, ASVI_Div is positively associated with the 
changes in the propensity to initiate (CPTI) or increase (CPTE) dividends and 
negatively associated with the changes in the propensity to decrease dividends 
(CPTD). Firms are more (less) likely to initiate or increase dividends when retail 
investors search more (less) on dividends via Internet. The regression coefficient of 
0.125 in column (2) suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in ASVI_Div is 
associated with 0.56% (0.045*0.125) increase in the propensity to initiate dividends 
in the following quarter. These results remain after controlling for the dividend 
premium.  
To summarize, the dividend sentiment effect is as predicted by catering after 
controlling for firm characteristics and the dividend premium. When dividends 
attract more (less) retail investors, firms have higher propensity to initiate or increase 
(decrease) dividends.  
 
4.3.3  The Propensity to Pay Dividends with Risk Controls 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) argue that risk is a significant determinant of the 
propensity to pay dividends, and the dividend premium becomes insignificant once 
we control for risk. Hence we examine whether dividend sentiment predicts firm’s 
dividend policy after controlling for risk in the first-stage Fama-Macbeth logit 
regression. The tests also proceed in three stages. The only difference is that we 
conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of a logit model with two additional 
risk controls in the first stage: 
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where Systematic_risk is the standard deviation of the predicted value from a 
regression of a firm’s daily excess stock returns (raw returns less the riskless rate) on 
the market factor (i.e., the value-weighted market return less the riskless rate). One 
firm-quarter observation of systematic risk is calculated using firm-specific daily 
stock returns within one quarter. Idiosyncratic_risk is the standard deviation of 
residuals from the above regression used to define systematic risk.  
We report first and final stage results in column (1) of Table 4.5. Consistent with 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), we find that both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk 
are negatively associated with the propensity to pay dividends. The average quarter 
prediction errors from the first stage logit estimates are the propensity to pay 
dividends (PTP) after controlling for firm characteristics and risk.  Panel B of Figure 
4.3 depicts the dividend sentiment and the propensity to pay dividends. The 
propensity to pay dividends spikes during the financial crisis period once we control 
for risk.  The variation trends of ASVI_Div and the propensity to pay are similar 
except the financial crisis period.  
With regards to the final stage results, we find that ASVI_Div is positively 
associated with the changes in the propensity to pay dividends.54 A one-standard-
deviation increase in ASVI_Div leads to 0.67% (0.045*0.148) increase in the 
propensity to pay dividends in the following quarter. This confirms that dividend 
sentiment has predictive power in capturing manager’s dividend catering behavior.  
We then study companies that newly initiate dividends in column (2) and firms 
that already pay dividends in columns (3) and (4). The coefficient on ASVI_Div is 
                                                            
54 Consistent with Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), we find that dividend premium becomes insignificant 
once we control for risk. 
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significantly positive in columns (2) and (3) and becomes significantly negative in 
column (4) after controlling for risk. Results are robust after controlling for the 
dividend premium. This again confirms that our dividend sentiment measure might 
capture information not reflected in the market data.   
Overall, we find that investors’ dividend sentiment still strongly predicts firm’s 
subsequent dividend policy after controlling for firm characteristics, risk and the 
dividend premium. Managers cater to investors’ demand for dividends over time by 
adjusting firm’s payout policy.  
 
4.3.4  Cross-Sectional Variation in Dividend Sentiment 
We next examine whether cross-sectional differences in dividend sentiment 
affect firms’ dividend policy. As local investors’ dividend sentiment varies across 
regions, we conjecture that the effects of dividend sentiment on firm’s dividend 
policy would be stronger among U.S. states with stronger dividend sentiment. 
Investors in these states are more likely to put premium on dividend-paying stocks 
and local managers are more likely to cater. In contrast, for firms locate in states 
with weak dividend attitudes, the relation between dividend sentiment and firm’s 
dividend policy should be weaker or non-existent. To test our prediction, we use 
each firm’s headquarter state to define its location and use the average state-level 
SVI_Div to measure the dividend sentiment of local investors.  
We repeat the analysis in Table 4.5. The test is conducted in three stages. We 
first conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of a logit model with firm and risk 
controls. We only include firms whose headquarters are located in these top/bottom 
10 states with non-zero dividend sentiment. We next obtain the average quarter 
prediction errors (actual dividend policy minus predicted policy) from the logit 
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regressions for each top/bottom 10 state. Then, to eliminate seasonality from the 
average quarter prediction errors, we regress the prediction errors on quarter 
dummies and keep the residual (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2015). The final stage 
regresses the seasonal-adjusted residual of average quarter prediction errors on 
ASVI_Div. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 55  We have 39 
observations for each top/bottom 10 state and 390 observations in total from 2004 to 
2013.  
Table 4.6 reports results. In Panel A, we find that ASVI_Div is positively 
associated with the change in the propensity to pay dividends (CPTP).  A one-
standard-deviation increase in ASVI_Div leads to 0.48% (0.043*0.111) increase in 
the propensity to pay dividends in the following quarter for firms in top 10 dividend 
sentiment states. These results are economically significant as the increase is 32.7% 
of the average propensity to pay in top 10 dividend sentiment states (1.47%). We 
then restrict the sample to surviving nonpayers in column (2) and to surviving payers 
in columns (3) and (4). As predicted by catering for dividend initiation and increase, 
the coefficients on ASVI_Div are significantly positive at the 5% level in columns (2) 
and (3).  
We find insignificant results in column (4) where the dependent variable is the 
change in the propensity to decrease dividends (CPTD). Firms that cut dividends 
experience poor prior, concurrent, and future stock returns. Hence valuation gains 
from catering might not be reflected in stock prices. Another possible explanation is 
that many firms cut dividends due to low profitability rather than catering. Hence it 
is not surprising to find a weaker relation between investors’ dividend sentiment and 
                                                            
55 Results are similar if we cluster standard errors by state or use the fixed-effects model.  
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the propensity to decrease dividends. Results remain similar after controlling for the 
dividend premium in Panel B of Table 4.6.  
Panel C of Table 4.6 repeats the regressions in Table 4.5 but restricts to firms in 
the bottom 10 states with non-zero dividend sentiment. In the final stage, the 
coefficients on ASVI_Div are insignificant in all specifications. This suggests that the 
dividend sentiment lacks power in explaining firm’s dividend policy for firms that 
located in states with weak dividend sentiment. Results are robust after controlling 
for the dividend premium in Panel D.  
Consistent with our conjecture, in regions with strong dividend sentiment, local 
managers are willing to cater to investors’ dividend sentiment. In contrast, in regions 
with weak dividend sentiment, individual investors pay less attention to dividends 
and managers decide not to cater. 
 
4.3.5  Robustness Checks and Other Tests 
Our dividend sentiment measure thus far is ASVI_Div. One concern to this 
measure is that the selection of the dividend-related keywords is not random. To 
alleviate the selection bias, we use ASVI_DT as an alternative measure of dividend 
sentiment. ASVI_DT is the abnormal search volume index for topic “dividend” from 
Google Trends and includes searches in different languages and various text strings 
as long as they are dividend-related.  
We repeat our baseline analysis using ASVI_DT and report results in Table 4.7.  
We find that dividend sentiment still strongly predicts dividend initiation and 
increase ratio. The relation holds after controlling for firm characteristics, risk, and 
the dividend premium. One exception is that we find insignificant results for 
dividend decrease. One potential reason is that the associated negative 
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announcement effects for dividend cut might offset the potential benefits of catering. 
This makes catering less likely to apply to dividend cut.  
To alleviate the concern that the search terms in SVI_Div are overly broad, we 
construct another keyword-based index, SVI_High_Div, which is the search volume 
index if the search term in Google includes “high dividend” or “high dividends” or 
“high payout” or “high dividend stocks” or “high dividend yield” or “high dividend 
payout”. Searching for these high-related dividend keywords is less ambiguous. If an 
investor is searching “high dividend stocks” in Google, she is undoubtedly paying 
attention to high dividend-paying stocks. Again, we find that retail investors’ 
dividend sentiment plays an important role in explaining firm’s dividend policy after 
controlling for firm characteristics, risk and the dividend premium. (Tables are 
available upon request). 
We include dividend omissions in our analysis and find that shifts in investors’ 
dividend attitudes over time do not affect firm’s dividend omission decision. Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009) provide several reasons that catering is less likely to apply to 
dividend omissions. Firstly, investors react negatively to dividend omission.56 The 
associated negative announcement effects might offset potential benefits of catering. 
Moreover, the limits to arbitrage are required for investor demand to affect stock 
prices. However, these constraints are less likely to apply when negative investor 
sentiments depress prices. Indeed, we find that results are stronger for dividend 
initiation and increase and the relation between the dividend sentiment and firm’s 
dividend policy becomes weaker for dividend cut and omission.  
Finally, we examine the lead-lag relation between the dividend premium and the 
dividend sentiment. To eliminate seasonality from quarterly dividend premium 
                                                            
56 Dividend omissions have announcement effects of nearly -7%. 
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(SVI_Div), we regress the ratio on quarter (month) dummies and keep the residual. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation to four lags 
using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). 
 We first regress current SVI_Div on one-, two-, three-, and four-quarter lagged 
dividend premium respectively in Panel A of Table 4.8. The coefficients on lagged 
dividend premium are all positive and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This confirms the positive relation between the dividend premium and the dividend 
sentiment. The regression R2 ranges from 13% to 22%, suggesting that the dividend 
premium only explains a small fraction of the changes in dividend sentiment. We 
next regress current dividend premium on one-, two-, three-, and four-quarter lagged 
SVI_Div respectively in Panel B of Table 4.8. We find positive relation between the 
dividend premium and the dividend sentiment in most specifications but coefficients 
are insignificant.  
 
4.4  Conclusion 
This paper investigates how changes in overall attitudes toward dividends affect 
firm’s dividend policy. We propose a direct measure of investor demand for 
dividends using the Internet search volume for dividend-related keywords. We find 
that managers cater to the time-varying investor demand for dividends. Managers 
initiate or increase (cut) dividends when retail investors have stronger (weaker) 
dividend sentiment. These effects are concentrated on firms located in high dividend 
sentiment states. Results are robust after controlling for firm characteristics, risk, and 
the dividend premium.  
These findings contribute to the emerging finance literature that examines the 
role of investor attention on corporate decisions. We directly test the dividend 
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catering theory by using the Internet search volume for dividend-related keywords. 
Previous papers have typically used the dividend premium to capture investor 
demand for dividends which results in controversy. In contrast, Internet search 
volume for dividend-related keywords intuitively captures investor attention to 
dividends and objectively reveals investors’ dividend sentiment. In future work, it 
may be interesting to study the Internet search volume in other corporate decisions 





















Table 4.1: Top, Bottom and Zero Dividend Sentiment States 
This table reports the search volume index for dividend-related searches from Google Trends. We 
calculate the median value of the search volume index from 2004 to 2013 for each state. SVI_Div is 
the search volume index if the search term in Google includes “dividend” or “dividends” or 
“payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or “dividend payout”. SVI_DT is the search 
volume index for the topic “dividend” from Google Trends. This includes searches in different text 
strings and various languages as long as they are dividend-related. We rank all U.S. states by SVI_Div 
and define a state as a zero dividend sentiment state (Panel C) if the median value of SVI_Div is zero 
within the sample period. Panel A (B) lists the top (bottom) 10 non-zero states with the highest 
(lowest) SVI_Div. 
Panel A. Top 10 States in Dividend Sentiment 
State Name State SVI_Div SVI_DT 
Florida FL 70 57 
Texas TX 68 58 
Colorado CO 66 54.5 
Maryland MD 66 55 
Missouri MO 65 55.5 
North Carolina NC 64 55 
Illinois IL 62.5 51 
Arizona AZ 61 53 
Georgia GA 61 49 
Panel B. Bottom 10 States with non-zero Dividend Sentiment 
State Name State SVI_Div SVI_DT 
Virginia VA 42 38.5 
Kansas KS 45 32 
Nevada NV 48.5 28 
Oklahoma OK 50 37 
Kentucky KY 50.5 33.5 
Utah UT 51 30.5 
Arkansas AR 52 38 
Louisiana LA 53 34.5 
Iowa IA 53.5 37 
South Carolina SC 56 28 
Panel C. States with zero Dividend Sentiment 
State Name State SVI_Div SVI_DT 
Wyoming WY 0 0 
North Dakota ND 0 0 
West Virginia WV 0 0 
South Dakota SD 0 0 
Montana MT 0 0 
Vermont VT 0 0 
Idaho ID 0 0 
Delaware DE 0 0 
Alaska AK 0 0 
Maine ME 0 0 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
This table depicts the summary statistics for each variable in Panel A and the correlation table in Panel B. 
Dividend Initiation Ratio expresses new payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving nonpayers from t-1. 
Dividend Increase Ratio expresses increase payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving payers from t-1. 
Dividend Decrease Ratio expresses decrease payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving payers from t-1. 
ASVI_Div is the abnormal search volume index if the search term in Google includes “dividend” or 
“dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or “dividend payout”. Dividend 
Premium is the difference between the logs of the value-weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers 
and nonpayers. We regress ASVI_Div on the dividend premium and keep the residual (ASVI_Div_DP). 
ASVI_DT is the abnormal search volume index for topic “dividend” from Google Trends and includes 
searches in different languages and various text strings as long as they are dividend-related. To eliminate 
seasonality from our ASVI measures (Dividend Premium), we regress the ratio on month (quarter) dummies 
and keep the residual. Market-to-book ratio M/B is book assets (item 44)  minus book value of equity (item 
60+item 52) plus market value of equity (item 12*item 61), all divided by book assets (item 44). Asset 
Growth dA/A is the difference between book assets (item 44) and lagged book assets, all divided by lagged 
book assets. Profitability E/A is earnings before extraordinary items (item 8) plus interest expense (item 22) 
plus income statement deferred tax (item 35), all divided by book assets (item 44). Size NYP is the NYSE 
market capitalization percentile, i.e., the percentage of NYSE firms having equal or smaller capitalization 
than firm i in year t. Systematic Risk is the standard deviation of the predicted value from a regression of a 
firm’s daily excess stock returns (raw returns less the riskless rate) on the market factor (i.e., the value-
weighted market return less the riskless rate). One firm-quarter observation of systematic risk is calculated 
using firm-specific daily stock returns within one quarter. Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of 
residuals from the above regression used to define systematic risk. 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. Std. Dev 
Dividend Initiation Ratio 0.043 0.019 0.038 0.071 0.021 
Dividend Increase Ratio 0.297 0.185 0.295 0.404 0.082 
Dividend Decrease Ratio 0.155 0.121 0.150 0.192 0.033 
ASVI_Div -0.006 -0.067 0.002 0.045 0.045 
Dividend Premium 0.000 -0.082 0.013 0.062 0.056 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.000 -0.060 0.006 0.051 0.045 
ASVI_DT -0.002 -0.054 -0.003 0.050 0.041 
M/B 2.134 0.867 1.475 3.839 2.118 
dA/A 0.027 -0.084 0.008 0.117 0.155 
E/A -0.011 -0.087 0.012 0.041 0.083 
NYP 0.256 0.001 0.114 0.770 0.299 
Systematic Risk 0.012 0.002 0.009 0.024 0.011 








Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 ASVI_Div Dividend Premium ASVI_DT M/B dA/A E/A NYP Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
ASVI_Div 1.0000         
Dividend Premium 0.0386 1.0000        
ASVI_DT 0.6211 0.0778 1.0000       
M/B 0.0261 -0.0873 0.0261 1.0000      
dA/A 0.0360 -0.0519 0.0408 0.0851 1.0000     
E/A 0.0543 -0.0322 0.0518 -0.1837 0.1948 1.0000    
NYP 0.0053 0.0075 0.0084 0.0961 0.0451 0.2712 1.0000   
Systematic Risk -0.2128 0.2013 -0.2739 -0.0634 -0.0534 -0.0528 0.0621 1.0000  










Table 4.3: Dividend Payment and Dividend Sentiment 
This table shows OLS regressions of dividend initiation, increase, and decrease rates 
on one-quarter lagged dividend sentiment from 2004 to 2013. The initiation rate 
expresses new payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving nonpayers from t-1. 
The rate at which firms increase dividends expresses increase payers at quarter t as a 
percentage of surviving payers from t-1. The rate at which firms decrease dividends 
expresses decrease payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving payers from t-1. 
ASVI_Div is the abnormal search volume index if the search term in Google includes 
“dividend” or “dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or 
“dividend payout”. The dividend premium is the difference between the logs of the 
value-weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and nonpayers. To 
eliminate seasonality from dividend initiation, increase, decrease, and premium 
(ASVI_Div), we regress the ratio on quarter (month) dummies and keep the residual. 
We regress ASVI_Div on the dividend premium in Panel B and keep the residual 
(ASVI_Div_DP). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation to four lags using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). ***, **and 
*represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Abnormal Search Volume Index 
         Initiate         Increase        Decrease 
ASVI_Div 0.086 0.305 -0.314 
 [4.46]*** [1.80]* [2.94]*** 
Constant 0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 [0.20] [0.17] [0.09] 
R2 0.18 0.09 0.25 
N 39 39 39 
 
Panel B. Controlling for the Dividend Premium: Abnormal Search Volume Index 
       Initiate         Increase         Decrease 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.083 0.298 -0.320 
 [4.03]*** [1.65]* [3.03]*** 
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 [0.00] [0.02] [0.30] 
R2                 0.16 0.08 0.26 








Table 4.4: Dividend Payment and Dividend Sentiment: Firm Characteristic Controls 
This table reports three-stage regressions of dividend payment on firm characteristics and dividend sentiment. 
We first perform a set of Fama-Macbeth logit regression of dividend payment on firm characteristics suggested 
by Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004b). We restrict the sample to surviving nonpayers in 
column (2) and restrict the sample to surviving payers in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if firm i pays dividend in quarter t and zero otherwise in columns (1) and (2). 
The dependent variable in column (3) ((4)) is a binary variable that equals one if firm i increase (decrease) 
dividend in quarter t and zero otherwise: 
P r( 1) lo g ( )
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
M d A E
P a y e r it a b N Y P c d e u
B A A
      
 
We obtain the average quarter prediction errors (actual dividend policy minus predicted policy) from the first-
stage logit regressions. Then, to eliminate seasonality from the average quarter prediction errors, we regress the 
prediction errors on quarter dummies and keep the residual (the propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease 
dividends). The propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease (PTP/PTI/PTE/PTD) is the difference between the 
actual percentage of firms that pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividends in a given quarter and the expected 
percentage, which is the average predicted probability from the logit model. The final stage regresses the 
seasonal-adjusted residual of average quarter prediction errors on ASVI_Div. We also regress ASVI_Div on the 
dividend premium and keep the residual (ASVI_Div_DP). The dependent variable in the final stage is the change 
in the propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividends (CPTP/CPTI/CPTE/CPTD). The definitions of other 
financial variables are listed in the Appendix. Standard errors in the final stage regression are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation to four lags using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). ***, **and 
*represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. First Stage Regressions 
          PTP          PTI                PTE             PTD 
M/B -0.013 -0.002 0.014 0.005 
 [21.94]*** [5.14]*** [5.32]*** [3.70]*** 
dA/A -0.132 -0.038 0.128 -0.001 
 [13.86]*** [7.13]*** [4.37]*** [0.09] 
E/A 0.466 0.062 1.077 0.228 
 [28.01]*** [6.56]*** [8.94]*** [2.52]** 
NYP 0.608 0.161 0.059 -0.032 
 [78.96]*** [11.05]*** [5.67]*** [7.18]*** 
Constant 0.137 0.015 0.094 0.047 
 [30.84]*** [9.19]*** [14.53]*** [11.88]*** 
R2 0.21 0.05 0.02 0.01 
N      135,982       101,623           34,359             34,359 
Panel B. Final Stage Regressions 
       CPTP        CPTI        CPTE         CPTD 
ASVI_Div 0.164 0.125 0.243 -0.120 
 [7.07]*** [4.40]*** [2.00]** [2.56]*** 
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.000 
 [2.16]** [0.57] [1.09] [0.17] 
R2 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.10 
N 39 39 39 39 
Panel C. Controlling for the Dividend Premium: Final Stage Regressions  
Final Stage:       CPTP       CPTI        CPTE        CPTD 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.160 0.118 0.236 -0.115 
 [6.76]*** [4.12]*** [1.95]* [2.41]*** 
Constant 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 [1.21] [0.10] [0.52] [0.22] 
R2 0.40 0.22 0.16 0.10 
N 39 39 39 39 
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Table 4.5: Dividend Payment and Dividend Sentiment: Risk Controls 
This table reports three-stage regressions of dividend payment on firm characteristics, risk and dividend 
sentiment. We first perform a set of Fama-Macbeth logit regression of dividend payment on firm characteristics 
and risk suggested by Fama and French (2001) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). We restrict the sample to 
surviving nonpayers in column (2) and restrict the sample to surviving payers in columns (3) and (4). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i pays dividend in quarter t and zero otherwise in 
columns (1) and (2). The dependent variable in column (3) ((4)) is a binary variable that equals one if firm i 
increase (decrease) dividend in quarter t and zero otherwise: 
P r( 1) lo g ( _ _ )
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We obtain the average quarter prediction errors (actual dividend policy minus predicted policy) from the first-
stage logit regressions. Then, to eliminate seasonality from the average quarter prediction errors, we regress the 
prediction errors on quarter dummies and keep the residual (propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease). The 
propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease (PTP/PTI/PTE/PTD) is the difference between the actual percentage 
of firms that pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividends in a given quarter and the expected percentage, which is the 
average predicted probability from the logit model. The final stage regresses the seasonal-adjusted residual of 
average quarter prediction errors on ASVI_Div. We also regress ASVI_Div on the dividend premium and keep the 
residual (ASVI_Div_DP). The dependent variable in the final stage is the change in the propensity to 
pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividends (CPTP/CPTI/CPTE/CPTD). The definitions of other financial and risk 
variables are listed in the Appendix. Standard errors in the final stage regression are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation to four lags using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. First Stage Regressions 
             PTP            PTI               PTE             PTD 
M/B -0.026 -0.004 0.008 0.004 
 [35.05]*** [5.10]*** [2.72]*** [2.53]** 
dA/A -0.149 -0.048 0.132 -0.009 
 [9.21]*** [7.07]*** [4.34]*** [0.59] 
E/A 0.496 0.112 1.145 0.337 
 [16.86]*** [10.63]*** [7.73]*** [3.40]*** 
NYP 0.498 0.138 0.044 -0.014 
 [64.17]*** [12.41]*** [3.69]*** [3.02]*** 
Systematic Risk -2.111 -1.467 -5.940 -0.499 
 [4.08]*** [7.75]*** [8.37]*** [1.45] 
Idiosyncratic Risk -4.169 -0.157 -1.999 1.435 
 [16.34]*** [2.87]*** [4.86]*** [5.61]*** 
Constant 0.339 0.039 0.203 0.015 
 [33.26]*** [10.56]*** [15.03]*** [2.70]** 
R2 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.02 
N           99,065           68,975               30,090              30,090 
Panel B. Final Stage Regressions 
            CPTP         CPTI            CPTE            CPTD 
ASVI_Div 0.148 0.097 0.350 -0.114 
 [2.00]** [4.74]*** [1.83]* [2.56]** 
Constant 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.29] [0.23] [0.07] [0.11] 
R2 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.10 
N 39 39 39 39 
Panel C. Controlling for the Dividend Premium: Final Stage Regressions 
            CPTP          CPTI            CPTE            CPTD 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.145 0.092 0.346 -0.109 
 [1.87]* [4.22]*** [1.80]* [2.47]** 
Constant 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 [0.07] [0.21] [0.12] [0.31] 
R2 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.09 
N             39          39             39           39 
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Table 4.6: Dividend Payment and Dividend Sentiment: Top/Bottom 10 Dividend Sentiment 
States 
This table reports the final stage results of three-stage regressions of dividend payment on firm characteristics, 
risk and dividend sentiment for top/bottom 10 states with non-zero dividend sentiment. We collect SVI for each 
U.S. state and rank all states by averaging the SVI from 2004 to 2013. The top 10 states with the highest dividend 
sentiment (highest average SVI) are Texas, Florida, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, Georgia, Illinois and Arizona. We only include firms whose headquarters are located in these states in 
Panel A and B. The bottom 10 non-zero states with the lowest dividend sentiment (lowest average SVI) are 
Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, Iowa, South Carolina, Utah and Virginia. We only 
include firms whose headquarters are located in these states in Panel C and D. We first perform a set of Fama-
Macbeth logit regression of dividend payment on firm characteristics and risk suggested by Fama and French 
(2001) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). We restrict the sample to surviving nonpayers in column (2) and restrict 
the sample to surviving payers in columns (3) and (4):  
P r( 1) lo g ( _ _ )
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We obtain the average quarter prediction errors (actual dividend policy minus predicted policy) for each state 
from the logit regressions. Then, to eliminate seasonality from the average quarter prediction errors, we regress 
the prediction errors on quarter dummies and keep the residual (the propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease 
dividends). The propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease (PTP/PTI/PTE/PTD) is the difference between the 
actual percentage of firms that pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividends in a given quarter and the expected 
percentage, which is the average predicted probability from the logit model. The final stage regresses the 
seasonal-adjusted residual of average quarter prediction errors on ASVI_Div. We also regress ASVI_Div on the 
dividend premium and keep the residual (ASVI_Div_DP). The dependent variable in the final stage is the change 
in the propensity to pay/initiate/increase/decrease dividend (CPTP/CPTI/CPTE/CPTD). The definitions of other 
financial and risk variables are listed in the Appendix. Standard errors in the final stage regression are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Panel A. Top 10 Dividend Sentiment States 
        CPTP          CPTI         CPTE          CPTD 
ASVI_Div 0.043 0.042 0.145 -0.019 
 [1.92]* [2.15]** [2.01]** [0.52] 
Constant -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.12] [0.26] [0.07] [0.19] 
N 390 390 390 390 
Panel B. Top 10 Dividend Sentiment States: Controlling for the Dividend Premium 
                CPTP                CPTI                  CPTE             CPTD 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.042 0.042 0.146 -0.020 
 [1.92]* [2.14]** [2.01]** [0.54] 
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 [0.08] [0.22] [0.03] [0.18] 
N    390  390   390        390 
Panel C. Bottom 10 States with non-zero Dividend Sentiment 
          CPTP          CPTI          CPTE          CPTD 
ASVI_Div 0.015 -0.136 0.025 0.011 
 [0.29] [1.34] [0.24] [0.22] 
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 0.000 
 [0.04] [0.01] [0.46] [0.01] 
N 390 390 390 390 
Panel D. Bottom 10 States with non-zero Dividend Sentiment: Controlling for the Dividend Premium 
          CPTP          CPTI          CPTE           CPTD 
ASVI_Div_DP 0.015 -0.137 0.026 0.010 
 [0.29] [1.34] [0.25] [0.22] 
Constant -0.000 0.001 -0.006 -0.000 
 [0.06] [0.11] [0.47] [0.00] 






Table 4.7: Dividend Payment and Dividend Sentiment: Robustness Checks 
This table reports our baseline results using ASVI_DT. ASVI_DT is the abnormal search 
volume index for the topic “dividend” from Google Trends. This includes searches in 
different text strings and various languages as long as they are dividend-related. To 
eliminate seasonality from ASVI_DT, we regress the ratio on month dummies and keep the 
residual. We also regress ASVI_DT on the dividend premium proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) and keep the residual (ASVI_DT_DP). Panel A shows results before 
controlling for firm characteristics and risk. Panel B to C list the final stage results of the 
three-stage regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation to four lags using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). ***, **and * 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. ASVI  
          Initiate             Increase           Decrease 
ASVI_DT 0.068 0.358 -0.195 
 [2.83]*** [1.90]* [1.34] 
ASVI_DT_DP 0.064 0.351 -0.205 
 [2.61]** [1.76]* [1.43] 
Panel B. ASVI Controlling for Firm Characteristics  
         CPTP        CPTI         CPTE        CPTD 
ASVI_DT 0.161 0.119 0.348 -0.009 
 [4.86]*** [3.77]*** [2.66]*** [0.19] 
ASVI_DT_DP 0.156 0.111 0.342 -0.000 
 [4.64]*** [3.45]*** [2.66]*** [0.01] 
Panel C. ASVI Controlling for Firm Characteristics and Risk  
            CPTP        CPTI          CPTE        CPTD 
ASVI_DT 0.184 0.100 0.452 -0.002 
 [1.95]* [3.43]*** [2.26]** [0.05] 
ASVI_DT_DP 0.182 0.093 0.451 0.004 









Table 4.8: Lead-Lag Relation Between the Dividend Premium and the Dividend Sentiment 
This table shows the lead-lag relation between the dividend premium proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) and the search volume index for dividend-related keywords from Google 
Trends. SVI_Div is the search volume index if the search term in Google includes 
“dividend” or “dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or 
“dividend payout”. Dividend Premium is the difference between the logs of the value-
weighted market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and nonpayers. To eliminate seasonality 
from the dividend premium (SVI_Div), we regress the ratio on quarter (month) dummies and 
keep the residual. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation to 
four lags using the procedure of Newey and West (1987). ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A. Relation between Lagged Dividend Premium and Current Dividend Sentiment 
 Dividend Premium 
        One-Lag       Two-Lag         Three-Lag     Four-Lag 
SVI_Div 1.011 1.221 1.071 0.989 
 [2.65]*** [4.07]*** [2.57]*** [2.41]*** 
Constant -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008 
 [0.05] [0.07] [0.10] [0.18] 
R2 0.14 0.22 0.17 0.13 
N             39            38              37              36 
 
Panel B. Relation between Lagged Dividend Sentiment and Current Dividend Premium 
 SVI_Div 
        One-Lag       Two-Lag          Three-Lag          Four-Lag 
Dividend Premium 0.053 0.081 -0.006 0.006 
         [0.74] [1.03] [0.09] [0.08] 
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.23] [0.16] [0.15] [0.11] 
R2 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 










Figure 4.1: Search Volume Index from 2004 to 2013 
This figure shows the natural log of the search volume index (SVI) from 2004 to 2013. We follow the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and 
define recession period from December 2007 to June 2009. The financial crisis period is within the dashed lines. SVI_Div is the search volume index if the 
search term in Google includes “dividend” or “dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or “dividend payout”. SVI_DT is the search 
volume index for the topic “dividend” from Google Trends. This includes searches in different text strings and various languages as long as they are dividend-


























































































































































































Figure 4.2: Dividend Sentiment, Dividend Initiation and Increase Rate 
This figure shows the time-series relation between dividend sentiment, the dividend 
initiation rate, and the dividend increase rate from 2004 to 2013. ASVI_Div is the abnormal 
search volume index if the search term includes “dividend” or “dividends” or “payout” or 
“dividend stocks” or “dividend yield” or “dividend payout”. The initiation rate expresses 
new payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving nonpayers from t-1. The rate at which 
firms increase dividends expresses increase payers at quarter t as a percentage of surviving 
payers from t-1. To eliminate seasonality from the dividend initiation rate and the dividend 









Figure 4.3: Dividend Sentiment and the Propensity to Pay Dividends 
This figure shows the time series relation between dividend sentiment and the propensity to 
pay dividends from 2004 to 2013. ASVI_Div is the abnormal search volume index if the 
search term includes “dividend” or “dividends” or “payout” or “dividend stocks” or 
“dividend yield” or “dividend payout”. The propensity to pay is the difference between the 
actual fraction of firms paying dividends in a given quarter minus the expected fraction of 
firms paying dividends. The expected value equals to the average predicted value from the 
Fama-MacBeth logit regression including four firm characteristics suggested by Fama and 
French (2001) in Panel A: asset growth, firm’s size percentile relative to NYSE firms, M/B 
and earnings divided by book assets. We include two additional risk controls suggested by 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) in Panel B: systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. To eliminate 
seasonality from the propensity to pay dividends (ASVI_Div), we regress the ratio on quarter 






Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Panel A. Firm characteristics  
NYP The NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e., the 
percentage of NYSE firms having equal or smaller 
capitalization than firm i in quarter t.  
Source: Compustat 
M/B Book assets (item 44)  minus book value of equity 
(item 60+item 52) plus market value of equity (item 
12*item 61), all divided by book assets (item 44) 
Source: Compustat 
dA/A The difference between book assets (item 44) and 
lagged book assets, all divided by lagged book 
assets  
Source: Compustat 
E/A Earnings before extraordinary items (item 8) plus 
interest expense (item 22) plus income statement 
deferred tax (item 35), all divided by book assets 
(item 44) 
Source: Compustat 
Panel B. Risk 
Systematic_risk The standard deviation of the predicted value from 
a regression of a firm’s daily excess stock returns 
(raw returns less the riskless rate) on the market 
factor (i.e., the value-weighted market return less 
the riskless rate). One firm-quarter observation of 
systematic risk is calculated using firm-specific 
daily stock returns within one quarter.  
Source: Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) 
Idiosyncratic_risk The standard deviation of residuals from the above 
regression used to define systematic risk.  
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